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     The main argument relates to an analysis of the essays written by 
Ernest Mason Satow in 1866, known as Eikoku Sakuron in Japanese, and 
also to an analysis of British diplomacy at the time of the civil war and 
during the Meiji Restoration in 1868-69. The major reason why these two 
areas should be examined is that the common understanding of them, which 
Japanese historiography has traditionally defined as historical truth, turns 
out not to be true. The main idea, which it was planned to argue in this 
thesis, was to emphasise the efforts of Satow during the Meiji Restoration, 
because Japanese historiography has consistently defined Eikoku Sakuron 
as the milestone for Japanese political modernization. In other words 
without Satow, nineteenth-century Japanese could never have promoted 
their remarkable national transformation. This modernization was 
connected with British diplomacy. Japanese historiography asserts that 
thanks to the British, who had supported the anti-feudal forces, the 
Japanese could found their modern state in such a short period. These two 
historical assumptions are viewed as common sense even in present 
Japanese society.  
     However, through this research, it must now be recognised that the 
tenets defined by orthodox Japanese historiography cannot be accepted in 
wider academic argument, because what the Japanese have always believed 
is largely refuted by British and other sources. Regarding Eikoku Sakuron, 
although it was read by some Japanese, it did not create a huge psychological 
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impact in nineteenth-century Japan. Satow’s argument was revolutionary, 
but it can hardly be defined as the guideline for eventual modernization. So 
why has Japanese historiography clung to its ideas and definition? When 
this question was asked, the direction for this thesis became established.  
     The Japanese interpretation of the Meiji Restoration was established 
not to pursue historical truth but to justify political actions. In Japanese 
historiography, there is a tendency that when historians discuss the Meiji 
Restoration, they revere it unconditionally, whereas when discussing 
feudalism, they do not analyse it fairly. The Meiji Restoration will be argued 
more objectively in this thesis. It will become the opportunity to challenge 
traditional Japanese historiography.  
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The history of Japan’s political transformation in the late nineteenth 
century has been written many times. A largely closed and feudal society at 
the time of Commodore Perry’s (1794-1858) visit in 1853, within 15 years its 
governmental structure was revolutionised and many of the assumptions 
which Japanese people held, both about their internal social relationships 
and their national identity, were significantly questioned. It is commonplace 
that the Tokugawa Shogunate failed to cope with the crises in Japan caused 
by the arrival of the foreigners, and that its enemies, particularly in the 
southern provinces, sought to exploit its evident weakness in their own bid 
for power. Perry’s initial communications caused confusion within the 
government, yet these early contacts did not in themselves undermine the 
regime. By 1858, however, the government of the Shogun (Tycoon) had been 
pressed into treaty agreements to open important ports to international 
commerce, thereby threatening internal economic stability and a breakdown 
of public order. Impotent to expel the foreigners, increasingly discredited 
among sections of a feudal nobility effectively independent within their own 
domains, and unable to prevent a resurgent and violent nationalist 
movement which saw disorder in the capital and attacks on foreign 
residents, the Shogunate delayed the inevitable by means of the London 
Protocol in 1862 – effectively postponing the opening of major ports for a 
further five years.  
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For the Tycoon, though, the crisis would not go away. His standing as 
the ruler of Japan was beginning to be doubted, both by the Western powers 
who had signed treaties with his government and, more alarmingly, by 
elements within Japan. Was his regime fit to defend the nation? A diplomatic 
rift with Britain following the death of a merchant led to a naval 
bombardment of Kagoshima in 1863. Shimonoseki was likewise attacked in 
1864 after foreign shipping had been fired on from shore installations. In 
1865 a combined naval demonstration, led by the British, compelled a treaty 
ratification which the Japanese had wished to avoid. Increasingly isolated in 
Edo, the last of the Tokugawa Shoguns renounced his political status in 
November 1867; within weeks, the nation was plunged into a civil war. The 
victors in this struggle were the rulers and samurais of Satsuma (modern 
Kagoshima) and Choshu (modern Yamaguchi) who had rallied around the 
imperial bloodline. Consigned for centuries to political obscurity in Kyoto, 
the Imperial Court thereby emerged in 1868 at the head of a new political 
model for Japan in what has always been known as the Meiji Restoration. In 
1869 all feudal lords returned their hereditary fiefs to the Emperor. In 1871 
they were ordered to leave their territories, receiving, as compensation, 
noble titles under the new regime. Japan was fast developing as a 
centralised state.  
Important questions arise from this narrative, many of them related 
to the understanding of events held by subsequent generations of the 
Japanese themselves. Where did mid nineteenth-century ideas for 
constitutional change come from? And what was the role of foreign, 
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particularly British, diplomatic intervention in bringing about these 
profound changes? Japanese historiography has been consistent on these 
points, long ascribing a crucial contribution to the development of political 
understanding among educated Japanese to essays written in 1866 by a 
young translator at the British Legation - Ernest Satow. In the 1860s, too, 
British diplomacy was supposedly sympathetic to the restoration of imperial 
authority and thereby instrumental in ending the feudal administration of 
the Tokugawa clan. In both scholarship and popular perspective, these 
fundamental assumptions have stood the test of time and have for long been 
accepted as historical truths, yet the documentary evidence for both is either 
non-existent or else too often dependent on subsequent and 
politically-inspired distortions of events and motives.  
This thesis aims to test these inherited truths. It is thus not concerned 
simply with telling the story of how Japan emerged into international 
politics and the world economy in the mid nineteenth century. It is as much 
concerned with the making and transmission of Japanese historiography as 
it is with unravelling the complexities of Japanese history between 1853 and 
1868. It will attempt to establish what is real and what might more usefully 
be regarded as imaginary during these two turbulent decades which forged 
the modern nation state. It examines how and why the Japanese population 
and Japanese scholarship came to believe so much that has been proved, by 
this research, to be in many instances little more than a reassuring version 
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     Ernest Satow (1843-1929) was one of Britain’s leading diplomats in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He was also acknowledged in 
both China and Japan as a prominent oriental scholar. Satow’s fascination 
with the Far East developed early in life; even at the age of 17, as a student 
at University College London, his ambition was to go out to Asia. In 1861, he 
declined the opportunity for further study at Cambridge in order to apply for 
admission to the Foreign Office as an interpreter. Satow was accepted, went 
out to China for training, and in 1862 arrived in Japan. Nigel Brailey rightly 
concluded that: 
 
          Satow’s claim to be Britain’s greatest ever Japanophile goes  
         right back to the point at which, according to his own account, he 
         decided he wanted a Japan career.1 
 
Satow worked continually at the British Legation in Japan until 1869. He 
was in the country, therefore, during some of the most turbulent years in 
modern Japanese history in which the old political order, based essentially 
on its traditional feudal social structure, gradually fell apart. He returned 
there after leave in 1870, witnessing now the early years of the new Meiji 
regime. He was moved to Siam in 1884 where he remained until 1887. From 
1889 to 1893 he was posted to Uruguay, and then to Morocco, until he 
returned to Tokyo as British Minister in 1895. Although the earlier 
commercial treaty had already been renegotiated and revised in 1894, 
                                                 
1 Nigel Brailey, ‘Sir Ernest Satow, Japan and Asia: The trials of a diplomat in the age of 
high imperialism’, The Historical Journal, 35, 1 (1992), 116.  
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between 1895 and 1900 Satow was still able to strengthen Anglo-Japanese 
ties and he was still in Tokyo when the system of extraterritoriality was 
officially abolished in 1899. His final appointment was to China, as British 
Minister, after the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. He retired from the diplomatic 
service in 1906, thereafter devoting his time to writing. Among his works, 
the best known was his book A Guide to Diplomatic Practice in 1917. 
Although not generally regarded as an original work, it remained for decades 
a manual in matters of diplomatic practice, areas of international law, and 
the conduct of international relations between the world’s major nations. It 
was revised several times prior to its fifth edition in 1979.2 
     The main purpose of this thesis, however, is not consider Satow’s 
activities or reputation as a senior British diplomat in both Japan and China 
at the height of his career in the 1890s and 1900s. This research will focus on 
his early years in Japan in the 1860s where he had the opportunity to be, at 
least to some extent, a participant in the upheavals of Japanese politics. 
Such a study is valuable, not only in its own right, but also in the context of 
Britain’s growing association with Japan after the country began the process 
of opening to foreign trade and Western influence from the mid 1850s 
onwards. From the first years of Western trade at Japanese ports, Britain 
was Japan’s most important commercial partner. In 1860, 55 per cent of 
Western vessels trading at Yokohama were British－71 per cent in 1861 and 
                                                 
2 Satow’s career and writings are discussed in Thomas Otte, A Guide to Diplomacy: The 
writings of Sir Ernest Satow, (Leicester, 1996). There is a biographical account 
specifically of Satow’s diplomatic career relating to Japan in Peter Kornicki, ‘Ernest 
Mason Satow’, in Hugh Cortazzi and Gordon Daniels (eds.), Britain and Japan 
1859-1991: themes and personalities, (London, 1991), 76-85.  
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81 per cent by 1862.3 In the following decades British investment became 
important for Japan’s early industrialization; indeed, without its ties with 
British trade and finance it is unlikely that Japan could have transformed 
itself so rapidly. 
     Comparable ties with Britain existed in the wider political and 
international arena: both nations had strategic interests in the Pacific. For 
much of the nineteenth century British diplomacy had sought to limit 
Russian influence in the Balkans, in central Asia, and along the northern 
frontiers of the Indian empire. By the late nineteenth century that anxiety 
extended also to the Far East where the British Government became worried 
about Russian expansion eastwards. By 1860 Russia had seized the vast 
Amur and Ussuri territories from China and founded the port of Vladivostok 
on the Pacific coast. Even Japan might be in danger. In 1860 the British 
Ambassador in St. Petersburg warned his government of Russian designs on 
the northern island of Hokkaido.4 Russia moved into the Ili Valley on the 
north-west borders of China in the early 1880s and, equally alarming, began 
her construction of the trans-Siberian railway in 1891. Swift and militarily 
significant communication with the Pacific would now bring northern China, 
especially the province of Manchuria, within Russia’s reach. 
     The perceived Russian threat to Britain’s trading and political 
supremacy in the Far East made Japan appear increasingly important. 
                                                 
3 Yuzo Kato, ‘The Opening of Japan and the Meiji Restoration, 1837-72’, in Ian Nish 
and Yoichi Kibata (eds.), The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations: Vol. I., The 
Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1600-1930, (London, 2000), 75.  
4 Dai Nihon Kobunsho－Bakumatsu Gaikoku Kankei Bunsho, Vol. 43 (University of 
Tokyo Press, 1991), 11.  
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Hence co-operating with Japan was not just economic. In the late nineteenth 
century Japan emerged as a naval force in the region and the British soon 
came to recognise that good relations with a nation itself wary of Russia was 
to mutual advantage. For their own strategic reasons the Japanese were 
determined to thwart Russian encroachments into Korea, while they saw 
Manchuria as an area where their own developing economic and 
international political ambitions might be fulfilled. In 1894-5 Japan crushed 
China in war, both on land and at sea. The Treaty of Shimonoseki which 
followed marked the rise of Japan as a Pacific power and hence as a most 
useful ally for Britain.5 The Anglo-Japanese agreement of 1902 was the first 
of Britain’s international accords in the early twentieth century. Ententes 
with France and Russia followed in 1904 and 1907 but it was the Japanese 
alliance which marked the end of Britain’s long-held stance of splendid 
isolation in diplomacy. 
     This new study of Anglo-Japanese relations in their earliest years is 
thus important because it throws more light on a relationship which 
influenced global international relations up to and beyond the First World 
War. This thesis will analyse those early years and in particular the 
influence of Satow, particularly through two essays which he wrote in 1866 
and which were published in The Japan Times on 16 March and 19 May. The 
main task is to assess how important Satow’s essays became for the 
                                                 
5 For recent analyses of this theme, see Yuichi Inoue, ‘From Unequal Treaty to the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1867-1902’, Shigeru Murashima, ‘The Opening of the 
Twentieth Century and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1895-1923’, and David Steeds, 
‘Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1902-23: A Marriage of Convenience’, all in Ian Nish and 
Yoichi Kibata (eds.), The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations: Vol. I, 131-158, 159-196, 
and 197-223.  
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Japanese in terms of their subsequent modernization. A re-examination of 
the diplomatic relationship between Britain and Japan during the 
Restoration period will thereby also be undertaken.  
     Why should Satow’s essays be studied? It is to challenge traditional 
academic ideas by proposing a new one, and then to determine whether that 
new idea is academically acceptable. Of course, the main purpose of this 
thesis is to establish the truth, not to disparage Satow’s reputation or 
political achievements. However, while researching his diplomatic activities 
during the Restoration period several facts have emerged which are not 
consistent with what Japanese historiography has always defined as 
common knowledge. After considering the reason and background to that, 
there emerged one conclusion: Satow’s diplomatic activities and opinions in 
the 1860s were never evaluated from a fair perspective. This research aims 
to explain why in Japan that has been so. In so doing it is necessary to 
reconsider British diplomacy with Japan during the Meiji Restoration 
period, because in Japanese historiography all Satow’s diplomatic activities 
were considered to represent the British Legation’s policy.   
     During the research, the direction of this thesis had changed. Initially, 
its main theme was to define the role of Satow during the Restoration period, 
and, by emphasising his importance, to identify him as a major contributor 
to Japanese modernization. In Japan, he has always been highly evaluated 
and the Japanese generally have considered that without him, 
nineteenth-century Japanese could never have understood the essence of 
modernization. However, in the middle of the research those notions were 
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abandoned, because Satow’s standing as defined within Japanese 
historiography cannot be proved by British official documents and a range of 
other primary materials. A new purpose for this thesis thereby emerged. 
Why do modern Japanese esteem him so much without sufficient proof? By 
analysing Satow’s works and the political background to the Meiji 
Restoration, a new understanding about him will be created.  
 
     How was this high evaluation of Satow formed? Certainly, 
eyewitnesses, both British and Japanese, honoured him. Algernon B. Mitford 
(1837-1916), who worked with him at the British Legation in the 1860s, 
claimed that Satow supplanted traditional Dutch ties with the Japanese by 
thoroughly researching Japanese history and traditions.6 He concluded that 
the British Minister, Harry Parkes (1828-85), had then been able to promote 
British diplomacy more efficiently because he was supported by the able 
Satow.7 Also, according to Bernard Allen, a contemporary who followed 
Satow’s career, the Japanese minister of Foreign Affairs, Higashikuze 
Michitomi, wrote a letter to Satow when the latter returned to London on 
leave in 1868. In it, he showed great appreciation for Satow’s contribution to 
the Meiji Restoration.8   
     Satow’s reputation was further strengthened by his essays. The essays 
which he had written in The Japan Times were edited as a pamphlet and 
sold to the public. As a result, these essays were known as Eikoku Sakuron, 
                                                 
6 Lord Redesdale, Memories, Vol. I (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1915), 377. 
7 Ibid., 377. 
8 Bernard Allen, The Rt. Hon. Sir Ernest Satow (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner 
& Co. Ltd., 1933), 79. 
16 
 
which means the British diplomacy in Japanese.9 After this, he became well 
known among Japanese and his essays held a large psychological impact. 
The main argument of Eikoku Sakuron was to suggest the foundation of a 
new regime for the purpose of establishing good diplomatic relations with the 
Western states.10 His proposal was revolutionary for nineteenth-century 
Japanese, because in 1866 they remained under the domination of the 
Tycoon and, for them, feudalism was essential to maintain the Japanese 
national administration. Since Matthew Perry’s arrival in 1853, the 
Japanese began to have diplomatic relations with the West and also, from 
1858, they established commercial relations. As a result, especially in 
commercial aspects, it was becoming apparent that feudalism itself was 
outdated. The Japanese innovated step by step to keep up with international 
diplomacy and commerce, but the existence of the Tycoon’s Government was 
always the precondition for innovation and nineteenth-century Japanese had 
no sense of national administration without it. Thus, Eikoku Sakuron was 
judged to provide a huge insight for the Japanese. Indeed, two years after 
the publication of Satow’s essays the Japanese had begun a civil war and 
within a short period the Shogunate was overthrown. Reviewing these 
historical events, the Japanese concluded that Satow and Eikoku Sakuron 
were necessary for the Meiji Restoration. Modern Japanese historiography is 
based on that attitude.  
                                                 
9 Ian Ruxton, The Diaries and Letters of Sir Ernest Mason Satow (1843-1929)-A 
Scholar-Diplomat in Japan (The Edwin Mellen Press, 1998), 50. 
10 Grace Fox, Britain and Japan (Oxford at the Clarendon press, 1969), 179. 
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     Yet at the same time, Japanese have also criticised Satow’s activities 
because he interfered in Japanese domestic affairs. The main representative 
of this idea is Tokutomi Soho (1863-1957), who lived in the same era as 
Satow and who is a major contributor to Japanese historiography. In fact, 
Tokutomi has been judged to be a major Japanese scholar who contributed 
not only to establishing a Japanese historiography but also to establishing 
the common academic interpretation of the Meiji Restoration. Thus, he was 
defined as follows: 
 
         Tokutomi was one of the most prodigious historians  
         of modern Japan, and certainly one of its most brilliant  
         stylists.11 
 
He reviewed the Meiji Restoration; he had already recognised that the 
Mikado could be the symbol of unification for establishing the modern 
Japanese state at the time of the Meiji Restoration.12 He then concluded 
that the unbreakable line of the Imperial family was not only the symbol of 
Japanese unification but also the main essence of Japanese thinking in the 
search for identity or when honouring Japanese nationality, especially in the 
event of a national crisis.13 In consequence, Tokutomi became recognised as 
the back-bone of modern Japanese political culture.14 When the Japanese 
have argued about their culture, his statements and analysis are always 
                                                 
11 Peter Duss, ‘Whig History, Japanese Style: The Min’yusha Historians and the Meiji 
Restoration’, The Journal of Asian Studies, 33, 3 (1974), 420.  
12 Ken Yonehara, Tokutomi Soho－Nihon Nationalism no Kiseki (Tokyo: Chuo Kouron 
Shinsha, 2003), 170.  
13 Ibid., 170. 
14 Yasuo Hattori, Tokutomi Soho Ko (Kyoto: Doushisha Kouronsha, 1980), 3. 
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cited by historians.15 In 1936 he wrote an essay in which he pointed out the 
secret relationship between Satow and the Satsuma samurai, Saigo 
Takamori (1828-77). Saigo is recognised as one of the three heroes of the 
Meiji Restoration. According to Tokutomi, during their conversation Satow 
was said to have told Saigo: “please take care of the matter as best you 
can”.16 Because Saigo had anticipated Satow’s intention to say such a thing, 
he was said not to have replied.17  
     What was the background to Tokutomi writing about the above 
episode? Essentially, when modern Japanese academics discuss diplomatic 
relationships during the Meiji Restoration period, the following structure is 
held to be obvious: the British supported the rulers of Satsuma and Choshu, 
while the French supported the Tycoon’s Government. On that assumption, 
some modern Japanese have defined Satow as a British spy, and Tokutomi’s 
episode contributed to that theory. In fact, from that episode, the Japanese 
historian Kiyoshi Inoue honoured Saigo as heroic Japanese who possessed a 
well developed sense of nationalism.18 Inoue’s opinion suggests that the 
British Legation tried to provoke a civil war by sending Satow to the major 
Japanese samurais; the intention was to establish a puppet regime. By 
interpreting British diplomacy in this way some Japanese have criticised 
Satow severely, with the result that there are also several negative ideas 
about Eikoku Sakuron. Yet one thing is clear: both ideas share the same 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 1. 
16 Soho Tokutomi, Meiji Ishin to Edo Bakufu, Vol. II (Tokyo: Koudansha Gakujyutsu 
Bunko, 1979), 275. 
17 Ibid., 275. 
18 Kiyoshi Inoue, Nihon Gendaishi I, Meiji Ishin (University of Tokyo Press, 2001), 255. 
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belief that without Satow, the Japanese could not have achieved 
modernization. Furthermore, Eikoku Sakuron became a milestone for it.  
     There is no doubt about Satow’s place based on an analysis through 
Eikoku Sakuron, but, from a different perspective, there emerges another 
idea: whether, indeed, Satow should be seen at all as a major British figure 
during the Restoration. The reason is that his name was not written in 
Japanese official documents. It fact the first date when his name appears in 
official documents of the Tycoon’s Government was 9 October 1865.19 And, 
even then, the reference was not about diplomacy but merely to the 
negotiation about constructing a new house for the British consul in 
Hakodate because the old house had burned down.20 It was no doubt a 
worthy topic, but could hardly be defined as an important negotiation in 
which Satow had represented the British Legation. Because Satow had 
arrived in Japan in 1862, traditional Japanese historiography might suggest 
that Satow’s name should have appeared earlier. Furthermore, as Mitford 
wrote, Satow had mastered Japanese, so he should have been noticed before 
1865. However, Japanese official documents refute that notion, which 
challenges the established idea of Satow’s significance.  
     Also, in Eikoku Sakuron itself, there emerges a new reason to challenge 
established assumptions: can all Satow’s ideas in there be truly defined as 
original? The following facts are the background to that question.  
                                                 
19 Shigetoshi Kusuya, Ernest Satow no Dokusho Note (Tokyo: Yushodo Shuppan, 2009), 
223. 
20 Ibid., 223. 
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First, in 1861, the British vice-admiral Hope sent a report to the 
Admiralty in which he cited a well-known pamphlet, the main topic of which 
was: “The Tycoon is not a sovereign of Japan”. Secondly, in March 1866, 
when Satsuma samurai, Matsuki Kouan, proposed his idea for future 
diplomatic relations between Britain and Japan when he was in London, 
most of his ideas were the same as those which were discussed in Eikoku 
Sakuron. Furthermore, he proposed them just a few days apart from when 
Satow wrote in The Japan Times. Eikoku Sakuron and Matsuki’s proposals 
were confirmed as citing the same material, which was British Minister 
Rutherford Alcock’s memorandum in 1864. Thirdly, a Prussian mission 
visited and stayed in Japan from 1860-61. It was just for six months, but 
when its staff published a book in 1864 they insisted that the Tycoon was not 
the representative of Japan. Finally, a Swiss diplomat, Aime Humbert, 
visited Japan in 1864. He stayed ten months in Japan but in the same year, 
when he published a book, he likewise insisted that the Tycoon was not the 
national sovereign of Japan. 
The one common point among the above facts is that before Satow 
wrote Eikoku Sakuron there were already Westerners who claimed that the 
Tycoon was not the national sovereign of Japan. Also, in the case of Matsuki, 
it was hard to conclude that the timing was just coincidence. Thus, it can be 
argued that Satow’s idea in Eikoku Sakuron was not his own and that he 
just edited ideas which already existed.  
     Why, then, did only Satow’s ideas spread among the Japanese? The 
obvious reason was that his ideas were translated into Japanese, whereas 
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Hope’s report and Alcock’s memorandum were official documents and so 
would not be published. Likewise, the books written by the Prussian staff 
and Humbert in 1864 were not translated into Japanese in the 1860s, 
thereby denying nineteenth-century Japanese an opportunity to read them. 
By contrast, Satow himself actually described the process of translating his 
essays into Japanese,21 and recorded the episode when the former feudal 
lord of Uwajima, Date Munenari (1818-92), told him that he had read Eikoku 
Sakuron. 22  Because Eikoku Sakuron was translated, the Japanese not 
unnaturally concluded that everything in Satow’s essays was his own 
original analysis. This notion remains in modern times, hence the need to 
challenge perceptions about Eikoku Sakuron.  
     Then, of course, Satow’s role means a reconsideration of diplomacy at 
the British Legation during the Restoration period. Had the British Legation 
been working to establish a puppet regime after the civil war? Evidence for 
why modern Japanese have interpreted diplomatic relations in this way 
comes from a book in 1917 by Shibusawa Eiichi (1840-1931), formerly a 
samurai of the Tycoon’s Government. In it, he wrote: by requesting British 
support, the Daimio and samurais of Satsuma tried to achieve their ends, 
and that by the same method the Tycoon’s Government was dependent on 
France.23 Shibusawa was on the staff when the last Shogun, Tokugawa 
Yoshinobu (1837-1913), sent his younger brother, Akitake, to Europe as his 
                                                 
21 Ernest Satow, A Diplomat in Japan (London: Seeley, Service & Co. Ltd., 1921), 159. 
22 Ibid., 179. 




deputy in 1867. After the foundation of the Meiji Government, Shibusawa’s 
efforts were acknowledged and he became recognised as a founder of 
Japanese capitalism. Since this major figure had so analysed diplomatic 
relations during the Restoration period, Japanese historiography became 
heavily influenced thereafter by referring to his analysis. It developed as the 
major premise within Japanese historiography, and an argument about the 
possibility of colonisation at the time of the Restoration thereby began.  
     In modern Japan, the principal assumption about the Meiji Restoration 
is that the country faced the danger of colonisation, implying that without a 
rapid promotion of modernization Japan would be colonised by Western 
states. Furthermore, during the ensuing struggle to modernize both the 
British and French were involved in domestic affairs through their support 
of either Satsuma-Choshu or the Tycoon’s Government. How did this idea 
become so commonly accepted in modern Japanese historiography? One 
historian, Akira Tanaka, explained it in his 2007 book. According to him, it 
started in 1951 when Shigeki Tohyama published a book asserting that 
although in an economic respect there was a possibility of subordination to 
Western states, nevertheless in political and military terms there was no 
danger of colonisation. 24  To counter-argue, the historian Kiyoshi Inoue 
published a book in the same year emphasising the possibility of colonisation 
by pointing out various historical facts.25 Since 1951 many historians have 
discussed the possibility of colonisation, with the majority on Inoue’s side. 
                                                 
24 Akira Tanaka, Bakumatsu Ishin-shi no Kenkyu (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Koubunkan, 
1996), 67-70. 
25 Ibid., 67-70. 
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Then, in 1981, when Takuji Shibahara published his book, the matter 
seemed to be settled. He supported Inoue and criticised Tohyama, and 
formulated a historical theory about the possibility of colonisation.26 The 
debate ended when Tohyama conceded some of the ideas of Inoue.27 
     However, can diplomatic relations in the Restoration period be so 
simply defined? Several historians have questioned that idea: Takashi Ishii 
is one of them.28 He claimed in 1961 that the major intention of Western 
diplomacy towards Japan was to establish a market for selling products and 
purchasing materials.29 By stressing that, he concluded that the Westerners 
had expected to undermine feudalism in Japan which would otherwise reject 
the growth of capitalism.30 He claimed, though, that the Westerners had no 
intention of colonising the Japanese mainland, although his idea is not 
accepted in Japanese historiography. 
     The above historical debate at least demonstrated one thing: that 
Japanese scholars had already defined the diplomacy of the British Legation 
and felt no need for any reconsideration. However, after the research in this 
thesis, it becomes apparent that to subscribe to existing Japanese 
historiography will be impossible. One major reason is because the Japanese 
do not cite any British materials. British records contain no accounts which 
support what the Japanese have regarded as common sense. As a result, the 
Japanese interpretation of British diplomacy collapses. In January 1868, 
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after the Battle of Toba-Fushimi when the civil war started, Lord Stanley, as 
Foreign Secretary, sent the following direction to Parkes:  
 
         Her Majesty’s Government desired that you should remain 
         neutral in regard to internal strife, and confine yourself to  
         requiring from whatever party may be in the ascendant a strict  
         observance of Treaties, and protection for British subjects and  
         their property.31 
 
Stanley clearly wrote nothing about involvement in any civil war. He also, 
judging from this statement, made it apparent that the British Government 
was only concerned about upholding the 1858 Treaty and protecting the 
property of British subjects. This thesis will not only reconsider British 
diplomacy but also the background to why the Japanese were compelled to 
define as common knowledge things which could not be supported from any 
British point of view. By doing so, it will be possible not only to reappraise 
Japanese historiography but also to assess British diplomacy more fairly.  
     How does British historiography, and how do present British 
historians, analyse Japan of the Meiji Restoration period? In his essay of 
1997, Alan Macfarlane claimed that there were several common issues 
between Britain and Japan after analysing points of geography, national 
governance, demography and their histories. 32  The following was his 
conclusion: 
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          If the Armada off England or the fleets of the Mongols off 
          Japan had not been destroyed by storms, if William had not  
          conquered England or Perry arrived in Japan, their histories  
          would have been very different.33 
 
This suggested that for British and other Western historians the Meiji 
Restoration was nothing but an inevitable historical procedure to establish a 
new society, since both British and Japanese history possessed some 
common historical trends. Thus, although for the Japanese the Meiji 
Restoration may have been an unpredictable event, it was not so surprising 
for the British. This underlying attitude could be one aspect of the British 
point of view concerning the Meiji Restoration.  
     As part of the background to the Meiji Restoration, Japanese 
historiography assumed that because the Tycoon’s Government had 
undertaken successive diplomatic failures, the Japanese mainland was 
threatened by the Western states. Nineteenth-century Japanese thus 
recognised that the old structure of feudalism would have to be overthrown. 
This attitude provided the justification for Satsuma and Choshu to establish 
the modern state by defining the Mikado as the national sovereign of Japan. 
This line of analysis points towards the conclusion that either the arrival of 
Perry in 1853 or the signing of the commercial treaties in 1858 was the 
turning point in Japanese history.  
     This analysis could be deemed correct because one British historian 
shared the same idea.34 To that extent both British and Japanese writing 
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contain a common idea about the causation of the Meiji Restoration, unless, 
of course, some British historians have simply followed the guidelines laid 
down by Japanese historiography.  
     However, is it really possible to say that the Meiji Restoration occurred 
because of the political and diplomatic failures of the Tycoon’s Government? 
In an essay in 1975, Conrad Totman questioned that academic analysis; 
more than that, he tried to evaluate the performance of the Tycoon’s 
Government. According to him, the Tycoon’s Government started to create 
the new Japanese society which Totman called, a new symbiosis. The effect 
of that had begun to emerge in 1867 but did not have enough time to 
mature.35 Judging from this approach, it could be said that the reason for 
overthrowing the Tycoon’s Government in 1868 was not because it could not 
keep up with the new trend but because it did not have sufficient opportunity 
to establish this new symbiotic society. Totman wrote: 
 
The Tokugawa could have had their support on the new  
basis, not the old; time would not flow backward. And so  
other men forged the modern alliance of bureaucrat and  
aristocrat and called it Meiji Japan.36 
 
His conclusion was at least evidence that not all Western scholars accepted 
everything as defined by orthodox Japanese historiography.  
 
     An essentially British attitude can also be applied to defining the 
relationship between Ernest Satow and Saigo Takamori. Although there 
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exist various for and against assessments, Japanese historiography 
generally evaluates Satow highly because he was seen as the embodiment of 
British diplomacy which allowed and supported nineteenth-century 
Japanese to promote political and economic modernization. In short, the 
presence of Satow in Japan in the 1860s became part of the justification for 
establishing the Meiji regime. Meanwhile, Saigo was given the highest 
evaluation within Japanese historiography because not only had he directed 
the Restoration but he also protected the Japanese mainland from the 
Western states. In fact, in present Japanese society, it is a commonly shared 
belief that without Saigo the Meiji Restoration could neither have been 
promoted nor completed. For those reasons, the existence of both Satow and 
Saigo were necessary to understand properly the Meiji Restoration.  
     Yet there are several British historians who did not follow the analysis 
provided by Japanese historiography. In 1968, Gordon Daniels explained 
that the main focus for British diplomacy towards the Japanese was just to 
expand commercial activities in Japan and to secure British subjects there.37 
Then he concluded: 
 
          But the political conclusions which the Foreign Office  
drew from this position were very different from those of  
Satow and Mitford whose memoirs have influenced so  
much historical writing. 38 
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His conclusion was again evidence that not all Western historians followed 
the tenets of Japanese historiography. In fact, regarding Satow’s diplomatic 
activities in 1867, Daniels claimed that it was hard to decide whether Satow 
really embodied the official diplomacy of the British Legation.39 Daniels’s 
analysis showed that British historiography did not trust Satow completely, 
even though Satow’s diary and memoir are treated as valuable primary 
sources for the Meiji Restoration.  
     Such ambivalence also applies to the assessment of Saigo. In an essay 
of 1994, Charles L. Yates analysed Saigo’s contribution to the Meiji 
Restoration. In one respect, he endorsed the orthodox evaluation made by 
Japanese historiography of Saigo. Likewise of the other two figures who 
along with Saigo are identified as the three major heroes of the 
Restoration.40 However, in terms of the future vision of these men after 
promoting modernization, Yates claimed that none of them predicted 
accurately what would happen next.41 His analysis thus did not accept the 
definitions of Japanese historiography entirely; more than that, he might 
even have questioned why those three were praised as the major heroes of 
the Meiji Restoration at all. In fact, Saigo committed suicide in 1877 after 
instigating the rebellion against the Meiji regime which he had devoted 
himself so completely to found. Had Saigo held a clear future vision, perhaps, 
that final outcome would have been avoided. That was one element to the 
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background when Yates reconsidered the role of Saigo. The following was his 
overall conclusion: 
 
         Between 1858 and 1877, Saigo’s world changed beyond  
recognition, in no small part because of the things Saigo  
did, and so perhaps the greatest tragedy of his life is simply  
that he rendered himself obsolete.42 
 
This contradicts the orthodox analysis of Japanese historiography, and 
illustrates one aspect of how British historiography has defined Saigo and 
the Meiji Restoration. In the above ways, British and Western 
historiography generally is useful for this thesis, since it can maintain a 
scholarly neutrality and has not been affected by the political considerations 
which underlie so much of Japanese writing about the events of this era.   
 
     The most important materials used to promote the arguments in this 
thesis will be, of course, the primary sources. When comparing British and 
Japanese official documents, the former are much better preserved. At the 
National Archives in London are preserved documents dating from 1853 to 
the foundation of the Meiji Government in 1868. There are also not only 
official despatches between the British Government and the Legation, when 
located both at Edo after 1858 and later at Yokohama after violent attacks in 
1861 and 1862 forced a temporary relocation, but also reports from local 
consuls and individual Legation staff. Promoting arguments in terms of 
British policy is, therefore, comparatively simple. By contrast, analysing the 
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Japanese stand point is more difficult because the official documents of the 
Tycoon’s Government were not well kept. In fact, it has at times been 
reported that in very old Japanese houses official documents have been 
discovered where used to strengthen a thick papered sliding door.43 After 
the foundation of the Meiji Government, official documents started to be 
preserved or edited in books, but in the case of earlier documents there was 
always less chance of survival. Furthermore, although there are preserved a 
few documents, those are hard to read for modern Japanese because the 
language of the nineteenth century was very different from modern 
Japanese in terms of grammar, style of writing, and the method of using 
Chinese characters.  
     There is one edited work which has recovered many official documents. 
It is Dai Nihon Kobunsho. Books in this series have been edited by the 
University of Tokyo (until 1947 the Imperial University of Tokyo) since the 
foundation of the Meiji Government, and they have made efforts to recover 
more each year. These books allow some understanding of Japanese 
diplomacy; unfortunately, the latest volume is 51, dealing with the year 
1861. The intention was to edit all documents since Perry’s arrival in 1853, 
but in almost 100 years since the work started only eight years have been 
covered. The main reason for that is that the documents are not preserved in 
one place but in universities, local museums and in private possession, which 
means that the documents have to be borrowed. Also, research is required in 
                                                 




foreign National Archives, not only in Britain but also in the U.S., France, 
the Netherlands, and Russia. Therefore, these volumes do not cover the civil 
war in 1868 or even the bombardment of Kagoshima in 1863 which followed 
the Richardson affair. These are major historical events discussed in this 
thesis. However, given the paucity of official Japanese documents, the 
Japanese perspective on developments is somewhat disadvantaged.  
 
     In terms of primary published materials, those are well preserved in 
both Britain and Japan. The published primary materials for the British side 
will be the memoirs written by Satow, Mitford, and Alexander Siebold and 
the book written by Rutherford Alcock (1809-97). All these men worked at 
the British Legation at the time of the Meiji Restoration. Satow, Mitford and 
Siebold wrote their memoirs looking back upon the past, of course, but they 
nonetheless experienced the Restoration and so their opinions are valuable.44 
Furthermore, they wrote not only of their experiences but also they analysed 
Japanese domestic affairs and the personalities and behaviour of the major 
Japanese samurais. Through their writings, something of the Japanese point 
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of view is therefore apparent.45 For example, in their memoirs, both Satow 
and Mitford mentioned the Japanese samurais, Saigo Takamori and Goto 
Shojiro (1838-97) who are both recognised as contributors to the Meiji 
Restoration. As already explained, modern Japanese historians honour 
Saigo, almost excessively, and conclude that without him the Japanese could 
not have achieved the Restoration. Goto’s name is well known to the 
Japanese but he is considered a lesser influence than Saigo. However, 
judging from Satow and Mitford’s memoirs, that Japanese appraisal should 
be revised because both portray Goto as an intelligent samurai who had been 
making an enormous effort to learn about and understand the British 
parliamentary system and British national administration.46 Their memoirs 
effectively argue against orthodox Japanese historiography, hence their 
value in this thesis.  
     Although both Satow and Mitford wrote memoirs, Satow’s memoir 
must be regarded as more trustworthy because Satow mastered the 
Japanese language whereas Mitford could not. In a private letter, Mitford 
wrote: 
 
         I am beginning the language but we only had three  
lessons yet. It was too cold in the winter to do anything  
but shiver. I can speak the lingua franca of Yokohama,  
but good Japanese is a very different story.47 
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Mitford certainly met some major Japanese figures during the Restoration 
period, but his ability to recognise and analyse all aspects of Japanese 
national identity must, therefore, be in doubt.  
     As for Alcock’s book, it is a memoir, but because it was written while he 
was on leave in London it cannot cover all the historical events which took 
place while he was Minister in Japan. However, Parkes, who succeeded him, 
did not write a memoir, so Alcock’s work is useful as the only book written by 
a British Minister at that time. For example, in 1863 when his book was 
published, Alcock already claimed that the Mikado was the hereditary 
sovereign of Japan.48 This observation may not make any impact today, but 
it is important for this thesis because it shows that in 1863 the British 
Minister had already identified the Mikado’s superiority. When the British 
had earlier made their commercial treaty with the Tycoon, officially they had 
acknowledged that the Tycoon was the national sovereign of Japan. From 
Alcock’s statement, it is possible to argue that even in 1863 the British were 
already anticipating that the Japanese would instigate some form of political 
modernization. 
     Also, the British Library holds the papers of Austen H. Layard from his 
years as under-secretary at the Foreign Office in the 1860s, but, for the Meiji 
Restoration era in Japan, there were few documents relevant for this thesis. 
Thus Layard’s documents were used only where preserved in the National 
Archives.  
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     Useful as the above primary materials are, there is always the 
possibility that these authors wrote their books subjectively. Thus, by relying 
on them, the possibility exists that the thesis itself may contain bias. To 
avoid that possibility, using books written by Frederick Dickins and Bernard 
Allen also will be necessary. The former traced the life of Parkes and the 
latter the career of Satow. All were of the same generation. These two works 
maintained a balanced analysis because their authors did not write with a 
view to honour Parkes and Satow. Satow expressed the opinion that, from 
his experience, Dickins’s work was excessive in its praise of Parkes. 
Nevertheless, as historical sources, these two accounts are generally 
trustworthy.  
     For example, Dickins cites a letter which Parkes sent to Marcus 
Flowers, as consul in Nagasaki, on 14 October 1866 in which Parkes clearly 
claimed that the Mikado was the sovereign of Japan.49 Historically that is 
important, because even before the civil war the British Minister had 
already made that plain. As for Allen’s book, that will be valuable not only 
when covering Satow’s point of view but also for introducing the Japanese 
perspective. As already noted, Allen discussed the letter written by 
Higashikuze to Satow thereby focusing on the Japanese dimension. There 
are few Westerners who focused on both sides of the argument and analysis 
when they wrote their books. In that way, Allen’s book adds to our 
understanding.  
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     Furthermore, for analysing the historical process of the Meiji 
Restoration, books written by Captain F. Brinkley, G. H. Gubbins and 
Joseph Longford will be used. The main theme in their books was just to 
recount the history of Japan, and for that reason they appear less important. 
Yet all three authors were eye-witnesses of the Meiji Restoration, and 
because they were in Japan their descriptions of Japanese affairs remain of 
interest because they wrote what they saw and their writings contain less 
obvious bias when compared with many secondary materials. For example, 
Brinkley analysed the incident when the British, French and Dutch sent 
their fleets to the Sea of Hyogo in 1865, and he explained the background to 
it. 50  As already described when introducing Shibusawa’s historical 
publication, the Japanese asserted that it was because the Westerners were 
trying to interfere in Japanese domestic affairs that this incident had 
happened. However, as a witness of events, Brinkley completely refuted this.  
     Japanese eye-witnesses also left several materials. For example, 
Shibusawa left not only the books which discussed Tokugawa Yoshinobu but 
also one which recorded a series of interviews conducted with him between 
1909 and 1912. This is a precious record of the Tycoon’s own reflections. 
Nineteenth-century Japanese did not write memoirs, so Yoshinobu himself 
did not publish anything. However, Shibusawa’s interview made it possible 
to reach back to the last Shogun. For example, in 1909 Yoshinobu claimed 
that because the British had supported Satsuma and Choshu they sent their 
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fleet to the Sea of Hyogo in 1865. 51  His statement was proof that 
nineteenth-century Japanese commonly believed that the British took the 
side of opponents of the Tycoon’s Government and illustrates how the 
Japanese analysed diplomatic relations in 1860s. As Tycoon, his statement is 
perhaps more instructive than those of other Japanese.  
     In the meantime, books written by Katsu Kaishu (1823-99), Tanabe 
Taichi (1831-1915), Fukuchi Gen’ichiro (1841-1906) and Hayashi Tadasu 
(1850-1913) are all essential sources because these men not only witnessed 
the Restoration but were samurais of the Tycoon’s Government. All of them 
were in important positions in the Government, adding value to their 
analysis and description. However, Katsu’s book was different from the 
others in style because his pupils collected his oral opinions; his book was 
edited, not to read as sentences from him but to convey his opinions. 
Nevertheless, he was a major influence within the Tycoon’s Government. For 
example, in April 1868, thanks to his negotiation with Saigo, the imperial 
army cancelled both the full-scale attack against Edo castle and the 
execution of Yoshinobu. In fact, at the time of this negotiation, Katsu was 
confirmed as having a connection with Parkes through Satow.52 This fact 
proves how he was also recognised by the British as a major figure.  
     Compared with Katsu, Tanabe and Fukuchi may not be so famous in 
Japanese history, yet their books are necessary for this thesis because they 
contain historical arguments focused on the period of the Meiji Restoration. 
Also, the two men had similar experiences. While they were samurais of the 
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Tycoon’s Government, they both learned foreign languages and they went 
abroad as staff of official missions. Tanabe went abroad in 1863 and 1867, 
while Fukuchi went abroad in 1861 and 1865. Clearly, they had an 
international perspective and, in fact, their books were written accordingly, 
maintaining a balanced approach. Shibusawa’s book set out largely to justify 
Tokugawa Yoshinobu. Both he and Katsu, although they described the Meiji 
Restoration, leave the impression that they did not always tell the truth. By 
contrast, Tanabe and Fukuchi sought the truth in great detail. That attitude 
was apparent in their books because not only did they not honour the Meiji 
Government but they also severely criticised that of the Tycoon.  
     Both Tanabe and Fukuchi traced the beginning of the collapse of the 
Tycoon’s Government to Perry’s arrival in 1853. Tanabe claimed in 1898 that 
the reason was that the cabinet of the Tycoon’s Government did not try to 
make decisions. 53  In the meantime, in 1892 Fukuchi highlighted the 
diplomatic awkwardness of the Tycoon’s Government at the time of its 
negotiation with Perry and concluded that because the Government 
misunderstood the reason for and political background to Perry’s arrival, 
they started to lose control.54 Such appraisals were not found in the books by 
Katsu and Shibusawa. However, these explanations did not mean that 
Tanabe and Fukuchi hated the Tycoon’s Government; they simply tried to 
maintain a sense of fairness and there was no personal animosity. 
     A further reason why the descriptions by Shibusawa and Tanabe were 
considered more reliable is that they had cited much information from the 
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official documents of the British Parliament. 55  In the Japanese 
historiography, the official documents of the British Parliament were 
considered as historical records unavailable in Japanese materials.56 Thus, 
it was concluded that their books maintained fairness and neutrality 
regarding Japanese history because they did not analyse it from only one 
side. Of course, there is a small objection to that idea: the official documents 
of the British Parliament were usually edited for the purpose of justifying 
British policies, and so cannot be primary materials for a systematic analysis 
of Anglo-Japanese diplomacy. 57  Focusing on British official documents 
therefore meant following the British attitude unconditionally. However, 
since in Japanese historiography it had already been determined that the 
British presence in Japan in the nineteenth century had given both a direct 
and indirect psychological impact for Japan’s modernization,58 so, on that 
point, both Shibusawa and Tanabe’s works were necessary for this wider 
thesis.  
     A book written by Hayashi seems less useful for this thesis. He did not 
discuss so many historical incidents and its viewpoint was narrower, 
focusing only on certain matters and promoting argument based on specific 
opinions. For that reason his work is less trustworthy. Nevertheless he was 
an eye-witness of the Meiji Restoration and his work has contributed to the 
creation of existing Japanese historiography. Thus, by reviewing his 
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writings, not only the historical content but also an aspect of Japanese 
understanding about the Meiji Restoration can be analysed.  
     All the above materials, however, may have one big disadvantage: their 
authors were men of the Meiji era whose Japanese was unlike the modern 
language. Whenever possible their Japanese was translated into a modern 
form, but to maintain their main arguments and analysis most of their 
writings were left untouched. Thus, although their sentences can be read, 
the fact remains that modern Japanese cannot understand them in every 
detail. Compared with using the British primary materials, this is obviously 
a disadvantage.  
     There are, however, books written by Tokutomi Soho which are easy to 
read, because, although he was born during the time of the Tycoon’s 
Government, he started his career only after the foundation of the Meiji 
regime. In fact, Tokutomi discussed many historical incidents in detail and 
the breadth of his analysis was greater than that of either Tanabe or 
Fukuchi. More trust, therefore, came to be placed in his accounts.      
Tokutomi was the first Japanese who pointed out the secret relationship 
between Satow and Saigo, and, by referring to his book, modern Japanese 
came to conclude that the British had supported Satsuma at the time of the 
Meiji Restoration. This is one explanation of why Japanese scholars have 
long been depending on him. More than that, by analysing his work it can be 
seen that he always maintained the stance of praising the Meiji Government. 
Of course, in that way, unlike Tanabe and Fukuchi, his books cannot be 
treated as unbiased. For example, concerning Tokugawa Yoshinobu, 
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Tokutomi claimed in 1936 that by considering all political options, he was an 
able Shogun.59 However, he ended his assessment by adding the comment 
that he was dependent on French support. 60  Yet, he did not analyse 
Yoshinobu’s policies deeply, and, after reading his works, the impression is 
given that Yoshinobu was a traitor, which was why after 1868 the Meiji 
authorities turned to Tokutomi’s books to establish a politically suitable 
Japanese historiography. Despite this, Tokutomi is valuable for analysing 
the historical process surrounding the Meiji Restoration. Through him, we 
can also revisit Japanese academic notions about the Restoration. In the case 
of British diplomacy during the Restoration period especially, his books will 
be used because they are representative of material indicating common 
Japanese assumptions at that time.  
     The conversation between Satow and Saigo was a good example for 
showing the method of Tokutomi’s analysis. He considered that foreigners 
might have been involved in the Meiji Restoration, and, based on his 
analysis, Japanese historiography accepted this as common academic 
understanding. In particular, the civil war of 1868-9 was highlighted by 
claiming that it was a proxy war between the British and French. As a 
result, through these successive arguments, one essential point emerged: the 
recognition of “foreign pressure”. The Japanese have commonly come to 
recognise that the time of the Meiji Restoration was also the time of possible 
colonisation by the Westerners, and Tokutomi was the first Japanese who 
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claimed this. Tokutomi thereby became associated with Japanese fears about 
foreign pressure.  
     Tokutomi certainly claimed the existence of foreign pressure, but there 
is one thing which needs to be clarified. It is that there is a big difference 
between Tokutomi and the Japanese historiography over the nature of this 
foreign pressure. In Tokutomi’s book, Shourai no Nihon (A Future Japan) in 
1886, he wrote about foreign pressure, but what he had meant was not an 
invasion but requests by which Westerners expected the Japanese to 
change.61 In fact, he claimed that under this foreign pressure progress and 
civilization would be promoted.62 Tokutomi thus considered that when the 
Westerners reached Japan, the Japanese naturally recognised the more 
advanced nature of European civilization, and, as a result, the Meiji 
Restoration had started naturally. But to emphasise that, he used the words 
“foreign pressure”.  
     It was only as an actual fact that Tokutomi mentioned the episode of 
the conversation between Satow and Saigo, yet by picking up only that point, 
Satow come to be considered as a British spy. However, for Tokutomi, that 
episode needed to be mentioned only for the purpose of showing that the 
Japanese had established connections with a well advanced civilization.  
     In fact, Tokutomi evaluated the British more highly than any other 
Japanese. He claimed that to survive, the Japanese would have to follow the 
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British. 63  This attitude can be seen as the background against which 
Tokutomi introduced the episode regarding Satow and Saigo. For Tokutomi, 
Satow might be one element in justifying Japanese modernization, so 
Tokutomi might have no animosity towards Satow. Indeed, when Tokutomi 
visited London in February 1897, he met not only the vice president of The 
Times, but was also guided around the company.64 That was because Satow 
had written a letter of introduction for Tokutomi.65 This indicates that 
Tokutomi was well acquainted with Satow, hence, it is hard to consider that 
Tokutomi had any ill-feeling towards Satow. Tokutomi had a habit of 
describing the British as the global influence of the time,66 so in the episode 
of Satow and Saigo there might be an element of admiration and respect for 
the British. Perhaps also, by mentioning that episode, Tokutomi tried to 
stress the wisdom of Satsuma and Choshu over other Japanese because of 
their connection with the British.  
     Immediately after the Meiji Restoration Tokutomi showed this 
respectful attitude towards the British, but after the Russo-Japanese war in 
1904-5 he began to focus more on the Imperial family.67 His writings thereby 
became more nationalistic for the purpose of promoting Japanese 
imperialism. As a result, the episode about Satow and Saigo might have 
begun to be considered by the Japanese as evidence for the possibility of 
colonisation. In fact, until 1945 Tokutomi contributed support for Japanese 
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imperialism. He was sufficiently impressed by the Japanese experience that 
he had been making an effort, by systematizing it academically, to allow it to 
serve as a counter to Western imperialism.  
     In the meantime, unlike modern Japanese historians, although 
Tokutomi honoured the Meiji Restoration he did not much praise the people 
who contributed to Japan’s modernization. In fact, his concept of 
modernization was defined as follows: 
 
          Tokutomi Soho argued that it was not the Meiji leaders 
           but inexorable trends that had created the new Japan.68 
 
As for contributors to the Meiji Restoration, he concluded that they were 
neither saints nor philosophers.69 His perception of the Meiji Restoration 
was different from that of others. In general terms the Meiji Restoration was 
defined as follows: 
 
         Pride in the Restoration rested on its character as a “nationalist 
         revolution”, the decisive event which spared Japan the fate of other 
         Asian peoples at the hands of Western imperialism.70 
 
Therefore, Japanese opinion, and especially the Meiji Government, worked 
at not only honouring the achievements of Japan’s modernization but also 
idolizing the people who had contributed to it. The main purpose was to 
spread the propaganda about the victory of Japanese traditional 
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nationalism. Until 1945 the Japanese were firmly influenced by such 
nationalism, but even in those circumstances Tokutomi did not relinquish 
his own point of view. In fact, he defined the background of the Meiji 
Restoration as being a general trend.71 And this was the point whereby his 
writings were trusted, because he did not honour Satsuma and Choshu 
blindly. In his 1893 book, Ishin Kakumeishi no Hanmen (Another Aspect of 
the History of Restoration), he claimed to define the Meiji Restoration as 
caused not only by foreign pressure but also by the natural process of the 
collapse of feudalism. Even if the foreigners had not come to Japan, he 
asserted, the Tokugawa Shogunate would have collapsed.72 This opinion was 
completely different from the attitude of the Meiji Government which had 
been idolizing the samurais of Satsuma and Choshu. This refusal to 
acknowledge the achievements of Satsuma and Choshu indicates an element 
of academic independence whereby his writings are still worth using for this 
thesis.  
 
     In this thesis, analysing the diplomatic relationship between Britain 
and Japan will be a major aim. However, if only British and Japanese 
materials are used there will be a danger of losing a balanced attitude 
because both the British and Japanese, naturally, tried to justify their own 
positions and actions in their materials. To avoid that situation, other 
material from a third party will be necessary, and for that purpose there are 
books written by Dirk de Graeff van Polesbroek (1833-1916) who was a 
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Dutch Consul-general, and Jhr. Johannes Lijdius Catharinus Pompe van 
Meerdervoort (1829-1908), a Dutch doctor. Both of them stayed in Japan 
during the Restoration period, the former from 1857 to 1870 and the latter 
from 1857 to 1863. Thus, they were also eye-witnesses of the Restoration and 
independent Westerners observers. Pompe observed that the British, and 
Alcock in particular, were the major figures in Japan; indeed, without the 
British there was little else to write about.73 But he described the situation 
of all the Westerners in Japan, which makes his publication useful. As a 
third party, Polesbroek described the Tycoon: the latter could leave his castle 
only two or three times each year and there was no freedom within it. In 
short, the Tycoon was a puppet manipulated by his retainers.74 Judging 
from British materials, however, the Tycoon appeared more as an absolute 
tyrant who could do whatever he wanted. In fact, Satow severely criticised 
the Tycoon for this in Eikoku Sakuron, and that was not just his own idea 
but representative of all British opinion. Afterwards, by focusing only on 
these British ideas, the Japanese justified promoting the Meiji Restoration. 
Polesbroek’s book suggests that this understanding might need to be 
changed, in which case a new approach to the Meiji Restoration is required. 
Pompe’s book also contributes to that possibility. 
     However, there is one serious problem when using these Dutch books: 
neither of them describes all the historical incidents during the period. In the 
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case of Polesbroek, he was in Japan for the whole time of the Restoration and 
he did leave a memoir. After his death, though, his uncle burned all his 
private papers, his memoir included. His book was partially recovered by 
using a memorandum and draft notes for his diaries, but it was impossible to 
restore it completely. As for Pompe, he described Japanese domestic affairs 
in detail, but only until 1863 when he left Japan, which means that not all 
the issues surrounding the Meiji Restoration were covered. Nevertheless, 
thanks to their books, a third-party position was established even if not all 
the historical issues were analysed. 
     There is one other material which can contribute from an independent 
perspective. Those are the books of edited newspapers in the nineteenth 
century. There appears no bias or arbitrary choices from the newspapers, so, 
by using them, each historical incident can be analysed from various points 
of view. For example, in The Times on 4 November 1863, journalists severely 
criticised Admiral Kuper for giving orders to set fire to the city of Kagoshima 
at the time of the bombardment.75 The Times was clearly not under British 
official influence or worked simply for Britain’s political advantage, or else 
this piece would not have appeared. The newspaper had made some effort to 
discover the truth.  
     Finally, for the purpose of arguing against the importance of Eikoku 
Sakuron, two materials will be necessary. Those are the memoirs written by 
the staff of the Prussian mission and by Aime Humbert. As with Pompe’s 
book, they both recounted and analysed the historical events which they had 
                                                 




witnessed and omitted things which they had not experienced. These sources 
will not be used to debate the Meiji Restoration; rather they focused more on 
the previous Japanese administrative system. The fact that their books were 
published years before Eikoku Sakuron is important for the argument of this 
thesis.  
     Although strictly a secondary material, the books written by the 
Japanese historian, Takashi Ishii, will be referred to as a major source from 
which to argue about the Meiji Restoration, especially, in relation to British 
diplomacy. Through the current research, it has become clear that the official 
position taken by Japanese historiography cannot be accepted in this thesis, 
because the proofs offered regarding Western diplomacy are so weak. 
Judging from his works, Ishii himself did not endorse Japanese academic 
orthodoxy. In fact, he confessed honestly that in the past he had been 
wrongly acknowledging that Parkes and Saigo could have made a political 
agreement based on the ideas of Eikoku Sakuron. 76  His confession is 
important because, from it, it can be deduced that he did not support 
arguments based on traditional Japanese historiography. He is also the only 
modern Japanese historian who has indicated the similarity between Eikoku 
Sakuron and Matsuki’s 1866 proposals in London.77 No representative of 
accepted Japanese historiography would have made such a point. 
Furthermore, unlike other Japanese historians, Ishii often used Western 
official documents and primary sources. He promoted historical analysis and 
argument by stressing those materials – an attitude which indicated his 
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international and balanced perspective. His work will be used to illustrate 
shortcomings in Japanese historiography.  
     Also, in recent years, Ishii’s achievements have been highly regarded in 
Japanese historiography because, thanks to his efforts, British, French and 
American diplomatic policies towards the Japanese during the Meiji 
Restoration period are clearly defined and also systematized more effectively 
than before.78 That is because his analysis was judged to have maintained 
fairness. For this reason, his analysis and his method of promoting 
arguments were considered to be reliable.  
 
     In the next chapter, the structure of the Tokugawa Shogunate will be 
explained, because, without it, it will be hard to understand why many 
nineteenth-century Japanese recognised the need for political change after 
the Westerners’ arrival. Chapter three will examine the Namamugi incident 
in 1862, its impact on Anglo-Japanese relations, and the extent to which it 
altered British perceptions of the Edo regime. Chapters four and five provide 
specific analysis of Satow’s thoughts about the future of Japan as revealed in 
Eikoku Sakuron. The significance of his 1866 writings, whether they 
contained original ideas, and whether they thereby merit the importance 
which almost all Japanese scholars have attached to them is examined in 
chapter six. Attention turns in chapter seven to the memorandum written by 
the British Minister, Rutherford Alcock, in 1864 which will reinforce 
arguments put forward in the previous three chapters. Chapter eight 
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attempts to determine what role Satow and British diplomacy played in the 
Meiji Restoration, and chapter nine likewise researches foreign influence in 
the Japanese civil war. Chapter ten, and the conclusion, return to the theme 
of Japanese historiography and place the findings of this thesis in that wider 
context. In light of this research, it is hoped to establish that much of the 
understanding of Japanese history in the 1860s, as discussed within the 
orthodox Japanese historical tradition, lacks any foundation either in 
reliable witness from the period or in archival evidence.  
 
Before arguing about the essence of the Meiji Restoration, there is one 
issue which will have to be examined. It is: when the Meiji Restoration began 
and when it was completed. However, this question is not easy to answer 
because the answer changes according to the topic under review. In short, 
the definition of the Meiji Restoration will be changed by the method and 
standpoint of any analysis. For example, from a general point of view the 
Meiji Restoration has been defined as beginning when Perry came to Japan 
in 1853. That is the diplomatic point of view. But from an economic point of 
view, the Meiji Restoration can be considered to begin when the Tycoon’s 
Government promoted economic reform in 1840s. Admittedly this reform 
failed, but thanks to the attempt the Japanese can be said to have introduced 
the basics of capitalism. In the meantime, in terms of completing the Meiji 
Restoration, there are several ideas in Japanese historiography. Some 
historians claimed it was in 1868 when the Tycoon’s Government 
surrendered Edo Castle to the Imperial Court. Or related to this, some 
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insisted it was in 1869 when the ex-Tycoon’s military completely 
surrendered at Hakodate. Other historians claimed 1871, when all the 
feudal regions were diminished legally, or even 1877 when the Satsuma 
rebellion was suppressed by the Meiji Government. From a militaristic point 
of view, victory in the Russo-Japanese war in 1905 has been suggested, 
because it was the symbolic triumph of Japanese modernization. Evidently, 
it is not a simple matter for many Japanese to define when the Meiji 
Restoration either began or was completed.  
     However, in this thesis, the Meiji Restoration will be defined by 
accepting the analysis of the Japanese historian, Shigeki Tohyama, whose 
book, Meiji Ishin (2nd version) was published in 1972. He suggested that the 
Meiji Restoration began in 1853 and was completed in 1877.79 His dates are 
considered the best general guideline by which to analyse the Meiji 
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Chapter II: Japan before the arrival of Satow 
 
Before the 1860s, Japan was an overwhelmingly feudal society 
characterized by a dual system of authority with both a Tycoon and Mikado 
at the top of their respective hierarchies. A Tycoon dominated the feudal 
lords while the Mikado headed the Court nobles. These hierarchies were 
fundamentally incompatible, which was a major reason why domestic affairs 
became increasingly chaotic after the arrival of Perry, with some Japanese 
trying to revive the authority of the Mikado and others to strengthen the 
political power of the Tycoon. Some also tried to unify them. All these efforts 
were proceeding at same time.  
Satow reflected on all this when much later he noted wryly that: 
 
          ‘Looking back now in 1919, it seems perfectly ridiculous  
that such a notion should have been entertained, even as   





The Japanese themselves could therefore not find a single vision for the 
future, but they recognized one thing: that the arrival of the Westerners 
meant that they had to revise their governance system. The political regime 
in the 1850s was called Tokugawa Bakufu in Japanese and usually, among 
the Western states, it was referred to as the Tycoon’s Government. The 
regime’s founder was Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543-1616), sometimes described as 
Gongen-sama in the diary of Satow and in British diplomatic documents. 
Gongen-sama means god and the reason why he had been treated as a god by 
successive Tycoon’s Governments was not only that he had crushed the 
previous regime but also that he had successfully created long-term stability. 
The previous regime was founded by Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who was 
recognized as Taiko-sama by the Westerners. He had once dominated all the 
feudal lords and Tokugawa Ieyasu was among those who had submitted to 
him. However, after his death, because his son was a child, Tokugawa Ieyasu 
began to resist the Toyotomi regime, and, by receiving support from other 
feudal lords, he crushed the army of the Toyotomi regime at the battle of 
Sekigahara in 1600. In 1603 he was appointed Shogun by the Imperial 
Court.81  
This title was given only to the dominant feudal lord, and, by virtue of 
this title, he was allowed to found his own regime to govern Japan. The title 
                                                 
80 L. M. Cullen, A History of Japan 1852-1941 Internal and External Worlds 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003), 188. 
81 Yoshi S. Kuno., Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent (New York: Kennikat 
Press, 1937), 1.  
53 
 
of Shogun had emerged in the Middle Ages. When the Imperial Court 
decided to subdue other tribes which did not concede the authority of an 
Imperial order, a commander in chief received that title as a lieutenant of 
the Mikado and was authorized to command all the warriors. That was the 
origin of the Shogunate. When the concept was translated into English, it 
became Barbarian-quelling-Generalissimo. 82  In the case of Tokugawa 
Ieyasu, after he had founded his regime, he fought two further battles 
against the Toyotomi family in 1614 and 1615 in which he crushed them 
completely and established a system of government which lasted for about 
260 years.83  
To stabilize his regime, Tokugawa Ieyasu established several rules of 
governance. He chose traditional feudalism, not centralization, which meant 
that he chose dominance over other feudal lords, thereby securing their 
territories for the stability of the Tokugawa regime. In reality, although he 
became Shogun, he remained essentially one feudal lord whose military and 
economic powers were superior to the others. He did not possess a national 
army or a centralized economic system. Thus, if he tried to take their lands, 
other feudal lords would ally and would resist him. Each feudal lord 
possessed military and economic power in his own region and at that time no 
Japanese had any idea of centralization. A Shogun could not therefore 
govern all of Japan by himself. In fact, there were 250 fiefs in Japan but only 
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one-fourth of them were under the direct governance of the Tokugawa 
Shogunate.84  
Tokugawa Ieyasu nevertheless faced the problem which previous 
regimes had to face, which was that once their political and military powers 
declined, other major feudal lords who had once surrendered would start to 
challenge the regime. However, Tokugawa Ieyasu was skilful and, to avoid 
that possibility, he classified all the feudal lords in three categories. Those 
were Shinpan,85 Fudai-Daimyo86 and Tozama-Daimyo.87 Daimyo is the title 
applied to a feudal lord who governed more than 10,000 koku (1 koku equals 
to 5 bushels) of rice produced in his fief.88 Under the Tokugawa Shogunate, 
Koku was the measure used to calculate the economic and military power of 
each feudal lord.89  
Shinpan was a feudal lord who had a blood relationship with the 
Tokugawa Shogunate, among whom were three major families called 
Go-sanke (three principal families.). Those three families were recognized by 
Tokugawa Ieyasu in case his direct bloodline disappeared. In that case, one 
prince from among the three would succeed to the Shogunate, which was 
why three direct sons of Tokugawa Ieyasu were appointed to be the masters 
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of those three houses. Those three houses were located in Kii (modern 
Wakayama), Owari (modern Aichi) and Mito (modern Ibaragi). Twice the 
direct bloodline of the Tokugawa Shogunate was diminished in Japanese 
history. In both cases, the princes of the Tokugawa family in Kii succeeded to 
the Shogunate. In addition to this major role for Go-sanke, the Shinpan had 
a role in censoring the other feudal lords.  
Fudai-Daimyo were the houses of the retainers of the Tokugawa family 
or were feudal lords who had already recognized the authority of Tokugawa 
Ieyasu before the battle of Sekigahara. Although they received that title as a 
reward, their fiefs were small and they were not allowed to receive more 
regions. However, they were given one important privilege: they were 
eligible to be appointed ministers in the Tycoon’s Government. By this 
means Tokugawa Ieyasu removed any dissatisfaction. Furthermore, they 
were located not only around Edo and Kyoto (which were the capitals of the 
Tycoon and the Mikado) but also around Osaka and in other regions which 
were under the direct governance of the Tokugawa Shogunate. By doing this, 
Tokugawa Ieyasu strengthened his political power and his Government 
secured its own regions.  
Tozama-Daimyo were the feudal lords who joined Tokugawa Ieyasu 
just before the battle of Sekigahara, or those who had surrendered to him 
after the battle. These lords were allocated regions far from the major cities 
and ports and were not allowed to participate in national politics. However, 
to discharge his obligation, Tokugawa Ieyasu allowed them to possess huge 
areas. In fact, among them were several feudal lords whose amounts of koku 
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were superior to the Shinpan and Fudai-Daimyos.90 That gave them the 
possibility to possess strong economic and military powers; indeed, they had 
experience of fighting against the Tokugawa family in the past. However, 
Tokugawa Ieyasu introduced various regulations which would make it 
impossible for them to preserve those powers. In the name of the Tycoon, 
they were forced to maintain all the roads and banks of the rivers in Japan 
at their expense. Also, in city planning procedures, they were forced to 
produce certain amounts of money and labour as assigned by the Tycoon’s 
Government. Although they were recognized as possessing huge amounts of 
koku, they were always facing a financial crisis. 
Another reason why the Tokugawa Shogunate was so stable was that 
Tokugawa Ieyasu made the rule of Sankin-Koutai, which means alternative 
attendance in Japanese. He ordered all feudal lords to send their wives and 
children to Edo, and all lords to come and stay in Edo every other year.91 
Keeping wives and children in Edo effectively meant the Tycoon’s 
Government kept them hostage, while by the regulation of coming to Edo 
every other year it became impossible for feudal lords either to conspire in 
their regions or to make secret alliances. This was not the only purpose. 
When the daimyos went to Edo, they would have to be accompanied by many 
samurais and retainers. That meant huge expenses each time, and those 
would be distributed among the residents of the major roads and ports and 
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also in the big cities. Thus, by this rule, Tokugawa Ieyasu tried to sustain 
commercial activities and to expand domestic markets at the expense of his 
feudal lords.92 And by promoting the system of Sankin Koutai, the Tycoon’s 
Government could create the following situation: 
 
         In the long run the sankin-kotai system helped to convert the  
         daimyo from fractious provincial warlords into free-spending 
         courtiers of the shogun cut off from concern for the administration 
         of their own domains and involved in the protocols and pleasures 
         of life at Edo.93 
 
By the system of Sankin Koutai, the Tycoon’s Government succeeded not 
only to let all the feudal lords become involved in governing their own 
regions, but also to define Edo as the capital of Japan. And by defining Edo 
as capital, the Tycoon could justify his status as a national sovereign of 
Japan under the Tokugawa Shogunate. Otherwise, the Tokugawa family 
could not establish a sufficient difference between themselves and the other 
feudal lords, even though the chief of the Tokugawa clan was appointed 
Shogun by the Imperial Court.  
A third reason for the success and longevity of the Tokugawa 
Shogunate was that Tokugawa Ieyasu had regulations for reducing and 
confiscating fiefs. For example, without permission, feudal lords were not 
allowed to repair their own castles and they were not allowed to inter-marry 
with the families of other feudal lords.94 If these rules were violated, their 
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fiefs would be reduced. In the worst cases, their houses were confiscated and 
they were exiled.  
This governance system was called Baku-Han (Shogunate and Fief) 
and it has been described as follows: 
 
        The Baku-Han System was, above all, designed to ensure the 
         sustained relative superiority of the Tokugawa ruler over 
         all the feudatories, even at the expense of the aggregate power 
           or wealth of Japan as a nation-state.95 
 
In the meantime, to reinforce a stable society, Tokugawa Ieyasu classified all 
citizens. The highest class was the warrior samurai, to which all samurais 
belonged. Samurais who served the Tycoon’s Government were called 
Banner-men96 and they were recognized as elite among the samurais, and 
given various privileges. For example, they were allowed to have the family 
name and also to carry swords. They were the symbols of the Tokugawa 
Shogunate. They were proud to be samurais and in history have come to be 
seen as the backbone of the nation. 97  People who were classified as 
non-samurai were not allowed to become samurai.98  
Fudai and Banner-men were the administrative officers of the Tycoon’s 
Government. Feudal lords of higher status were, for example, chief and 
subordinate censors (written as Oh-metsuke and Ko-metsuke in Japanese). 
Banner-men were appointed commissioners and magistrates and served 
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under the feudal lords. Those positions were called Bugyo. Able and 
experienced lords were appointed to be senior ministers of the Shogun 
(Toshiyori) or junior ministers (Wakatoshiyori). These were the core 
administrative posts in the Tycoon’s Government. 99  Experienced feudal 
lords were appointed to be Rojyu, which was the highest government post, 
and, to an extent, they had responsibility for national political decisions. All 
of these were plural posts, and their administrative powers subdivided so as 
to avoid individual abuse. In the case of a national emergency, a Tairo (which 
was the highest administrative position and allowed to exercise state power) 
would be appointed. There were various other administrative posts in 
relation to civil affairs, religion, the police force and trials, all of which could 
only be held by samurais.  
The social class next to samurais was the peasantry. They held second 
status because they produced the rice. Under the Tokugawa Shogunate, the 
market price of rice decided all other product prices.100 It could be described 
as a rice-standard economy; in fact, the salaries for samurais were paid with 
rice. In terms of tax, the peasants had to pay 40%, but, in fact, they were 
forced to pay more than 70%,101  so they were always living in severe 
circumstances. Whatever the situation, they were forced to pay the tax which 
was assigned or to incur severe punishment. They were neither allowed to 
band together against the samurais nor to abandon their lands. Also, all 
children were forced to succeed their fathers. In Japanese history there were 
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several peasants uprising against the samurais, but each time they were 
harshly suppressed. That was the reality for the peasants, but since the 
properties of samurais were based on the peasants,102 they were given the 
second social status.  
The third and fourth social classes were the artisans and merchants. 
Although the merchants had the lowest social status, they possessed 
economic power-especially after permanent peace was established when they 
created a money circulation economy throughout Japan. The merchants used 
widely accepted gold and silver coins in their daily lives, which were more 
stable than rice. In fact, the feudal lords and samurais started to borrow 
from the merchants.103 Thus as time passed, the more the feudal lords 
needed to be supported by the major merchants. By that process, some 
merchants gained huge economic advantage. However, they were not 
allowed to change their status. Under the Tokugawa Shogunate, there was 
no concept of liberty or social equality.104  
These strict social structures, however, did not mean that all Japanese 
except the samurais were confined to the margins of society. Under the 
Tokugawa Shogunate a high rate of literacy was recorded105 and citizens 
broadly lived in satisfactory conditions under that social classification.106 In 
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fact, after about 260 years of such governance, Japanese society was 
favourably evaluated by some Westerners as follows:    
    
1. The Polity was headed by a divine king. 
2. The religious institutions (Shinto and Confucian) were not 
differentiated from the polity－Buddhist temples were separate but 
were subordinate to political authority.  
3. Society was viewed as a part of the natural order.  
4. The World view was monistic, there was no religious “Other”.107 
 
It was a picture largely of domestic stability which made it possible for the 
Tycoon to govern in peace.  
 
Tokugawa Ieyasu also applied severe restrictions to the Imperial Court. 
After the late Middle Ages, when the Mikado and Court nobles gave up their 
political power and authority over the warriors,108 they had been ignored in 
secular matters, and only in rituals could they demonstrate their existence. 
Not only were they kept isolated in Kyoto, but Tokugawa Ieyasu also 
restricted their activities by laws. They came under the censorship of the 
civil administration of Kyoto, which had duties of censorship against both 
the feudal lords of western Japan and the Imperial Court.  
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Tokugawa Ieyasu also used the Imperial Court for the justification of 
the Tokugawa family. He ensured that when a new Tycoon succeeded, the 
Mikado must acknowledge that fact. In the seventeenth century, still, there 
was no political role for the Imperial Court, so it was powerless to resist the 
Tokugawa family. Ieyasu recognised that, but even so did not risk the 
Imperial Court being seen to identify with any opponent. That was why the 
Mikado was involved in the ceremony for the succession of the new Tycoon. 
In fact, Ieyasu determined this when he became Tycoon in 1603 and was 
acknowledged by the Emperor Go-Youzei (r. 1586-1611).109 There were two 
reasons for this. One, as indicated earlier, was to define the Tokugawa 
family as different from the other feudal nobility, but the second was to 
clearly place the status of the Imperial Court as being beneath the Tokugawa 
Shogunate. It was not the Imperial Court which voluntarily appointed 
Ieyasu as Tycoon but Ieyasu who requested the Imperial Court to do it.110 
This acknowledged publicly that the Imperial Court could not resist the 
Tokugawa family.  
     This historical fact provided one justification for promoting the Meiji 
Restoration111 because, before Ieyasu, the title of Shogun was called Kubo. 
However, originally, Kubo was the title for the Mikado, meaning the person 
who would succeed to the status of Emperor.112 Thus, when Ieyasu became 
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Shogun, previously called Kubo, he could in practical terms become the 
national sovereign of Japan.113 Ideologically too, Ieyasu could thereby be the 
true national sovereign of Japan instead of the Mikado by virtue of 
succeeding to that title. Yet although Ieyasu invented the procedure whereby 
the new Shogun would have to be appointed by the Mikado, still it was 
considered by some Japanese that the Tokugawa family had taken over a 
title which should have belonged to the Imperial Court. This became one 
element in establishing the new ideology for promoting political 
modernization.  
     Nevertheless, in the early seventeenth century Ieyasu had to enforce 
that method, otherwise his efforts to achieve victory over all the other feudal 
lords would be meaningless. That was why the Tycoon’s Government was 
defined as follows: 
 
         The bakufu, through a number of devices, came over time  
         to pose as a national government, and in the process came to  
         outshine the court, drawing all attention to itself as the sole  
         center of political authority.114 
 
As a result, the Mikado and the Imperial Court had to fallen into obscurity in 
Kyoto for about 260 years in the name of neutralization or 
De-symbolization.115 
Although the Court nobles had lost all their regions after the late 
Middle Ages, Tokugawa Ieyasu nevertheless regulated them because he was 
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afraid that other feudal lords might try to access the Imperial Court. He 
permitted the Imperial Court to conduct traditional rituals by themselves, 
but he ordered them to report regularly to the civil administration of Kyoto. 
In return, he donated a certain amount of money every year. Furthermore, 
Tokugawa Ieyasu promoted the ceremony whereby when a new Tycoon 
succeeded, he would receive acknowledgement from the Mikado. Tokugawa 
Ieyasu thereby tried to show that the Tycoon’s Government derived its 
legitimacy from the Imperial Court. However, since the Tycoon’s 
Government dominated all secular aspects of Japan, its attitude towards the 
Imperial Court was nothing but a deception aimed to avoid criticism. Except 
for the Tycoon’s Government, nobody was allowed access to the Mikado and 
Imperial Court.116 
The reason why Tokugawa Ieyasu was so nervous about isolating the 
Imperial Court related to Japanese spirituality. The Mikado was the symbol 
of Japanese identity, and defined as follows: 
 
         The Emperor is the true and only legitimate sovereign, the  
          lineal descendant of the Gods of Heaven by whom Japan was 
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          created, the first and best of all the lands on earth; that to him  
          alone the unquestioning allegiance of every loyal Japanese is due.117 
 
In the Shinto faith, the Mikado was a descendant of the Sun-goddess 
Amaterasu,118 hence the Japanese commonly believed that the imperial 
bloodline was sacred. Indeed since the Emperor Jinmu, who was said to have 
existed in 660 BC, the imperial bloodline had been (and remains) 
uninterrupted. The Mikado was a god and the Imperial Court a sacred place. 
Living where the common people were forbidden to enter, the Mikado 
performed many rituals to pray for peace and the fertility of Japanese soil. 
Since the Japanese possessed the universal idea of unconditional obedience 
to and worship of the Mikado, any person who failed to admit imperial 
authority was regarded as an enemy of the state. Tokugawa Ieyasu thus 
considered the potential psychological impact of the Mikado upon the 
Japanese to be most dangerous. If the Mikado instigated feudal lords to rise 
up against the Tycoon’s Government, none would refuse. Indeed, they would 
justify themselves by indicating imperial authority. Hence it was vital that 
the Tycoon’s Government acknowledged the position of the Imperial Court in 
a way which would not cause complaint within Japan.  
     In this thesis, there are arguments about analysing the raison d’etre for 
the Mikado from various points of view, but before that there is one thing 
which has to be stressed. It is the difference between the Mikado and 
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emperors elsewhere in the world. It is hard to find any similarity by simple 
comparison or argument, largely because the Mikado is well defined as 
follows: 
 
         The word emperor is more problematic. As scholars have noted,  
         Japanese “emperors” rarely ruled as such. They lacked individual  
         power, a standing army, and, most significantly, an empire.119 
 
In particular, after the Middle Ages the Mikado became the symbol of 
Japanese national identity, and that attitude meant the Mikado would never 
be involved in secular matters. There was even a suggestion that the 
Japanese should use the word Tenno not Mikado.120 The reason was that, 
although there are difficulties using the word Tenno, still when compared 
with Mikado, Tenno seemed more appropriate.121 However, in this thesis the 
word Mikado will be used rather than Tenno, because in the nineteenth 
century, not only the Japanese but also the foreigners used that word. If the 
word, Tenno is used, the arguments will become confused.  
In the meantime, Tokugawa Ieyasu encouraged the Japanese to learn 
Confucianism. This was partly to encourage the idea of loyalty to the state 
and their masters, but also by promoting Confucianism, to diminish Shinto 
ideas among the ordinary people.122 He did not destroy the Shinto shrines 
and rituals but he and his successors founded many Confucian schools. 
Shinto customs were deeply related to daily life, 123  and thoroughly 
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recognized by the Japanese. Thus, by stressing Confucianism ideals, 
Tokugawa Ieyasu emphasized the importance of loyalty to political masters 
and not for the Mikado. By doing this, Tokugawa Ieyasu eventually achieved 
the dominance of Confucianism over Shinto, and the more time passed, the 
more the Mikado and his Imperial Court were marginalised. As Rutherford 
Alcock described, a Mikado was born and spent his whole life at the Court in 
Miyako, and in the end he died there. 124  Not surprisingly, for the 
Westerners, the existence of the Mikado meant nothing, which was why they 
misused the title of emperor for the Tycoon.125 That all stemmed from the 
policy of Tokugawa Ieyasu. 
 
Tokugawa Ieyasu was also a skilful diplomat. By tradition, the 
Japanese had a diplomatic relationship only with China. By acknowledging 
the emperor of China as a leader in Asia, the Japanese were allowed to trade 
with the Chinese. However, in the fifteenth century, the Jesuit missionary 
Francisco Xavier arrived in the southern part of Japan and started to 
promote Christianity. Since then, along with Christian missionaries, 
Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and English traders came to Japan and some 
feudal lords started to trade with them. The feudal lords expected to 
purchase guns and powder, so to encourage active trade they allowed the 
missionaries to spread Christianity. In fact, Tokugawa Ieyasu achieved his 
military victories by using gunpowder, so, at first, he preserved the 
                                                                                                                                               
(Oxford University Press, 1993), 243.  
124 Alcock, The Capital of the Tycoon, Vol. II, 227. 
125 Cambridge Modern History, Vol. XI, 826.  
68 
 
diplomatic policy of the previous regime and allowed trade with Western 
states.126  
After the foundation of his regime, though, Tokugawa Ieyasu started to 
reconsider. He became afraid that other feudal lords, especially, those who 
had once been enemies of the Tokugawa family, might promote secret trades. 
If that happened, they too could gain advanced weapons and technology. 
Thus, he decided to get rid of this danger to his regime. First, in 1616, he 
limited international trade to the ports of Hirado and Nagasaki.127 Then, in 
1624, he forbade the Spanish to come to Japan, and in 1638 he applied that 
regulation against the Portuguese.128 In 1623 the English withdrew from 
Hirado because they lost to the Dutch in the competition for international 
trade in East Asia.129 The English, however, had received the right to trade 
and to live in Edo with extraterritoriality.130 These privileges were thanks to 
the effort of one Englishman, William Adams, who was an advisor to 
Tokugawa Ieyasu. No other Western state received such advantages. By the 
above process, the Netherlands in time became the only European state 
which maintained commercial relations with Japan. However, that did not 
mean that all the feudal lords could trade with the Dutch freely. The 
Tycoon’s Government ruled that only the Tokugawa regime could trade at 
Nagasaki, thereby dominating the wealth produced by international trade. 
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Furthermore, although the Dutch were allowed to be in Japan, they were 
forced to stay on an artificial island in the harbour at Nagasaki, called 
Dejima, which only authorized people could visit. The Dutch were not 
allowed to travel around Japan freely. Also, after 1715, the Tycoon’s 
Government started to limit the number of Chinese ships which could enter 
Nagasaki. This was to prevent the huge amounts of gold and silver coins 
which flew overseas. 131  That same limitation on trade applied to the 
Japanese. Until that time, many Japanese had sailed to China, the 
Philippines and Southeast Asia, but now this was prohibited. The Tycoon’s 
Government had become afraid that the Japanese might experience the 
benefits of other civilizations,132 and any person who violated this regulation 
was sentenced to death.133 By these procedures, the Tycoon’s Government 
completed its isolation policy.134 However, it had already proved one thing: 
the Japanese had closed the state, but that did not mean that this situation 
had happened only in Japan, because at that time China, Korea and 
Vietnam had also closed their states.135 The main reason was a reaction to 
Western economic contacts since the feudal states of East Asia needed to 
control their own territories strictly.136 That was judged the only means by 
which these Asian states could maintain their national hierarchies, 
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otherwise, their regimes might collapse under pressures caused by free 
trade. The Japanese experience was not unique.  
In the meantime, Tokugawa Ieyasu forbade the existence of 
Christianity in Japan. Under the regime of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Christian 
missionaries had already been persecuted, but Tokugawa Ieyasu introduced 
regulations to persecute the Christians systematically. In 1614 all Christian 
missionaries were exiled and two years later the Tycoon’s Government 
ordered all the feudal lords to persecute the Christians in their regions.137 
Those who refused to abandon their religion or who kept worshipping in 
secret were either to be executed or exiled overseas. By this time, many 
Christian churches had been constructed, especially in the Kyushu area, and 
many Japanese had been baptized. Since their numbers were increasing 
rapidly, Tokugawa Ieyasu decided to act swiftly and severely. He wished to 
exterminate them in Japan because they refused to submit to the authority 
of the Tycoon’s Government and their feudal lords. As a result of his actions, 
all the missionaries and Christians had either been executed or were exiled 
by 1639.138  
Japan’s subsequent isolation was intended both to protect Japan and to 
secure its economic system. If the regime allowed free trade, then rice, which 
was the core element in the Japanese economy, would be exported and, if so, 
the Japanese economic system might easily collapse. This would mean not 
only the collapse of the Tokugawa regime but also that Japanese soil could 
be captured by foreigners. Tokugawa Ieyasu, by promoting isolationist 
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policies, arguably did create a more secure nation and a more stable polity 
and society than under previous regimes. 
 
       Ieyasu (1542-1616) set up the last in a series of Shogunates,  
        or hereditary military dictatorships, whereby the greatest  
        feudal family exercised political power while relegating the  
        Emperor and court-with suitable euphemisms of veneration  
          and obedience-to the obscurity of a cloistered life in Kyoto.139 
 
The problem, however, was that for 200 years the Japanese had no 
opportunity to notice the advance of Western civilization. When they finally 
opened their ports and came face to face with Western technology, the 
psychological impact would be enormous.  
 
Yet even before 1853, diplomatic contacts with Westerners had 
occurred. In 1771, via the Dutch at Nagasaki, the Tycoon’s Government was 
told that the Russians had founded a Japanese language school in Irkutsk.140 
After that, the Russians showed themselves on the Japanese coast and 
requested a commercial relationship. A. Laxman in 1792, N. P. Rezanoff in 
1804 and Captain V. M. Golovnin in 1811 headed the major Russian 
missions which visited Japan.141 In 1818 Britain sent a mission aimed to 
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open Japanese ports.142 In addition to these official missions there were 
unofficial activities and foreign appearances in Japanese seas.  
Despite Japan’s isolation, several Japanese were interested in going 
overseas. For example, the scholar Honda Toshiaki urged that Japan should 
become the England of the East,143 for which purpose he identified four 
essentials: gunpowder, metals, shipping and overseas possessions.144 The 
astronomer Hayashi Shihei stressed the problem of defending Japanese soil, 
so insisted on the complete dominance of Ezo (modern Hokkaido) against the 
Russian advance. 145  However, the Tycoon’s Government rejected their 
opinions and maintained its isolation policy. Furthermore, the Government 
ordered feudal lords to fire against Western ships without any warning in 
1825.146 Officials remained unaware how Western states had developed in 
political, economic, military and industrial terms. Hence when the king of 
the Netherlands explained the political situation in Western Europe and 
requested a loosening of the isolation policy, the Tycoon’s Government 
rejected it without consideration. 147  This hostile response was only 
abandoned when it was reported that British military forces had crushed the 
Chinese in the Opium War of 1840-1842. The Japanese had traditionally 
considered China to be the centre of the world, and that by respecting 
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Chinese emperors, peace and order in Asia would be maintained. However, 
in a short period, the British destroyed that belief through advanced military 
technology, following which the Tycoon’s Government concluded that a 
British advance towards Japan would be only a matter of time.148   
Perry arrived with an official letter from U.S. President Fillmore in 
July 1853 against this altering perception of international affairs.149 He 
requested ports to be opened and a supply of water, wood and food for 
American ships. His request was not to open the ports for commerce, but only 
to secure the lives of American sailors in the Pacific.150 However, his request 
had an enormous psychological impact on the Tycoon’s Government since he 
commanded four battleships. Before his arrival, several Westerners had 
appeared on Japanese coasts, but they did not show any military power. This 
time, Perry requested negotiations by showing advanced military technology. 
Since the officers of the Tycoon’s Government already knew of the 
superiority of Western technology, they promised negotiations to be 
concluded next year. Perry agreed and left Japanese waters. That was not a 
solution but it did allow time for a decision.  
When confronting this arrival of Westerners and their military force, 
the Tycoon’s Government abandoned one tradition: it now translated the 
documents from Fillmore and Perry into Japanese and distributed them to 
all the feudal lords, asking them to express their ideas. That was 
unimaginable from a regime which had hitherto been promoting absolutism 
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and which never asked for opinions regarding political decisions. This fact 
alone showed Perry’s psychological impact. 61 feudal lords replied: 19 urged 
“willingness to accept the trade and the opening ports” while another 19 
insisted on “outright rejection of Perry’s request”. 14 more “reflected a 
primary concern with the need to avoid war” and seven suggested “rejection 
to be the ultimate aim but envisaged the adoption of temporary expedients 
meanwhile”. Only two replied: “Bowed to Bakufu Orders”.151 Although not 
all the lords replied, nor would their replies be adopted as a national 
decision, this example did show how Japanese opinion had become 
fragmented. Furthermore, the fact that the Tycoon’s Government had 
requested opinions indicated how its confidence had been shaken.152 
When Perry returned on 31 March 1854, the Government made a 
treaty with him, the main content of which was to open the ports of Shimoda 
and Hakodate and to supply food, water and wood for American ships.153 
The Tycoon’s Government thereby gave up its isolation policy but there were 
several feudal lords and many samurais who opposed this treaty. However, 
this was not a commercial but a friendship treaty, so at the time there was 
no anti-regime movement. In 1854 the Government made the same treaty 
with Sir James Sterling of Britain, the content being similar to one which an 
earlier envoy, John Bowring, had suggested in 1845. This time, the British 
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recognized the effectiveness of showing military force.154 Shortly after, the 
same treaties were made with France, Russia and the Netherlands and the 
Japanese were thus forced to enter into international politics and commerce. 
In The Times there were only three articles featuring Japan in 1846 and 
1847, and then, during the next four years, none at all. By 1852 there were 
11 articles about Japan,155 indicating how Europeans had started to focus on 
Japan in both political and commercial terms in the Far East.  
 
From this time, the Japanese also started to emphasize new ideas: 
Sonno and Jyoi. These would become key elements for discussion relating to 
the Meiji Restoration. These ideas were formulated academically by scholars 
of the Mito-Tokugawa family. They took several generations to form and 
developed by fusing the ideals of Shinto, traditional Japanese thought, and 
Confucianism. The core idea was to worship the Mikado for the purpose of 
increasing nationalism, whereby all Japanese should be unified under 
imperial authority. With time, however, this changed its meaning to 
crushing the Tokugawa Shogunate. Then, when Westerners forced Japan to 
make treaties, a further dimension was added: hostility against foreigners to 
defend Japanese soil. Hence Sonno (worship the Emperor) and Jyoi (expel 
the barbarian) developed and became popular slogans after the opening of 
Japan. The efforts of the scholars of the Mito-Tokugawa family were later 
evaluated as follows; 
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      The Mito historians or the leaders of the theologico-philosophical 
      movement known as the “Revival of Pure Shinto”. Their work  
tended to break down the barriers of seclusion which had been  
one of the main defences of the Shogunate against radical changes  
in thought and life in Japan.156 
 
These ideas spread quickly. Motoori Norinaga, a famous scholar of Japanese 
thought, had already taught: 
 
        The Japanese emperor was descended directly from the  
Sun-goddess; that his claim to temporal power rested on  
divine descent; that the Japanese islands and people were  
also of divine origin; and that Japan was by these facts made  
superior to other lands.157 
 
His thinking paved the way for Sonno-Jyoi and foreigners became targets of 
hostility for the purpose of raising Japanese nationalism under the Mikado. 
The revival of ancient tradition and the arrival of the foreigners in the same 
period thereby combined as a major step by which political power and 
authority would shift from the Tycoon to the Mikado.158 
Another dimension to the rapid spread of Sonno-Jyoi was that some 
feudal lords and samurais severely criticized the diplomatic policies of the 
Tycoon’s Government. Recognizing the superiority of Western military 
technology and wishing to avoid war, it had made various efforts to maintain 
good foreign relations. However, other Japanese criticized the Government 
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as a yes-man of the foreigners and began an anti-regime movement. 
Sonno-Jyoi justified such actions, especially for those samurais who swore 
loyalty to the Mikado, called Shishi.159 Samurais traditionally belonged to 
feudal lords, but Shishi were samurai who chose to work for the Mikado 
instead and they became master-less samurais. Their actions became a 
major element of social uneasiness for both Japanese and foreigners, because 
they were the main promoters of violence in the name of punishment by 
Heaven.  
Judging from this, it could be claimed that Sonno-Jyoi and the 
Mitogaku were out of date and that they simply encouraged terrorism. 
Indeed, Jyoi may have appeared an act of terror for the foreigners, although 
in truth it was not. The following was the essence of Jyoi: 
 
         The Jo-i thought of Mito was based on a fear that the  
         moral fibre of the people was weakening. Relations with  
         foreign nations must be prevented, or postponed, while the  
         national spirit was aroused and national strength built up; 
         they would then be established on Japan’s own terms,  
         advantageous to its own interest.160 
 
Since the foundation of diplomatic and commercial relationships with the 
foreigners, the Japanese had recognised the necessity of protecting the 
organs of the state,161 and that attitude became an important background to 
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the quick and wide spread of Sonno-Jyoi and Mitogaku among the Japanese. 
Attacking the foreigners nevertheless was not the essence of the movement.  
     However, Mitogaku contributed indirectly to solving one difficult 
situation. That was the Restoration of Imperial rule by Tokugawa Yoshinobu 
when on 9 November 1867 he returned his political authority to the Imperial 
Court. It can, of course, be argued that because the feudal lords no longer 
obeyed the Tycoon, he had to give up his political status. That may be true, 
but equally it can be suggested that, because Yoshinobu was from the 
Mito-Tokugawa family, he could make such a decision having already 
accepted the essence of Mitogaku thinking. Yoshinobu never made this clear, 
but his action was consistent with such thinking. According to the Mitogaku, 
the political status of the Tycoon was conferred by the Mikado, so, if the 
Mikado did not allow the status then the Tycoon would lose his 
justification. 162  From that point alone it is hard to conclude that the 
Mitogaku school was simply the ideology of terrorism.  
At first, even though Japanese had created Sonno, radical Japanese did 
not focus initially on the issue of imperial authority. Rather, they used the 
slogan to criticize the Government; by emphasizing the Mikado, they could 
distance themselves from loyalty to the Tycoon. Originally, Jyoi was 
advocated to defend Japanese soil under the command of the Tycoon’s 
Government in case of war. In reality, radical Japanese promoted terrorism 
against Westerners in the name of Jyoi. Thus, Sonno-Jyoi spread among the 
Japanese differently from the intention of the Mito-Tokugawa scholars. The 
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Dutch representative, De Wit, described the former Prince of Mito, 
Tokugawa Nariaki, as the enemy of Westerners,163 and illustrated how 
radical Japanese justified their violence by using the slogan. Although 
intended to protect Japan’s national identity,164 the promotion of Sonno-Jyoi 
became transformed into a step on the road to modernization. In 1856 
British and French military forces confronted the Chinese again and, as a 
result, the Chinese were soon forced to open markets. Fearful that this was 
the first step towards an attack on Japan, the Tycoon’s Government decided 
to make commercial treaties with the West to avoid China’s fate. It had 
already started to negotiate with Townsend Harris (1804-78), the first 
American Consul General and Minister to Japan in 1856. Because British 
and French forces had been fighting the Russians in the Crimea, and were 
also fighting China in the Arrow War,165 those two powers could not press 
for negotiations at that time with the Tycoon’s Government.  
Right after the 1854 treaty with Perry, the Tycoon’s Government 
started to promote English, French and German, and also, the study of 
military technology, science and metallurgy. 166  It was eager to learn. 
However, the feudal lords and samurais were not so concerned. They had 
been opposing the policies of the Tycoon’s Government, based on Sonno-Jyoi, 
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and criticized the Government as acting contrary to Japanese tradition. For 
them, making commercial relations with foreigners meant a serious betrayal 
of Japan’s sacred identity. Because of their long isolation, the Japanese had 
little understanding of international politics and trade, so, whatever the 
situation, they opposed the Tycoon’s policies. Opposition became larger and 
more nationwide day by day, and, as the authority of the Tycoon’s 
Government declined, it could no longer keep control. Thus, the Government 
decided to take advantage of the Imperial Court by requesting imperial 
approval which could be used not only to subdue the feudal lords but also to 
justify making the commercial treaties.167 Because of their dominance over 
the Imperial Court since the era of Tokugawa Ieyasu, ministers considered 
that they would receive this easily. Rutherford Alcock even described the 
Mikado as possessing no power in such matters.168  
However, the 121st Emperor Komei (1831-67) had already analysed the 
background to this decision by the Tycoon’s Government and he recognized 
the declining power of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Thus, to recover the status 
of the Imperial Court and also to defend Japanese soil, he declined the 
request.169 Emperor Komei was said to have stated that had he approved, he 
would set a shameful example for the future and that the Japanese people 
would not trust the Imperial Court anymore.170 By this imperial action, 
Japanese adherents to Sonno-Jyoi received justification for their actions and 
became even more aggressive in criticism of the Tycoon’s Government. By 
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this incident, the Mikado and the Imperial Court, long abandoned, 
re-entered Japanese politics.  
The opposition of Emperor Komei shocked the Tycoon’s Government, 
because it could not now promote the policies which it had planned and 
because the idea of Sonno-Jyoi was approved indirectly by the Mikado. The 
Government became deadlocked, and, to resolve this political struggle, Ii 
Naosuke, a prince from the major Fudai Daimyo, was appointed Tairo. He 
had already negotiated with Townsend Harris and in 1858 had signed a 
commercial treaty without any imperial grant.171 Ii considered that having 
commercial relationships with foreign countries was unavoidable; in 
international politics and to avoid war, commercial treaties were the only 
solution.172  He was reported as insisting that commercial relationships 
would also be to the advantage of Japan. 173  By this 1858 treaty, the 
Japanese agreed to open the ports of Hyogo, Niigata, Yokohama, Nagasaki 
and Hakodate and also to open the cities of Edo and Osaka. In the meantime, 
the Japanese allowed the Americans free trade, extraterritoriality and a 
most favoured nation clause.174  
Shortly after, the Tycoon’s Government made the same commercial 
treaties with France, the Netherlands and Russia. The British treaty with 
Lord Elgin followed on 26 August 1858.175 This was proof that the Tycoon’s 
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Government tried to avoid wars against Western states.176 In the meantime, 
huge criticism was directed against Ii Naosuke, who had made these treaties 
without an imperial grant, hence an anti-Tokugawa Shogunate movement 
emerged beyond anything seen at the time of Perry’s treaty. Ii was a realist, 
but mid-nineteenth-century Japan had no international perspective. Indeed, 
Japan has been described as follows: 
 
       In the middle of the nineteenth century Japan was as  
weak as contemporary Burma or Siam, facing the most  
powerful nations of the West without allies, without a fleet  
or a modern army, with no monies in its treasury, its industry  
still handicraft, its trade negligible, its poverty profound,  
its ruler the Shogun-as distinct from the sovereign-a  
figure no longer commanding respect or obedience.177 
 
Japan was thus visibly weak and Ii probably knew it. Thus, when told by 
Harris that if the Tycoon’s Government refused his treaty, the Japanese 
would suffer the same fate as the Chinese, Ii felt he had no choice but to 
sign.178 His decision was correct in the circumstances, but his reaction to the 
opposition made the situation worse.  
The most humiliated person was Emperor Komei who, of course, had 
officially rejected the Tycoon’s request. As an expression of his anger, after 
the Government announced the treaty with Harris, the Emperor officially 
opposed it by the following statement: 
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        A blemish on our Empire and a stain on our divine land.179 
 
Alexander von Siebold, a colleague of Satow at the British Legation, pointed 
out the two big mistakes of the Tycoon’s Government. First, the Government 
passed the responsibility to the Mikado, forcing him to make the decision, 
but then ignored the Mikado’s opinion. The second mistake was that by 
appearing to yield to foreign pressure, the Tycoon’s Government revealed its 
inability to govern either domestically or internationally.180  
Whatever the intention, the commercial treaties made by Ii now 
became the major element of confusion in Japan’s domestic politics. The 
commercial activity which followed produced economic chaos － a 
phenomenon shown in the rapid rise of prices. The Japanese had experience 
of price increases due to unseasonable weather, but otherwise the Tycoon’s 
Government had maintained the rice standard economy. However, after 
making the commercial treaties, not only rice but also other products were 
soon exported overseas. Raw silk, cloth, grains (including rice), lamp oil and 
wax were cited as five leading special products of Japan exported rapidly,181 
leading to a domestic shortage. In the meantime, the Government 
monopolized coal, oxen and sweet potatoes which were essential for daily 
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life.182 By those means, prices were raised to levels which the Japanese had 
never experienced in the past.  
De Wit reported to the Dutch Government in 1861 that the prices of the 
major Japanese products had risen between 75% and 100%.183 Central to 
this was an article in the commercial treaties with the Western states which 
specified that the usual rate of duty levied on imports was 20%, while only 5 
% was charged on exports.184 Japanese products were thereby exported 
without restriction. The rapid rise in prices especially affected the lower 
samurais.185 Their salaries were paid in rice, but because of the shortage of 
rice their living standards were endangered. Thus, they started to criticize 
the Tycoon’s Government which could not take effective action. The only 
thing the Government could do was to reject the Western states’ demand to 
open new ports by explaining the domestic situation.186 That, however, could 
not be a solution.  
Another reason for rapidly rising prices related to the exchange rate 
between gold and silver. At that time, the exchange rate in Japan was 1 to 5, 
but internationally it was 1 to 15.187 Foreigners, therefore, just exchanged 
silver for gold in Japan, making large profits when they returned overseas. 
As a result, a huge amount of gold flew abroad.188 De Wit estimated in 1861 
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that by exchanging silver for gold in Japan, he could make a profit between 
100% and 200%.189 To solve this problem, the Tycoon’s Government changed 
the gold content of coins so that the quality of Japanese gold coins conformed 
to the international standard, but for the Japanese, this meant a significant 
inflation. 190  Living conditions for all Japanese citizens became worse. 
Furthermore, there were riots attacking the merchants who profited by the 
rising prices. In the last 30 years of the Tokugawa Shogunate, 786 riots and 
revolts were reported.191 Since the Tycoon’s Government collapsed fully ten 
years after it had made the commercial treaties, this would suggest that it 
was not all because of the opening of the ports. However, during those ten 
years the living standards of the Japanese were certainly threatened by 
international trade.  
Part of the background whereby Japanese products were exported so 
rapidly was that many were also favoured in the Chinese market.192 For all 
these reasons, then, various problems emerged in their economy which the 
Japanese had never previously experienced. After the Meiji Restoration the 
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Tycoon’s Government was criticized by the new regime for its diplomatic 
failure, which had caused serious economic disruption and placed Japan in 
danger of being colonised by Western states.193 While that became useful as 
a justification for the Meiji Restoration, nevertheless it was true that the 
“unequal” treaties with the West caused serious fragmentation in both 
Japanese political and economical life.  
The feudal lords were also critical of the Tycoon’s Government. 
Whereas complaints from ordinary citizens were based on the fact that their 
living circumstances were deteriorating, the feudal lords criticized the 
governing system itself. The Tozama daimyos especially, who had not been 
allowed to enter national politics for hundreds of years, now, when the 
Tycoon’s Government faced a national crisis, requested to participate in 
national politics. The Imperial Court supported their actions because Court 
nobles thereby expected to gain influence. Both these groups were 
accustomed to obedience, but the national crisis provided an opportunity to 
promote reform of the governing system.  
However, the Tycoon’s Government was not in favour of this and 
reacted severely to suppress those movements. In particular, a counterattack 
was undertaken by Ii Naosuke called the Ansei purge (undertaken in the 
years of Ansei in Japan). That began when the Imperial Court sent an 
imperial edict to the Mito-Tokugawa family to attack the Tycoon’s 
Government in 1858.194 Ii justified the oppression of those who criticized his 
politics and many people were arrested, not only samurais but also feudal 
                                                 
193 Sumiya and Taira (eds.), An Outline of Japanese Economic History 1603-1940, 180.  
194 Satow, Kinse Shiriaku, 13. 
87 
 
lords and Court nobles. The nobility were mostly forced to retire or to be 
confined,195 among whom were several feudal lords who became famous 
during the era of the Meiji Restoration. Tokugawa Yoshinobu, who became 
the 15th Tycoon, was one of them. The samurais were mostly executed,196 one 
of whom was Yoshida Shoin, later recognized as an idealistic inspiration for 
the Meiji Restoration.197 He had sent a letter to Emperor Komei requesting 
the latter to save Japanese soil.198 For such men, to criticize the Tycoon’s 
Government meant saving Japan. However, Ii did not think so, and sought to 
secure the absolutism of the Tycoon’s Government. As a result, samurais and 
Shishi who were concerned about Japan’s future started to take action by 
themselves. This consisted of terrorism against both the Tycoon’s 
Government and the foreigners. The purpose of attacking the former was to 
demonstrate the incompetence of its governance while attacking the latter 
was based on nationalism. 
The most symbolic act of terrorism was the assassination of Ii Naosuke 
by master-less samurais in March 1860.199 The top minister of the Tycoon’s 
Government was killed in the middle of the city near Edo castle during 
daytime. His assassination had two consequences. First, the decline of the 
Tycoon’s Government became apparent to both domestic and Western 
observers, which meant it could no longer justify the idea of absolute 
dominance to all the feudal lords. Thus, the Government started to cooperate 
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with major feudal lords and the Imperial Court in order to reform the 
Tokugawa Shogunate and to restore the Tycoon’s authority. The second 
consequence was that terrorism and assassination came to be seen as a 
solution in making political decisions. Thus, terrorism became more 
widespread in Edo and Kyoto, which the Government could not control. The 
Dutch vice-consul, Polesbroek, reported to his Government in 1861 the 
serious threat to peace and order in Edo.200 However, the target for this 
terrorism was also the foreigners. Examples of terrorism against the British 
were the first Touzen-ji incident on 5 July 1861 and, the second Touzen-ji 
incident on 26 June 1862. One British sailor was killed at Nagasaki in July 
1861. Then came the Namamugi incident on 14 September 1862. The 
assassination of Major Baldwin and Lieutenant Bird at Kamakura followed 
on 24 November 1864. Harry Parkes was attacked on his way to the Imperial 
Court as late as February 1868. These were attacks only on British subjects; 
there were more against other foreigners. In fact, Polesbroek reported on 30 
November 1864 that he had buried 13 European dead since 1859.201 This 
chaotic situation became one reason why the Tycoon’s Government lost the 
confidence of the Western states. A French representative, Duchene de 
Bellecourt, expressed grave doubts about the Tycoon’s Government in terms 
of its governance and diplomacy. 202  Against this background, Satow 
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described the Japanese domestic situation after arrival as one in which 
political stagnation was mistaken for stability.203 
Thus, only a few years after contact with Western states began, 
Japanese society, with its long-established mechanism of political authority, 
was already under considerable strain. There was neither consensus about 
how to deal with the foreigners nor agreement about the nature of the threat 
which they faced. International trade was damaging Japan’s traditional 
economy and the presence of foreigners on Japanese soil was giving impetus 
to a nationalist spirit, often accompanied by violent attacks. And as the old 
order appeared to weaken, feudal daimyos saw the opportunity to test 
further the power of the Tokugawa regime － either directly or by 
rediscovering the nominal role of the Imperial Court. The samurai class, 
once defined by duty to their lords, was becoming more difficult to control, 
either because many had no recognised masters or because they rallied to 
the Mikado as a focus of loyalty for the protection of the nation.  
In the next chapter, the Namamugi incident in 1862 will be discussed. 
This was important because, through this incident, the incapability of the 
Tycoon’s Government to act as the national government became apparent. It 





                                                 



















Chapter III: Namamugi Incident 
 
     The Namamugi Incident (in Britain known as the Richardson Affair) 
happened on 14 September 1862 (in the Japanese calendar, the 21st day, 8th 
month, 2nd year of Bunkyu). The outline of that incident is that a party from 
Satsuma, headed by Shimazu Hisamitsu (1817-87), father of the feudal lord 
of Satsuma, was travelling on the Tokaido, between Edo to Kyoto, while the 
British merchant, Charles Richardson and three companions (William 
Marshall, Woodthope Wilson and Mrs. Borrodaile) were on the Tokaido on 
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their way to Kawasaki. When they met, Satsuma samurais attacked them. 
Richardson was killed and Marshall and Wilson were injured. The incident 
was so called on account of nearby Namamugi village.  
     This incident created a major diplomatic problem between Britain and 
Japan, which is why, for the purpose of discussing British diplomacy during 
the Meiji Restoration era, it needs to be analysed. The incident proved to 
both Westerners and Japanese that the Tycoon’s Government lacked the 
political ability and authority to control Satsuma. As a result, the Tycoon’s 
Government showed that it could not control all the feudal lords. If, through 
earlier diplomatic negotiations, the Westerners had concluded that the 
Tycoon was not the national sovereign of Japan, this incident seemed to 
prove it. 
Furthermore, analysing this incident from another point of view, it can 
be argued that the Richardson affair caused the British to confront the 
Japanese more severely and that this change in Britain’s diplomatic attitude 
had a psychological impact on the Japanese which moved them towards the 
Meiji Restoration. Until then, although they had made the commercial treaty 
with the Tycoon’s Government in 1858, the British tended not to focus on 
commercial activities with the Japanese. Instead, as a commercial foothold 
in East Asia, the British focused on Canton in China, considering Japan to 
be far away.204 When Perry first arrived in Japan in 1853 requesting the 
opening of ports, the British were already established in China, and unlike 
Perry, who had to sail across the oceans, the British were thus 
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advantageously placed to advance to Japan in terms of geography. Yet 
although the British recognised that fact, they allowed the Americans 
precedence, which suggests that the British had less interest in initiating 
diplomatic and commercial relations. Fox, in 1969, concluded: 
 
          By 1854 the British had been glad to let Commodore Perry,  
         acting for the United States, take the risk of opening Japan to 
         the West and hoped to profit by the results.205 
 
Another view is that there was a shortage of British naval force in East 
Asia, although this cannot be the only reason for not bothering much about 
Japan. 206  True, the British possessed enormous naval power in the 
nineteenth century, but even they did not have sufficient naval force for 
maintaining peace and extensive commercial activities in East Asia. 
Although the British might have been expected to be the first to access 
Japan, they did not, in fact, do so, contrary to Japanese predictions. The 
Opium War in 1840-42 had caused nineteenth-century Japanese to have an 
unimaginable fear of the British because they considered that the British 
would do exactly the same thing on the Japanese mainland.207 
     However, that did not mean that every Briton shared the same idea as 
British officials. In the 1830s there was a conviction, especially in 
commercial circles, that the British Government should send official 
missions to Japan and there was analysis whereby Japan had enough 
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resources to be developed as a British market in Asia.208 Nevertheless, the 
British Government was not concerned to establish diplomatic or commercial 
relations before 1853. Only on 14 October 1854 did the British naval 
commander, James Stirling, make a treaty of peace, amity and friendship 
with the Tycoon’s Government, and even then Stirling was said to have 
believed that the British could not properly make such a treaty.209 Not until 
21 January 1856 did the Secretary at the Foreign Office, Edmund 
Hammond, notify the Admiralty that the British Government acknowledged 
Stirling’s actions. 210  The following statement represented the limited 
ambition of the British Government. It was in a document sent by Hammond 
to J. Emerson Tennent, an official at the Office of the Committee of Privy 
Council for Trade:  
 
          But at the same time they give to British ships what  
they never possessed before, namely, the right of entering  
certain ports of Japan to effect repairs, and obtain provisions  
and supplies.211 
 
Because British trade and diplomacy focused on the market in China, they 
rarely saw Japan as a business partner. The only thing the British expected 
from the Japanese was to open ports in cases of emergency or as a part of 
their commercial activities in China. 
Although Lord Elgin made his commercial treaty with the Tycoon on 26 
August 1858, this diplomatic attitude did not seem to be changed 
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dramatically. Whatever the situation, the main focus for the British 
remained China and the Japanese market was of secondary importance in 
East Asia. All that the British Government might expect from the Tycoon’s 
Government was not to make any trouble for British subjects in Japan, 
otherwise, if incidents arose, Britain would have to deal with unnecessary 
problems and possibly with huge military expenditure. Unfortunately, 
though, one British merchant was killed by a Japanese samurai in 
September 1862, as a result of which the British Government seemed to have 
started thinking more seriously about its diplomatic relationship with the 
Japanese. One example of that was that the British began gradually to 
understand and recognise the nature of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Before 
then, the Tycoon had been widely recognised by the Westerners as follows: 
 
          The Shogun, no matter how dissolute, was not only the  
recognised head of the government and the monopolist of  
legitimate foreign trade, but the most powerful lord in  
Japan’s rigidly stratified feudal order. 212 
 
That statement indicates how the Westerners had previously trusted the 
Tycoon regarding the governance of all Japanese regions. However, following 
the Richardson affair, the British began to reconsider the status and function 
of the Tycoon and thereby notice the contradiction within Japanese 
feudalism. On that point, the Richardson affair seemed to be a turning point 
not only for the Japanese but also for the British.  
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     Although this incident was not the immediate reason for the collapse of 
the Tycoon’s Government in 1868, it became an important part of the 
background to it. When, in April 1867, the British Minister, Harry Parkes, 
met the 15th Shogun, Tokugawa Yoshinobu at Osaka castle, declining to use 
the word Majesty for him but the word Highness instead, that was because 
Parkes had already recognised that Tokugawa Yoshinobu was not 
sovereign.213 The Namamugi incident was one reason for this change in 
British diplomacy.  
 
     Although this incident caused a significant problem for both states, 
Japanese and British sources provide different accounts. Captain Vyse of the 
British Legation reported to Lt-Colonel Edward St. John Neale, who was 
Charge’ d’Affaires, like this: Richardson and the three British were moving 
on the Tokaido two by two, and, when they saw the party from Satsuma, 
they stopped and tried either to step aside or to turn back, so as not to 
interfere with the march.214 However:  
 
At the moment they were turning they were surrounded  
and attacked. 215 
 
Neale reported this to the British Government.216 Thus, from the British 
point of view, the British were killed and injured by Satsuma samurais even 
though they were completely innocent. It was true that at this time there 
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were radical Japanese who, in the name of the nationalist spirit of Jyoi, 
wished to attack foreigners. In fact, the British had already experienced two 
such attacks at the Temple of Touzen in 1861 and 1862, so, when Neale 
reported, he might well have thought this incident was similar. Ernest 
Satow supported Neale’s analysis, and in his memoir he described the 
incident as the most barbarous murder. 217  According to the British, 
Richardson and his companions were the victims of Jyoi.  
     However, Japanese materials convey a different point of view. Hayashi 
Tadasu, who was a samurai in the Tycoon’s Government and later became 
the first Japanese Ambassador to Britain, contradicted the British version. 
He cited his American friend, Mr. van Reed, who also met the group from 
Satsuma on the same day on the Tokaido. Knowing the Japanese custom, 
Reed got off his horse and stepped aside.218 He bowed to them by taking off 
his hat, after which the Satsuma samurais did nothing and he reached Edo 
without any problem. Thus, when he heard the news that Richardson had 
been killed, he remarked that it was because Richardson was ignorant and 
too proud, which had caused the problem. 219  Hayashi also wrote that 
Richardson was told to be careful before his departure, but he answered that 
he knew how to deal with the Asians so there was no reason to worry.220 One 
of the authorities in Japanese historiography, Tokutomi Soho, likewise 
claimed that Richardson was killed because he ignored a warning by 
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Satsuma samurais as they tried to pass each other forcibly.221 Judging from 
the Japanese materials, this incident happened because Richardson ignored 
the Japanese custom. He was not the victim of Jyoi.  
     Perhaps neither side told the truth for fear of admitting any 
responsibility. Hence both sides claimed themselves to be innocent. 
Therefore, from the accounts only of the Japanese and British, the truth was 
hard to define. Fortunately, there was a third party to this incident, material 
from which helps analyse this affair impartially.  
     Graeff van Polesbroek, who became Consul-General of the Netherlands 
in 1863, and a Dutch doctor, Pompe, also left a statement about this incident. 
Polesbroek hastened to secure the dead body right after he heard the news. 
He recorded Marshall’s testimony, which was that he had advised 
Richardson to turn back. Richardson had ignored him, so everything 
thereafter was Richardson’s responsibility. 222  Pompe criticised not only 
Richardson but also the British Government. He defined Richardson’s 
attitude as totally insane,223 because, in the circumstances, in no country 
would anyone be allowed to pass by on horse. 224  As for the British 
Government, he insisted that they should not react to the affair because it 
was caused by Richardson’s eccentricities. 225  The background to the 
Richardson incident was therefore totally different from the occasion when 
Choshu fired on foreign ships passing through the Shimonoseki Strait in 
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July 1863, as ordered by the Imperial Court. Namamugi happened by 
accident; it was not because of Jyoi.   
     In terms of using the Tokaido, there was a further difference between 
the British and Japanese material. According to Neale’s report to London, 
although he was told by the Tycoon’s Government that foreigners were 
expected to refrain from using the Tokaido because the imperial envoy would 
use that road from Edo to Kyoto on 15 September, he was told only on the 
day before the incident. Thus, he concluded, it was the Tycoon’s 
Government’s fault.226 His report showed how the Tycoon’s Government 
could not maintain appropriate diplomatic relations with the Westerners, 
even regarding a domestic matter. Like Neale, Tokutomi also criticised the 
Tycoon’s Government but his point was different. He insisted that the 
Government did not mention Shimazu Hisamitsu to the foreigners, and as 
proof he cited a later interview between Neale and an official for foreign 
affairs. Neale questioned why the Tycoon’s Government had not sent official 
notice of the Satsuma party using the Tokaido just as it sent the notice about 
the imperial envoy. The official replied that the imperial envoy was a noble 
belonging to the Imperial Court, whereas Satsuma belonged to the 
Government.227 Judging from this answer, it could be surmised that the 
Tycoon’s Government had a responsibility for imperial envoys because they 
did not belong to the Government, which was why they had to send official 
notice to the foreigners about their schedule in advance. The Government did 
                                                 
226 FO881/1130, Neale to Russell, inclosure, Neale to the Japanese Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, 15 September 1862. 
227 Tokutomi, Ishin heno Taido, Vol. I, 426. 
99 
 
not have to send any notice about Satsuma because they were under the 
Shogunate. While this was a possible explanation, and even if the Tycoon’s 
Government was confident about managing the Satsuma party, they should 
still have sent an official notice in advance. Otherwise, the foreigners would 
not know about their moving on the Tokaido.  
     The descriptions by Neale and Tokutomi were different in detail, but 
they shared the same idea: that the Tycoon’s Government also had some 
responsibility for the incident. The Government doubtless considered that 
the Satsuma party would go back to its feudal area without causing any 
problem. However, that assumption was based on a feudal code which, after 
the opening of the country, was hard to maintain because there were now 
many foreigners who did not know Japanese traditional customs. On that 
point, the Tycoon’s Government should have been more cautious. 
Furthermore, although it might assert that the Shogunate dominated all the 
feudal lords, they were not always under its control. This incident thereby 
revealed another aspect of Japanese politics: that the feudal relationship was 
only effective when Japan had been closed.  
     By contrast, Hayashi claimed that the Tycoon’s Government had 
definitely sent notice in advance. According to him, the Government advised 
that, on that day, the Tokaido would be busy because several lords were 
planning to use it, but the Westerners did not acknowledge this because the 
Tokaido was valuable for them to use too.228 The Government identified a 
new road next to the Tokaido to avoid possible problems, but Richardson and 
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his companions did not use it, and instead moved towards Kawasaki using 
the Tokaido.229 Being a samurai of the Government, Hayashi was naturally 
on the side of the Tycoon. But, by analysing his opinion, it could be 
considered that the Government recognised a responsibility for protecting 
the lives and property of foreigners, in which case the Government acted and 
deserved to be considered as a sovereign body. Since even the Japanese held 
different views about this incident, it will be hard to attribute exact 
causation. Nevertheless, the attitude of the Government after the affair led 
to the Westerners placing less reliance upon it.  
     After killing Richardson, the Satsuma party continued on the Tokaido, 
while, against them, strong reactions emerged from the foreign settlement in 
Yokohama. For example, a French military officer, Jaquemot, insisted that 
the foreigners should act to arrest Shimazu Hisamitsu as soon as possible.230 
However, Neale rejected his extreme opinion, which Satow approved, 
because if the foreigners attacked Satsuma that night, then all Japanese 
would attack foreigners in Japan in vengeance. If that happened, there 
would be a war between the Western states and Japan.231 After that, Satow 
concluded, Japan would be in a state of anarchy.232 He did not worry about 
which side would win: he was concerned about the collapse of the Japanese 
governmental system because of a war. According to Alcock, commercial 
activity in Japan was Britain’s main concern233 so avoiding further trouble 
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was the priority. In that way, Neale made a good decision without being 
influenced by others.  
     From another point of view, though, Neale’s decision was based less on 
worrying about the future Japan. His reason was rather the commercial 
treaty which Lord Elgin had signed on 26 August 1858. According to Article 
V, it was agreed that Japanese who committed crimes against the British 
would be punished under Japanese laws.234 That meant if the Westerners 
now attacked the Satsuma party, it would be a breach of the Treaty. As 
Charge’ d’Affaires, Neale would have understood that. Satow’s claim in his 
1921 memoir, that to avoid creating chaos in Japan all the Western 
representatives supported the Tycoon’s Government in its claim to national 
sovereignty,235 was not strictly correct. For Neale, it did not matter whether 
the national sovereign was the Mikado or the Tycoon. He had to make a 
decision based on the Articles of the Treaty and had no intention that the 
British should support the Tycoon. Satow’s later writing reflected the theme 
of Eikoku Sakuron, for which purpose he chose to suggest that at this time 
the British decided in favour of the Tycoon due to concern for Japan’s 
long-term future. Sentences like this allowed modern Japanese to think that, 
through Satow, the British had been involved in Japanese domestic affairs.  
     In fact, the attitude of Her Majesty’s Government was the same as that 
of Neale. They simply made a decision based on the 1858 Treaty which had 
defined the Tycoon as the national sovereign. Lord Russell, as Foreign 
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Secretary, ordered Neale accordingly. From the Tycoon’s Government, he 
should request a formal apology and the payment of ￡ 100,000 as 
compensation, and, from Satsuma, the execution of the murderer, in front of 
British naval officers, and the payment of ￡25,000 as compensation.236 
Russell thereby tried to force both the Tycoon’s Government and Satsuma to 
recognise their responsibility. The Tycoon’s responsibility was to protect the 
lives of British subjects, while the responsibility of Satsuma was that they 
should now resolve the problem peacefully. Russell wanted to show the 
Japanese what would happen if British nationals were killed, hence, as a 
deterrent, he made this severe request. At this point it was clear that the 
Tycoon’s Government had already lost a good deal of credibility. The British 
feared that the Japanese would do the same thing again and that the 
Tycoon’s Government would not restrict radical activists.  
     Russell’s decision was important and it provoked curiosity in Britain. 
The Times of 4 November 1863 later criticized it by referring to a debate in 
the House of Commons. It asked by what reason Russell sought to punish 
both the Tycoon’s Government and Satsuma.237 The criticism was that if the 
British admitted that Satsuma was independent of the Tycoon, then Russell 
should not have to request anything from the Government in Edo. Equally, if 
the British admitted Satsuma to be a dependency of the Tycoon, then Russell 
should not request anything from Satsuma. The Times thereby judged 
Russell’s decision as abnormal.238  This was indeed the truth. Why did 
                                                 
236 FO881/1135, Russell to Neale, 24 December 1862.  
237 Minamura, 66. 
238 Ibid., 71-72. 
103 
 
Russell apportion responsibility to both when, according to their diplomacy, 
the British had defined the Tycoon as the national sovereign in Japan 
because they had signed the Treaty with him? When requesting the 
compensation from Satsuma, was he admitting indirectly that Japan was not 
governed by the Tycoon, thereby formally denying his status? The Times 
might well have anticipated a situation whereby both the Japanese and the 
other Westerners would misunderstand British diplomacy. But one thing is 
clear: as a result of this contradiction Japanese historians concluded that the 
British had already given up on the Tycoon’s Government. By citing Satow’s 
memoir in addition, the Japanese drew the apparent conclusion that the 
British were on the side of the Imperial Court during the Restoration era.         
However, one publication supported Russell’s decision. It was The 
North China Herald on 11 October 1862. This newspaper first stated that 
the Namamugi incident had not happened due to Jyoi. Richardson and the 
three others must, therefore, take some responsibility for this affair.239 From 
this, it might be concluded that the newspaper did not support Britain’s 
official response to the Tycoon’s Government. However, after that, it 
expressed the surprising view that the British should not demand that the 
Tycoon’s Government arrest the murderer because it had already become 
apparent that the Tycoon did not possess any political ability to enforce it.240 
This opinion reflected a significant truth, because in 1862 the Westerners 
had already realised that the Tycoon could not govern all the feudal lords. 
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Moreover, the paper claimed that the Tycoon was just a usurper; he was not 
of the imperial bloodline.241  
     In both a spiritual and secular sense, this idea was, of course, correct. 
The Tycoon was neither the son of the Mikado nor, under Japanese 
feudalism, could his Government administer or interfere in individual feudal 
lands. The Government might issue orders to the feudal lords, but it was up 
to the latter to enact them or not. The British military officer, F. Brinkley, 
noticed also the existence of paper currency in each feudal land, 242 
suggesting that they were effectively independent from the Tokugawa 
Shogunate. They all recognised the Tycoon’s Government, but their separate 
currencies indicated the independent identity of each fiefdom.  
     Only ten years after the Japanese had officially opened their country in 
1854, the Westerners had thus identified the weakness of the administrative 
system of the Tycoon’s Government and it is hard to believe that Russell did 
not also recognise this and assumed that Satsuma would not follow the 
orders of the Government. Nevertheless, Britain’s Treaty was with the 
Tycoon, and although they might doubt the political ability of his 
Government, they could not change their diplomatic stance. Even if Russell’s 
decision looked contradictory, he had to choose that option in order to make 
Satsuma accept its responsibility.  
     In fact, Russell’s fear was justified when Satsuma officially responded 
to the Tycoon’s Government. Satsuma claimed that the person who killed the 
foreigner was a masterless samurai, not of Satsuma, who had escaped from 
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the area and still not been discovered.243 This statement showed how they 
made a fool of the Government, suggesting that Satsuma already looked 
down upon it.244 The samurais of Satsuma seemed to have concluded that 
the Tycoon’s Government had already lost all political power because during 
the 260 years of Tokugawa rule the Government had never been disrespected 
like that.  
     The samurais of Satsuma might also have understood that the only 
reason why the Government could maintain a feudal dominance was because 
Japan had been closed. Since opening Japan, the Government had conducted 
a series of diplomatic failures with the Western states, and Satsuma could 
see that the Tycoon could not act as national sovereign, nor did his 
Government possess authority over the feudal lords. Satsuma did not 
publicly state this, but its attitude made these assumptions clear. The 
Namamugi incident was therefore a turning point in Japanese 
modernization. Satsuma even replied to the Government that if the British 
came to Kagoshima with military force, Satsuma would react to them 
alone.245 This statement showed conclusively how the samurais of Satsuma 
had no confidence in the Government and how emphatically they refused to 
obey the Tycoon.  
     Time passed, yet the situation did not change. According to The 
Illustrated London News of 8 August 1863, the British gave another three 
weeks period of grace for the Tycoon’s Government to resolve the situation, 
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which was the third time for them.246 It was now almost one year after the 
incident, but nothing had happened despite Neale’s repeated demands. The 
British had been respecting the Tycoon as national sovereign, which was 
why they had been so patient. But, after observing the Tycoon’s Government 
for a year, it became obvious to the British that he could not control 
Satsuma. This was the significant diplomatic failure for the Government in 
Edo, about which two Bakufu samurais left important statements. These 
were Shibusawa Eiichi and Tanabe Taichi (who had the experience of 
visiting Europe as a member of an official mission).  
     Shibusawa testified that although there were various and contradictory 
opinions about what to do, Government officials did not expect the British to 
negotiate directly with Satsuma samurais.247 Of course, the Government 
could not acknowledge any direct negotiation between the British and 
Satsuma since the Tycoon would thereby lose the status of national 
sovereign. Yet the important point in Shibusawa’s statement was his 
admission that various and contradictory ideas had emerged when there 
could be just one solution: the Government had to deal with Satsuma as soon 
as possible to maintain its diplomatic position. Confusion within the 
Government indicated that it had already lost its way in this affair, since if it 
could not solve the problem then it could not enforce Article V of the 1858 
Treaty. If so, the Government could no longer maintain its diplomatic 
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relationship with the British because it could not take responsibility for any 
foreigner’s safety. For the British, if the Tycoon could not uphold all Articles 
of the 1858 Treaty, then they could not regard him any longer as the 
sovereign of Japan.  
     In fact, the Government had already revealed its inability to the British 
when Neale pointed out in October 1862 that the seventeen days promised 
had already passed for an important official of Satsuma to arrive in Edo.248 
Neale had expected that date to be the turning point in settling the 
Namamugi incident, and had the Government succeeded the British would 
not have lost confidence. The following conversation between Neale and the 
official for Foreign Affairs demonstrates the main reason for the British 
Government’s decision.  
 
        (Neal): What will the Japanese Government do if the  
                Prince of Satsuma does not send the guilty persons? 
        (Japanese official): The Japanese Government cannot arrest  
them in the territory of Satsuma, but we are certain  
that the steps which have been taken will result in the  
production of the offenders.249 
 
Ironically, as early as November 1858 The Illustrated London News had 
reported that the word ‘Tycoon’ simply meant great servant.250 At that time, 
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the British Government had not appreciated that. The Namamugi incident 
suggested that they should have trusted that publication.  
     Tanabe Taichi spelt out another criticism of the Tycoon’s Government. 
He pointed out that Tokugawa officials expected Satsuma to be defeated by 
British military forces 251  because they would not admit the Edo 
Government’s authority.252 But this casual attitude proved to be a mistake. 
As Tanabe indicated, the Government thereby unofficially acknowledged 
that they could not extend their sovereignty all over Japan and appeared to 
give up their status as the national representative voluntarily.253 Likewise, 
Shibusawa judged that if the British won it would be dishonour for the 
Japanese, yet if Satsuma won it would cause the downfall of the Tycoon’s 
Government.254 In essence, the Government abdicated authority by this 
decision and left the British to solve the problem. Lacking political power, 
and trying to maintain their honour by avoiding failure, the Government did 
not deal with Satsuma. The outcome, however, was that they lost not only 
their political standing in Japan but also their credibility with the 
Westerners.  
     The fact that the Tokugawa Government implicitly relinquished its 
sovereignty might be interpreted as shameful. However, modern Japanese 
historians do not suggest that because they commonly focus on events after 
negotiations had broken down and the bombardment of Kagoshima which 
followed on 15 August 1863. As a result, Satsuma recognised advanced 
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British technology and its samurai class changed their political attitude and 
started to promote modernization. Furthermore, after the bombardment, 
Satsuma samurais were able to establish a close relationship with the 
British, with whose support they could eventually achieve the Meiji 
Restoration. The problem here is that historians concentrate on the result, 
not the process, and the Government’s decision making is ignored. On 24 
June 1863 the Tokugawa Government paid the necessary compensation to 
the British Legation. Historians might consider therefore that in the end the 
Government could not escape its responsibility.  
     Yet even though the Government had to pay compensation they could 
scarcely still define themselves as the national government of Japan because 
they did nothing about Satsuma. It was a shameful episode for the Tycoon. 
Compensation was paid nine months after Richardson had been killed when 
it was too late to take any action. Following the Namamugi incident, British 
confidence in the Tycoon’s sovereign status in Japan was shaken. It was now 
understandable why Satow defined the Tycoon not as sovereign but as chief 
of the feudal lords of Japan in Eikoku Sakuron, and also why Parkes used 
the word Highness to describe the Tycoon, Tokugawa Yoshinobu.  
      
     Although the Tycoon’s Government deserved to be criticised over the 
Namamugi Incident, it is still hard to follow modern Japanese 
historiography whereby the British subsequently supported Satsuma and 
significantly interfered in Japanese domestic affairs. This attitude is based 
on historical works by Tokutomi Soho. According to Tokutomi, Satow 
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remarked to Satsuma samurai, Saigo Takamori, that although the British 
had been supporting the Imperial Court, the Mikado and the Court nobles 
still defined them as barbarians.255 On another occasion, during the civil 
war, Satow repeatedly asked Saigo: please take care of this matter as best 
you can. Saigo already knew what Satow meant and, wisely, did not respond 
to him.256 Because Tokutomi is regarded as a major Japanese historical 
authority and was an eye-witness to the 1867 Restoration, Japanese 
historians have always trusted his books without question, and, as a result, 
place the British on the side of the Imperial Court. However, Satow is 
misunderstood by Tokutomi’s account. He was also said to have told Saigo 
that a British military force was ready to join with the Imperial Court during 
the civil war. Yet in his memoir, where Satow described this conversation 
with Saigo, he did not say any such thing. Japanese scholars have believed 
Tokutomi’s version without any proof. Especially after Ishin Kakumeishi no 
Hanmen was published in 1893 the mysticism based on Japanese tradition, 
of which the Imperial family was the core, became the main point for 
Tokutomi to argue. 257  His approach was to place absolute trust in a 
nationalist policy whereby foreign pressure might be the exact element to 
help raise the nationalist spirit. That attitude would contribute to establish 
absolutism for the Imperial family. 
     Judging from Satow’s memoir, it can be seen that Satow met with 
many Japanese samurais and his relationship with Saigo does not appear to 
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be special. Saigo was merely one of them, hence it is hard to believe that 
Satow complained specifically to him. On the contrary, there is an official 
document on the British side about their conversation in January 1867 
suggesting that Satow insisted that Britain would not care whether Japan 
was governed by the Mikado or the Tycoon or the Confederate Daimyos, but 
would just like to know who the true sovereign was.258  His statement 
indicated that the British did not involve themselves with Japanese domestic 
affairs. Also, in 1868, during the civil war, the British Legation soon declared 
neutrality. Thus, although the British had become disillusioned with the 
Tycoon’s Government’s political inability in 1862-3 that did not mean that 
they switched allegiance to the Imperial Court right away. In 1866 the 
British opened tariff convention talks with the Tokugawa Government and 
renewed the 1858 Treaty. Officially, therefore, the British still treated the 
Tycoon as national sovereign even after the Namamugi incident. Thus, it is 
hard to accept the traditional Japanese view that the British had actively 
encouraged the Japanese to embark upon their modernization. That view 
emerged after the foundation of the Meiji Government for the purpose of 
justifying its existence. 
 
     There is one aspect of the Namamugi Incident which modern Japanese 
historians do not discuss. It concerns the murderer of Richardson. Neale 
demanded that Satsuma execute the murderer and because Satsuma refused 
to do so the negotiation was broken off and the bombardment of Kagoshima 
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followed. After this, Satsuma paid compensation to the British, but whether 
they handed over the murderer was not confirmed. After the bombardment, 
the British likewise did not mention the murderer. Judging from both sides’ 
attitudes, it has to be concluded that there was no execution.  
     Did the British withdraw their demand in return for compensation? It 
is difficult to conclude that because, after this incident, in several cases 
where foreigners were killed by radical Japanese, the Westerners demanded 
that the Tycoon’s Government execute the murderers. For example, on 21 
November 1864 British officers Major Baldwin and Lt. Bird visited 
Kamakura where they were attacked and killed by Japanese. Afterwards, 
the Government arrested the murderers and they were executed in front of 
British representatives. Satow wrote about this case in his memoir.259 On 4 
February 1868, after only a small affair when Bizen (modern Okayama) 
samurais fired at some French sailors, the Imperial Court nonetheless 
executed one culpable samurai in front of French representatives. On 8 
March 1868, too, when Tosa (modern Kouchi) samurais fired at French 
sailors in Sakai, the Imperial Court did the same thing. These cases showed 
clearly that when Japanese committed crimes they were executed in front of 
foreigners without exception. So why not after the Namamugi incident?  
     On 8 July 1864 Parkes arrived in Japan to succeed Alcock. Parkes was 
certainly not averse to demanding the execution of murderers as shown by 
the Icaros incident in 1867 when two sailors from the British ship Icaros 
were killed by Japanese. However, Parkes appeared to take no action over 
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arresting the murderer of Richardson in 1864. Perhaps because the 
Namamugi Incident had happened when he was not in Japan? This is 
unlikely because the British believed a deterrent was necessary. So did 
Parkes also make an effort to find the murderer? In one secondary source, 
the Japanese scholar investigating the Namamugi incident suggests that 
Parkes might have negotiated with the Satsuma samurais in secret.260 One 
historical fact is cited: that two days after the arrival of Parkes in Japan, the 
Satsuma samurai, Narahara Kizaemon, died of disease261 and Narahara is 
now widely thought to have killed Richardson. However, the Japanese 
material relating to this was edited after the foundation of the Meiji 
Government; indeed, official material covering the murder of Richardson and 
the bombardment of Kagoshima was edited as late as December 1892, 
making it difficult to accept as a reliable primary source. No eye-witness 
record was produced and it is thus impossible to be certain whether 
Narahara was the real murderer. Because Parkes had been told in 1864 that 
the murderer was already dead, he could take the matter no further. There 
may always be suspicion surrounding the death of Narahara. His timely 
death certainly maintained Satsuma’s dignity, and the Meiji Government’s 
official version may not reflect historical truth in so far as the new regime 
was preoccupied with establishing its own legitimacy and persuading the 
nation that the emergence of its modern Government structure had saved 
Japan from colonisation. It is possible that the British had to be content with 
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the compensation payments from the Tycoon’s Government and from 
Satsuma.  
     On the surface, Richardson’s death at Namamugi in 1862 was only one 
of a number of outrages which resulted in the death of foreigners in Japan 
and for which Western states demanded punishment and compensation. Yet 
unlike others, it gave rise to a serious diplomatic clash with the British, and 
it exposed, for both foreigners and Japanese to see, the ineffectiveness of the 
Tycoon’s Government when obliged to call powerful daimyos to account. 
Clearly the Tycoon did not rule all of Japan. Why, then, were foreign states 
treating with him, as if he was head of a national government, when he could 
not enforce either his own domestic will or the binding international 
agreements which he had entered into? Unable to exact compensation or a 
satisfactory acknowledgement of responsibility from Edo, the British 
diverted their frustration towards Satsuma by way of a naval attack on 
Kagoshima. These events, surrounding and following Richardson’s murder 
on the Tokaido, took place within months of Satow’s arrival in Japan and 


























Chapter IV: Analysis of volume I and II of Eikoku Sakuron  
 
Ernest Satow wrote essays for The Japan Times in 1866 which are 
recognized as a turning point in Japanese modernization. By analyzing not 
only Japanese history and its value, but also by reviewing the historical 
identity of the Mikado and the Tycoon, he concluded that the Tycoon should 
not be the person representing Japan. He emphasised the existence of the 
Mikado and appealed for all Japanese to be united under the Mikado. In the 
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meantime, he suggested to the Western states why they could not establish 
appropriate diplomatic relationships with Japan. According to him, the 
reason was because Western states had made commercial treaties with the 
person who was not the sovereign of Japan. Thus, in these essays, he 
appealed not only to the Japanese but also to the Westerners.  
     Surprisingly, Satow was not a major person in the diplomatic 
relationship between Britain and Japan, his name first appearing in official 
Japanese documents in the 8th month and 20th day of the first year of Keio (9 
October, 1865)  regarding the new house for the British consul in 
Hakodate.262 Presumably, his presence was requested at the negotiations 
simply because he was able to speak and write the Japanese language. Six 
months later, he wrote the essays for The Japan Times, although it is hard to 
believe that in just six months he became a major figure at the British 
Legation. It is natural to assume that his status was unchanged. 
Nevertheless, even as a junior diplomat, his essays had a huge psychological 
impact.  
     Before discussing Satow’s essays, there is one serious question which 
has to be considered. Why when he wrote essays twice for The Japan Times 
on 16 March and 19 May 1866 (he was said to have written another essay in 
April, but that essay has always been missing) in both cases did he write 
anonymously and without using any title? It must be for a political reason. 
In 1868, when Japan entered civil war, Her Majesty’s Government ordered 
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the British Legation to maintain neutrality.263 It is easy to understand the 
reason for non-interference in Japanese domestic affairs. However, Satow 
discussed Japanese domestic affairs with an attitude beyond the bounds of 
British diplomatic instructions. That is why he must have recognized the 
need to write anonymously.  
     In fact, Satow never said anything about these essays. In his memoirs, 
A Diplomat in Japan, he made no definite statements about them. In one 
place only is there a related reference, where he confessed that his essay 
became a pamphlet and was distributed among the Japanese under the 
name of Eikoku Sakuron. The following is his account:  
      
With the aid of my teacher, Numata Torasaburo, a  
retainer of the prince of Awa, who knew some English,  
I put them into Japanese in the form of a pamphlet  
for the perusal of his prince, but copies got into circulation,  
and in the following year, I found myself to be favourably known  
through this means to all the daimios retainers whom  
I met in the course of my journeys.264 
 
According to him, therefore, his essay was written to be handed to the feudal 
lord of Awa (modern Tokushima). If this were true, it could be concluded that 
he did not have any intention to appeal more widely to the Japanese. 
However, the following happened:  
 
In the end the translation was printed and sold 
  in all the bookshops at Ozaka and Kioto under the  
title of Ei-Koku Saku-ron, English policy, by the Englishman  
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Satow, and was assumed by both parties to represent  
           the views of the British Legation.265 
 
One thing must be made clear. Satow admitted only to writing the essays 
which became the pamphlet, not the ones in The Japan Times. Thus, even if 
he was identified as the writer of Eikoku Sakuron in the Japanese version, 
that does not prove conclusively that he was the author of the English 
version. 
     Before any analysis, some information is needed about The Japan 
Times. In the foreign settlement in Yokohama, several newspaper companies 
existed; The Japan Commercial News was one of them. However, because of 
financial troubles, that company had to suspend publication. In May 1865 
the manager of First Bank in Yokohama, Charles Rickerby, bought the 
company and from September of that year, he began to publish the 
newspaper, The Japan Times.266 Yet just three years after that The Japan 
Times was officially discontinued.267 The reason was that although the 
paper hired excellent journalists, Rickerby did not have enough ability in 
management.268 It appeared that The Japan Times did not maintain an 
open-minded position and was just criticising the Tycoon’s Government for 
reasons of populism.269 At the time of the Meiji Restoration the population of 
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the foreign settlement in Yokohama was considered to be about 500.270 
There were other newspapers there, so not all the foreigners might have read 
The Japan Times. The length of Satow’s essays was about one page for each, 
but there was no title or name of author. Thus, although the content of his 
essays was significant for the Japanese, it is possible that his essays were 
not so well known among the Westerners.  
     What then, was Satow’s motive for writing? As he described it in The 
Japan Times:  
 
My proposal was that the Tycoon should descend  
to his proper position as a great territorial noble,  
and that a confederation of daimios under the  
           headship of the Mikado should take his place as  
the ruling power.271 
 
He did not deny the identity of the Japanese national governing system. 
However, he denied the legality of the treaties which Britain had made with 
the Tycoon’s Government in 1854 and 1858 because Her Majesty’s 
Government had been acknowledging the Tycoon as head of state until 1866, 
even though the latter apparently denied this status. Satow thereby 
implicitly rejected the propriety of British diplomacy which was why his 
essays had to be written anonymously. Satow was neither an anarchist nor 
revolutionary. He returned to Japan as British Minister in 1895 as a very 
able and skilful diplomat. However, his idea in 1866 contained the possibility 
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of destroying the diplomatic relationship between Britain and Japan, which 
was why it had an enormous psychological impact on the Japanese.  
     Satow, then, had a specific reason for writing Eikoku Sakuron. After 
analyzing the historical relationship between the Mikado and the Tycoon, he 
defined it as follows: 
 
All that the Mikado had given was a general authority  
to conclude treaties with foreign countries.272 
 
Satow thereby recognized the hidden truth. In a secular aspect, the status of 
the Tycoon was higher than that of the Mikado, which was why he could 
make a treaty with foreign states. However, the treaties should be ratified by 
the Mikado each time, otherwise they would not be validated. In other words, 
without the imperial grant, the Tycoon could not make treaties. Satow might 
have been the first person who recognized that truth having experienced a 
similar situation in 1865. At that time, the Western states requested the 
Tycoon’s Government to open the port of Hyogo (modern Kobe) earlier than 
the date which had been designated in the London Protocol of 1862. He 
attended that negotiation as interpreter and might well have realised that 
the Tycoon’s Government lacked authority in both international diplomacy 
and domestic politics. If this experience led him to write Eikoku Sakuron, 
then it becomes easier to understand the background to why Satow criticised 
the governmental system of the Tycoon in his memoir.273 
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In the meantime, when the Tycoon made treaties with the Western 
states or exchanged official documents with them, he expressed his status as 
Majesty. Satow questioned this as follows: 
 
In the English text the Tycoon was spoken of as  
His Majesty, and thus placed on a level with the Queen.  
In the Japanese version, however, this epithet was  
rendered by the equivalent of Highness, and it was thus to  
be inferred that our sovereign was of lower rank than the Mikado. 
           Moreover, the word queen had been translated by a title which  
was borne by the great-grand-daughters of a Mikado.274 
 
Hence the Tycoon’s Government used the word Majesty for the purpose of 
trying to make an equal relationship with the Western states. Satow might 
have wished to question this approach when he decided to write Eikoku 
Sakuron.  
It is uncertain whether he could have predicted its impact. However, 
for the Japanese, it can be stated that without his essay they could not have 
begun their modernization because, without Eikoku Sakuron, nobody could 
have envisaged a political structure which was not associated with 
feudalism.  
 
     Vol I of Eikoku Sakuron makes the following statement:  
 
Accustomed as are the foreign merchants of Yokohama  
to see in their port vessels of war flying the flag of the  
“morning Sun”－the arrival of a merchant steamer, with the  
private ensign of an independent Daimio at the main, still  
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cannot occur at present without causing some slight decree  
of excitement.275 
 
In his memoir, using an example of a ship from Satsuma,276 Satow insisted 
the same. What he had perhaps intended to complain about in Eikoku 
Sakuron, and later his memoir, was that foreigners were not allowed to trade 
with the Japanese freely, since that was an undeniable fact. But in fact, 
since 1858 the Japanese had started to trade with Western states in 
accordance with the Treaty of Ansei even though, in reality, the Tycoon’s 
Government had dominated and regulated all the international trade. No 
feudal lords or ordinary merchants had been allowed to join it.  
     What was the problem with this? According to Article XIV of Elgin’s 
1858 Treaty: 
 
At each of the ports open to trade, British subjects shall be  
at full liberty to import from their own or other ports, and sell  
there, and purchase therein, and export to their own or any  
other ports, all manner of merchandize, not contraband, paying  
the duties thereon, as laid down in the Tariff annexed to the present  
Treaty, and no other charges whatsoever. 
            With the exception of munitions of war, which shall only be sold  
to the Japanese Government and foreigners, they may freely  
buy from Japanese, and sell to them, any articles that either may  
have for sale, without the intervention of any Japanese officers  
in such purchase or sale, or in making or receiving payment for  
the same; and all classes of Japanese may purchase, sell, seep,  
or use any articles sold to them by British subjects.277 
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The important part is the latter paragraph wherein the British were allowed 
to buy products from the Japanese freely and also were allowed to sell their 
produce in Japan without interruption by Japanese officials. Both British 
and Japanese had the right to promote commercial activities freely.  
     However, that agreement was not being fulfilled. Satow insisted that 
when a ship from Satsuma tried to enter the port of Yokohama, officials of 
the Tycoon’s Government ordered them to anchor to the side of Kanagawa, 
which was far from Yokohama, to prevent communication with the 
foreigners.278 That was an obvious example of how the Tycoon’s Government 
had been ignoring the spirit of Article XIV. Satow tried to point out this 
contradiction to readers of The Japan Times. He reported that the captain of 
that ship had tried to sell Japanese products to the Europeans in accordance 
with Article XIV; governmental officials had not only prohibited their 
commercial activities but also refused the crew permission to land at the 
port.279 
     Judging from the first part of his memoir and from Eikoku Sakuron, it 
was clear that the reason why Satow criticised the Tycoon was not because 
Japan was under feudalism but because of the treaty condition. He argued 
that with the Tycoon’s Government the British could not promote 
commercial activities. But whatever the reason, his attitude was to have a 
significant impact on the Japanese.  
     By what logic did Satow claim that the Tycoon could not provide 
leadership regarding international politics? An eye-witness of the later Meiji 
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Government, F. Brinkley, explained the historical background to the 
authority of the Tycoon. It was that on 28 March 1603 the Mikado had 
appointed Tokugawa Ieyasu as Tycoon and acknowledged his full military 
power.280 This meant that he had achieved victory all over other feudal lords 
and as a result was allowed to govern Japan. Nevertheless, though 
appointed, he was not a member of the Imperial family. Thus, even if the 
Tycoon tried to present himself as the national head of Japan, foreigners 
could not accept him as that. For the foreigners, the Tycoon had been 
entrusted to govern Japan but could not define himself as the true 
representative of the Japanese people in diplomacy because the Tycoon was 
not from the bloodline of the Imperial Court. Satow criticised the Tycoon by 
using the phrase extraordinary presumption in Eikoku Sakuron281 because 
the Tycoon had faced Elgin in diplomatic negotiation as if he were the true 
sovereign of Japan. The reality was that since the late Middle Ages, warriors 
dominated Japan by extending feudalism and as a result the Tycoon became 
recognized as the national head. Furthermore, Tokugawa Ieyasu made the 
code, Kinchu narabi ni kuge sho hatto (Rules of the Imperial Court, and the 
Court Nobles) in 1613,282 and by limiting their activities by that code he 
could control the Imperial Court. That was why, when Graeff van Polesbroek 
passed the imperial palace at Kyoto in April 1858, he confessed that the 
Mikado’s residence was less magnificent than the house of the magistrate of 
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the Tycoon’s Government in Nagasaki.283 The authority of the Mikado had 
been almost forgotten since the late Middle Ages, and under Tokugawa 
Ieyasu, the Mikado and the Imperial Court had been excluded from national 
politics legally. Yet Tokugawa Ieyasu must have recognized that although he 
possessed military superiority against all other feudal lords, he did not 
govern directly across all Japan. That might be one reason why, up to the 
time of Perry’s arrival in 1853, no Japanese had forgotten about the spiritual 
role of the Mikado in 250 years. However, in the 1860s, as international 
trade increased, not only the Japanese but also the Europeans started to see 
this inconsistency within the governance system of Japan.  
     Although Satow criticised the Tycoon for making treaties with Western 
states without eligibility, 284  there were counter opinions. A Japanese 
historian, Tanabe Taichi, who joined the Tycoon’s Government mission as an 
interpreter when they concluded the London Protocol of 1862, claimed that 
the 1854 treaty of amity and friendship with Perry had been based on a 
concept of universal law and international common sense, so there was no 
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reason to question it.285 Furthermore, an eye-witness, Frederick Dickins, 
analysed the political situation in Japan at that time as follows: 
 
In 1858, there was, indeed, no other Japanese authority  
who could even be approached on the subject. All the acts of  
the Japanese state, inclusive of the decrees against Christianity 
 and of the very decree of isolation itself, during the earlier  
Shogunate and during the whole of Tokugawa period, were the  
acts of the Shogun alone; neither Mikado nor Daimio had any  
concern with them.286 
 
Dickins defended the Tycoon because he was the only person who could 
negotiate with the Western states. In fact, Satow was in a minority for 
criticizing the Tycoon as being unsuited for diplomacy. Because the Mikado 
and Court nobles had been excluded from national politics, it was impossible 
to bring them into any international negotiation. When considering that 
background, it appeared more natural that the Tycoon should enter into 
international diplomacy.  
     Even if there were people who questioned the isolation of the Mikado, it 
would have been impossible to express that opinion under the Tokugawa 
Shogunate, because they were not only censored severely but also there was 
no concept of a public press. Even after the foundation of the Meiji 
Government, Joseph Longford pointed out that the number of newspapers in 
Japan was fewer than in Britain.287 It needed several more years for the 
Japanese to appreciate the essence of journalism. Thus, under the Tokugawa 
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Shogunate, although Satow might be irritated by the situation, the Japanese 
had a fixed concept of the Tycoon’s dominance such as nobody questioned, 
and even if they did question it there was no method of dissemination. That 
was the background to the psychological impact of Eikoku Sakuron. Satow 
might even have realised that he could take the lead in spreading a political 
idea among the Japanese.  
     Satow analyzed Japanese domestic affairs in the 1850s. He did not 
investigate the illegality of the Tycoon further in Eikoku Sakuron, but he left 
both Japanese and foreigners to reconsider the characteristics of the 
Shogunate by the following statements: 
 
It must be borne in mind that the Tycoon, though claiming  
to conduct the Government of Japan, is in reality, or was at  
the time when the first treaties were made, only the  
head of a Confederation of Princes.288 
 
Accordingly, the Tycoon could not be the true sovereign of Japan since it was 
proved by historical facts that his Government could not control all Japan. 
Except in the directly controlled Tokugawa regions, there were feudal lords, 
and in each fief there were various laws which applied only there. 
Furthermore, a paper currency which was called han-satsu existed in each 
region.289 This meant that the Tycoon’s Government was not a centralized 
government. It is interesting that after the foundation of the Meiji 
Government, the Japanese claimed two disadvantageous mistakes which the 
Tycoon’s Government had made in the treaties with the West. One was 
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extraterritoriality and the other was the low rate of customs duty. However, 
the Japanese had already experienced the essence of extraterritoriality by 
admitting the existence of feudal lords. Because the Japanese had been 
isolated they could not see that there had been a form of extraterritoriality in 
Japan. Furthermore, even under the Tokugawa Shogunate, the low rate of 
tariff had been a matter for discussion.  
     Another eye-witness, J. H. Gubbins, pointed out the serious problem 
thus created by the Tycoon’s governance system: except for the region under 
his direct control, everywhere else remained isolated as before.290 Gubbins 
concluded that although the Tycoon’s Government had given up the isolation 
policy and opened the ports, the regions of many feudal lords could not enjoy 
any benefit. This was true and meant that the Tycoon’s Government had 
been negligent in enforcing the commercial treaty with Britain. Gubbins’s 
opinion reinforced Satow’s claim that the Tycoon’s Government did not abide 
by Article XIV. Not only that, Satow could cite Article XIV of the 1858 Treaty 
to prove that the Tycoon had not control over all Japan.  
     From this part of his statement, it can be assumed that Satow tried to 
appeal not to the Japanese but to the Europeans; because the Japanese could 
not understand the essence of Article XIV it would be pointless for Satow to 
appeal this point to them. However, although Satow had been focusing on 
Article XIV, he did not think all the Japanese ports should be opened. He 
noted that there were 20 independent feudal lords in Japan291 and if all of 
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their ports were opened, commercial activity would decline. He concluded 
that one or two ports would be enough.292 Satow did not mention which 
ports, but according to Nobutoshi Hagiwara, who had followed the life of 
Satow, those might be Kagoshima and Shimonoseki. 293  It appeared 
contradictory, of course, that Satow should focus on one or two ports after he 
had been claiming the illegality of excluding feudal lords from international 
trade. However, his intention here was not to discuss how many ports might 
be opened but rather to consider whether the Tycoon’s Government could 
open another port or not. He was not an economist, hence did not expect to 
have to discuss how many open ports would be beneficial for both Britain and 
Japan.  
     In fact, Satow wrote as follows: 
 
So long, however, as we continue to have a treaty with  
the Tycoon only, and not with Japan, it will never take place.294 
 
By writing such a clear statement, he showed himself at odds with the 
Tycoon’s Government. Discussion of one or two ports was therefore only a 
method of promoting discussion for what he really intended. It is hard to be 
certain what incident led him to adopt that attitude, but in his memoir, he 
wrote as follows: 
 
It was the keynote of a new policy which recognized the  
Mikado as the sovereign of Japan and the Tycoon as his lieutenant.  
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We gave up the use of Tycoon, which my reading had  
taught me was properly a synonym for the Mikado.295 
 
     The major reason for Satow promoting this discussion of port opening 
was to emphasise the ineligibility of the Tycoon to govern Japan and because 
he feared that a situation would arise causing a serious problem in the 
commercial relationship between Britain and Japan. Also, as a diplomat, he 
might have recognized the serious error which the Tycoon had committed 
when he made treaties with the West which had come into effect without 
imperial ratification. In consequence, Satow boldly proposed a new idea for 
Japanese governance: 
 
We gravely and seriously advocate a radical change.  
What we want is not a Treaty with a single potentate,  
but one binding on and advantageous to everyone in the  
country.296 
 
Satow did not identify the Tycoon as single potentate directly, but judging 
from his previous discussion it was easy to guess who he had in mind. Then, 
he apparently denied the validity of treaties with the Tycoon. This was the 
point which impacted upon those Japanese who had been criticizing the 
Tycoon’s Government since they could now use Eikoku Sakuron as a 
guideline. By stressing the existence of Eikoku Sakuron, they could also cite 
British hostility toward the Tycoon’s Government in order to justify their 
own opposition.  
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     In Japanese historiography, Britain’s anti-Tycoon stance has been 
universally accepted. For that reason, the Japanese have always assumed 
that the British expected the complete collapse of the Tycoon’s Government 
in the early period of the Meiji Restoration. But did Satow really expect that 
to occur? He might have complained about the actions of the Tycoon’s 
Government, but it seems that he did not expect its complete collapse. As he 
said in his memoir,297 he wished to revise the treaty which the British had 
made with the Tycoon, and also to renovate the system of national 
governance. He did not express radical opinions, such as the banishment of 
the Tycoon or the encouragement of any anti-establishment movement. In 
fact, he wrote as follows: 
 
We must give up the worn-out pretence of acknowledging  
the Tycoon to be sole ruler of Japan, and take into  
consideration the existence of the other co-ordinate powers.298 
 
He thereby questioned the political authority of the Tycoon, but he never 
suggested the collapse of the Tycoon’s Government nor condemned the 
governance system by which it had been maintained. Rather, he argued that 
everybody, include the Tycoon himself, should stop recognizing the Tycoon as 
the sole ruler of Japan. In fact, in 1867 Satow met Saigo Takamori and made 
the following statement: 
 
Whether Japan is governed by Mikado, Bakufu, or  
becomes a Confederation, we don’t care. But we should  
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like to know who is the real head.299 
 
Satow and the British were focusing on international trade; they did not 
much care who became a representative of Japan. 
 
The Japanese who read the above paragraph in The Japan Times, 
however, must have concluded that Satow represented the will of the British, 
and the samurais of Satsuma quickly responded. In June 1866, three months 
after the first volume appeared, Parkes visited Kagoshima to meet Saigo. In 
the past, it has been widely accepted that both Parkes and Saigo could agree 
about the idea expressed in Eikoku Sakuron. The scholar of Japanese 
history, Takashi Ishii, has confessed that in the past he attached much 
importance to their agreement.300 However, he subsequently changed his 
view after considering the content of their conference. According to Ishii, 
Saigo requested that Parkes should cite the bad faith of the Tycoon’s 
Government over opening the port of Hyogo. However, Parkes declined 
Saigo’s request, insisting that the foreigners never joined or interfered with 
Japanese domestic affairs.301 This is one example of how long-accepted 
aspects of Japanese history needed to be re-evaluated. 
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     Ishii provides another example. This was on 16 February 1867 when 
Komatsu Tatewaki, who was the major retainer of Satsuma, met Satow and 
Mitford in Osaka. Komatsu insisted that if the British Minister made a 
treaty with the Mikado directly it would significantly damage the Tycoon. 
However, Mitford replied that if any feudal lord wished action for the future 
of Japan then he should be the first to do so.302 Despite this reply, Komatsu 
still expected British action, so he entreated Mitford to ask whether the 
British Minister might express his distrust of the Tycoon’s Government in a 
simple statement. Komatsu urged that if Parkes said that, not only would 
the other Western states but also the major Japanese feudal lords be united 
behind one idea. However, Mitford’s attitude did not change and he again 
declined Komatsu’s request, claiming that Komatsu should not expect 
anything from the British.303 When Parkes received a report of this from 
Mitford, he judged this attitude to be highly appropriate.304  
     These episodes showed one important truth: that the Japanese, 
especially the samurais of Satsuma, only appreciated Satow’s idea according 
to their own interests and that they misunderstood if they thought that the 
British had been expecting the collapse of the Tycoon’s Government. 
Nevertheless that idea survived among the Japanese, and when the Meiji 
Government, of which Satsuma was the centre, had been founded, it became 
orthodoxy. Even in present times, the Japanese widely believe that the 
British were on the side of Satsuma. Some people have even criticised Satow 
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as too presumptuous in interfering in Japanese politics. Yet judging from 
these decisions by Parkes, Satow and Mitford, it seems clear that the British 
never intended any interference in Japanese domestic affairs. That 
reinforces Satow’s statement that Britain did not care who became the 
leader of Japan. Even so, many Japanese did not anticipate that, and 
subsequently analysed the whole process of the Meiji Restoration according 
to their earlier expectations.  
     In The Japan Times, Satow concluded as follows: 
 
In other words we must supplement or replace our present  
treaties, by treaties with the CONFEDERATE DAIMIOs  
of Japan.305 
 
He did not mention anything about the collapse of the Tycoon’s Government. 
Furthermore, he proposed the formation of a confederation of Daimios, so he 
presumably considered that feudalism would be maintained or else there 
would be no structure for Japanese society. Satow must therefore have 
considered that the Japanese should retain the Tycoon. Satow did not 
express total disapproval of Japan’s social system; he just claimed that the 
Tycoon should not be the representative of Japan and that his Government 
should not be the administrative body for Japan. According to Eikoku 
Sakuron, when translated into Japanese, this attitude was expressed by 
making the following points: 
 
1. We do not expect to make treaties with one person. 
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2. We know that the Tycoon is not the true sovereign of Japan.  
3. We know there are several feudal lords who possessed the same political 
power and authority as the Tycoon. 
4. We are expecting to make the new treaty with those feudal lords, or 
modifying the present treaty with the Tycoon.306 
 
     Judging from the above, it was perhaps natural for the Japanese to 
conclude that the British adopted an anti-Tycoon policy. It is not certain if 
the translator intentionally wrote as above, or whether the translator did not 
possess a full command of the English language. Nevertheless, by this 
translation the samurais of Satsuma very likely misunderstood the British 
attitude, assumed that the British were on the side of Satsuma and would 
willingly fight against the Tycoon’s Government with them. Either that or 
possibly they intentionally distorted Satow’s idea for the purpose of 
promoting the anti-Tycoon movement. After all, Satow had complained about 
treaty implementation by the Tycoon, and the samurais of Satsuma might 
therefore justify their actions by pointing that out, and quoting Eikoku 
Sakuron as proof of it. The samurais of Satsuma were seeking proof to justify 
their opposition and Satow’s essays were useful for their ambitions.  
     In fact, comparing the statement in The Japan Times and the Japanese 
version of Eikoku Sakuron, there was a significant difference in one place. In 
The Japan Times Satow wrote: 
 
It would not be a political revolution, deposing the  
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Tycoon from the position which he arrogated as head of the  
Government, for that has taken place already.307 
 
His point was that the Tycoon had already fallen from the position of 
national sovereign, so any action against him would not be a political 
revolution. In the English version, there was nothing which qualified the 
word, Tycoon. However, in the Japanese version, the Tycoon was described 
as the person who pretended himself as the Tycoon.308 Japanese in the 
1860s were not familiar with English and most commonly people listened to 
a translation from a senior official’s writings. The Japanese version of 
Eikoku Sakuron goes some way to explain how the Japanese misunderstood 
Britain’s attitude.  
     Although Satow did not criticise the Tycoon directly, he calmly 
analysed the position of the Tycoon and concluded as follows: 
 
We have lately seen the Tycoon acknowledge by his  
actions that without the sanction of the Mikado they would  
never be carried out or be recognized by the Daimios, and  
from this men have naturally and reasonably concluded  
the Mikado to be the superior.309 
 
From Satow’s point of view, when the Tycoon had requested imperial 
ratification for the treaties with the foreigners, that became the turning 
point at which the Japanese commonly understood that the Mikado was 
superior to the Tycoon. By emphasizing that obvious fact, he demonstrated 
the temporal as well as the spiritual superiority of the Mikado, whereas the 
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Tycoon’s Government had long concealed that idea by enforcing the Rules of 
the Imperial Court and the Court Nobles of 1615 and thereby intentionally 
hidden the Mikado from society. That was why when Alcock asked about the 
condition of the Mikado, one official replied that nobody could see the 
Mikado.310 
     Satow effectively rescued the Mikado from that situation by 
demonstrating his superiority and by explaining that although the Tycoon’s 
Government made treaties and claimed their effectiveness, those treaties 
would be meaningless without imperial ratification. For the Japanese to 
consider that any imperial grant would be unnecessary in diplomacy would 
mean denying the existence of the Mikado, which would call into question 
Japanese national identity. In fact, all the treaties of 1858 were not ratified 
until November 1865. In international law, it could be argued that the 
Tycoon’s Government established diplomatic and commercial relations with 
Western states based on ineffective treaties. Against that background, Satow 
wrote as follows: 
 
A notion however, has arisen out of this that a Treaty  
with the Mikado will be a good thing.311 
 
By using this euphemistic expression, he nevertheless denied the validity of 
the treaty with the Tycoon. He might, of course, have reached the conclusion 
that the Tycoon’s Government could not properly represent Japan after 
reviewing its poor diplomatic procedures. Yet at the same time, he suggested 
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the creation of a Confederate of Daimios whose political status would become 
equal to that of the Tycoon. Under feudalism, there would be a difference 
between them, but once feudalism disappeared the Tycoon would not be able 
to maintain his superiority over them. These factors were important when 
Satow suggested a Confederation of the Daimios. Having already concluded 
that the Tycoon could not be the national sovereign and, in the meantime, 
that the Mikado could not easily be brought out from his spiritual role, either 
way the British could not establish a well developed diplomatic and 
commercial relationship. Thus, the Confederate of Daimios would fill the 
political gap. Satow may also have still been influenced by the actions of the 
samurais of Choshu who in May 1863 had fired on foreign ships passing 
through the Shimonoseki strait. He wrote in his memoir that the samurais of 
Choshu had done this by following an imperial order.312 It was clear from 
that incident, though, that all Japanese would follow the Mikado’s direction.  
     For Satow, if another body could receive the imperial ratification then 
the British would not have to recognize the Tycoon as the national head. In 
the meantime, to maintain its dominance, the Tokugawa Shogunate had 
been excluding the major feudal lords who had expected to join in national 
politics. This suggested to Satow that the Tycoon had already lost much 
authority as the ruler of Japan. Satow thus gave up supporting the Tycoon 
and shifted to the Confederate of Daimios, consisting of the major feudal 
lords. Then, by applying the traditional concept of the Mikado to that 
confederation, Satow considered that this might be the ideal structure for 
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the future Japan. All would obey the Mikado without hesitation, hence the 
issue of leadership among the feudal lords would be solved easily. Under 
Imperial authority, the major feudal lords would be involved in both 
domestic and international affairs, and in the name of the confederate, the 
Mikado could ratify their decisions. That process would be much smoother 
than that of the Tycoon’s application for an imperial grant. Under imperial 
and confederate authority, Japanese politics would be organized better than 
under the Tokugawa Shogunate.  
Satow must have envisaged this when he wrote in1866: 
 
Between the present time and Jan. 1st, 1868, on which  
date Hiogo is to be opened, there is ample time for  
negotiations with the Daimios, for discussing every point  
hitherto in dispute, for settling what new ports shall be  
opened and in which Daimios’ territories, and for establishing  
           our relations generally on a secure and permanent footing.313 
 
By the London Protocol of 1862, the port of Hyogo was to be opened on 1 
January 1868. Considering the present situation, however, Satow must have 
worried whether the Tycoon’s Government could enforce that agreement. 
That was why, right after the above statement, he wrote: 
 
Unless some arrangement is come to before that date,  
we fear that we shall not enter on residence at the port  
without resort to coercion and bloodshed.314 
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This statement clearly reflected Satow’s apprehension, and in making it he 
again criticised the Tycoon indirectly. When he used the word bloodshed, he 
might have been resigned to situations in which Japanese would attack the 
British, or the British would take further actions such as the 1863 
bombardment of Kagoshima and that of Shimonoseki in 1864. For him, 
opening Hyogo as planned represented a serious problem, and on that issue 
he clearly did not trust the Tycoon. In fact, had Satow trusted the Tycoon’s 
Government he could have presented a revised proposal involving further 
negotiations－a natural tendency in diplomacy. However, he did not suggest 
anything. His distrust of the Tycoon’s Government was shown by the 
following statement: 
 
If we would avert such misfortunes; we must treat with  
the Daimios for they are responsible rulers of the country  
equally with the Tycoon.315 
 
It is easy to understand Satow’s thinking. He insisted that the foreigners 
should make treaties with the feudal lords because they exercised 
responsible authority. He did not deny the existence of the Tycoon but he 
recognized him only alongside other feudal lords. This was the point which 
was judged to be revolutionary by the Japanese.  
     Meanwhile, among British diplomatic staff, Satow’s suggestions were 
the opposite to those of Parkes. Dickins portrayed the feelings of Parkes as 
follows: 
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Nevertheless, from the Tycoon only could we with any  
effect or show of legal right, demand the fulfillment of  
engagements made by his predecessors, and acknowledged  
by him alone as valid and binding. In the dissolution of his  
Government and existing relations, we should lose the only solid  
foundation for the assertion of Treaty rights.316 
 
Privately, Parkes might have felt dissatisfied with the Tycoon’s Government, 
but, as British Minister, he was bound by the official view and therefore 
concluded that only the person who had made the treaty with the British 
was the one whom the British could recognize as sovereign. In diplomatic 
terms, Parkes was correct, which was why he considered that anything 
which might lead to the collapse of the Tycoon’s Government should be 
avoided.317  
     However, six months after Satow’s article was carried in the 
newspaper, Parkes sent the following letter to Flowers, the British consul in 
Nagasaki: 
 
The Mikado is now the Sovereign without doubt－the  
Tycoon is one of his principal and most intelligent ministers  
and advisers.318 
 
Whether Parkes realised that Satow was the author of that essay is unclear; 
in his memoir, Satow wrote that Parkes appeared not to know it. 319 
However, Parkes now clearly began to see the Mikado as the sovereign of 
Japan and, while maintaining diplomatic relations with the Tycoon, 
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appeared to recognize step by step who should be Japan’s true 
representative. Satow had taken a truly radical step in being the first to 
deny the political authority of the Tycoon and when defining the Tycoon as 
having merely the same status as other major feudal lords. Parkes initially 
looked nervous at the prospect of the disappearance of the Tycoon’s 
Government, but after considering Satow’s perspective, seemed to worry 
less. Satow had recognized that the existence of the Mikado and a 
confederate of Daimios would be able to conduct both national politics and 
international diplomacy. Admittedly, neither in Eikoku Sakuron nor in his 
memoir, although he had criticised the Tycoon and his government, did he 
promote discussion much about the new political regime to be a replacement. 
Perhaps he could not foresee one, or feared a situation in which readers of 
his essays would start radical movements, or where Japan might become 
anarchic as a result of a complete collapse of responsible government. 
     So why did Satow criticise the Tycoon’s Government as he did? One 
reason was clear: the Tycoon’s Government did not abide by Article XIV. He 
wrote that: 
 
The Gods themselves cannot fight against the Inevitable  
and, though somewhat reluctantly, we have no doubt that  
the TYCOON’S cabinet will yield, with very slight pressure,  
to the conviction that Art. XIV. of the Treaty with their  
master cannot longer be treated as a dead letter.320 
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He may even have feared that the Tycoon’s Government would unilaterally 
renounce the treaty. On 12 February 1861 the American Minister, Townsend 
Harris, wrote to Alcock, describing Japan as a half civilized state and similar 
to Europe in the Middle Ages. 321  That was a common concept among 
Europeans about the Japanese, so Satow likely interpreted the Tycoon’s 
failure to follow the articles of the treaty as evidence that the Japanese had 
no understanding of international law and agreement. But there was also a 
translated document which Alcock had handed in to the Tycoon’s 
Government which criticised the Government severely for not following the 
articles of the treaty, and for activities contrary to its terms.322 The fact that 
this had been translated into Japanese means that officials of the Tycoon’s 
Government certainly read it. Yet even though Parkes had replaced Alcock 
as British Minister, the attitude of the Tycoon’s Government did not change. 
All this gave Satow grounds for fearing that his prediction of chaos would 
become reality.  
 
     In the next paragraph of Eikoku Sakuron part I, Satow reflected upon 
what had been done by the foreigners. It concerned events in 1862-63 when 
Japanese radicals had attacked foreigners by way of expressing their 
political views. Satow recalled how the foreigners had requested the Tycoon’s 
Government to expel all the Japanese from the foreign concession in 
Yokohama to preserve security. 323  From the Europeans, therefore, the 
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Tycoon, who merely existed as Titular Sovereign of Japan, assumed that he 
possessed national sovereignty.324 It was thus, in part, the attitude of the 
Europeans which allowed both foreigners and Japanese to misunderstand 
the social and political status of the Tycoon. Satow now much regretted this, 
claiming that it was a real mistake to recognize this great Daimio as the 
national head.325 He refused to use the word ‘Tycoon’ anymore, which was 
one way of showing his feeling and indicating that the Shogun had been 
demoted to the status of being just one feudal lord. He concluded his essay of 
16 March as follows: 
 
Therefore we earnestly commend the matter to the  
“best consideration”, of the Representatives of the Treaty  
powers, convinced that, not only will the measure be of immense  
benefit to the country, but that a great stimulus will be also given  
to our own rising trade with Japan.326 
 
Judging from this, Satow was suggesting that when reforming the national 
administrative system in Japan, a process started by foreigners via 
diplomatic policy would be much more effective than one started by the 
Japanese. He was afraid that if it was started by the Japanese, it would 
become a revolution. In fact, The Times of 2 July 1864 reported a debate in 
the House of Lords on the previous day in which it had been remarked that 
China had been flourishing until the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842, but after it, 
China experienced anarchy and serious poverty. 327  Renegotiating the 
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Japanese treaty might therefore be profitable.328 Aware of this strand of 
public opinion in Britain, perhaps that was why Satow could not have 
predicted the civil war, revolution and chaos which subsequently developed.  
     The Japanese version of Satow’s letter was a little different on this 
point. It omitted the paragraph which expressed the view that other feudal 
lords possessed the same responsibility as the Tycoon. The paragraph in 
which Satow admitted that the foreigners themselves had some 
responsibility for allowing the Tycoon to misunderstand his status was also 
omitted. The following paragraph, too was left out of the Japanese version: 
 
By the TYCOON and his cabinet, as relieving them 
from domestic troubles and jealous, by the Daimios as  
opening to them new springs of wealth, by the people of  
the country and by the foreign traders for the same reason.329 
 
So, the Japanese version focused only on Satow’s criticism of the Tycoon, and 
the paragraph which expressed potential benefit for both the Tycoon and the 
other feudal lords was deleted. It is unclear whether the translator 
intentionally omitted this or whether Satow, who was involved with 
composing the Japanese version, was instrumental. Of course, the 
readership of The Japan Times and that of the Japanese version would have 
had different points of views. In the Japanese version, it was stated that 
Satow’s proposal would facilitate profitable commercial activities between 
the British and the Japanese.330 Because Satow had been criticizing the 
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Tycoon for controlling international trade and had argued that his proposal 
would be beneficial for the commercial relationship between Britain and 
Japan, his idea was taken up by the Japanese as one whereby if they could 
diminish the status of the Tycoon then everybody could be involved in 
international trade, and as a result, everybody could benefit. The expression 
in the Japanese version was vague, thereby increasing its impact on the 
Japanese because they could understand Satow’s proposal according to their 
own wishes.  
     In The Japan Times, Satow wrote more for the foreigners and about the 
need to reform Japan’s administrative system, but in the Japanese version 
the emphasis is on the downfall of the Tycoon as beneficial for Japan’s 
future. The Japanese language being complex, simple changes created 
different meanings and expressions. Satow would have recognized that. Yet 
however these subtle changes came about, it is easy to understand why 
many Japanese came to regard his essays as a guide for modernization.  
 
     It was always said that Satow published his second essay in April 1866 
in The Japan Times in order to continue this discussion. That article 
however, has never been found. Thus, it is impossible to follow his views in 
detail through The Japan Times. However, in the Japanese version, there 
were several paragraphs which clearly had been translated from English, so 
these parts must be assumed to be from the article in English which was 
carried in April.  
147 
 
     In volume II, Satow insisted that the current treaties should be 
annulled and that new treaties, from which all the feudal lords could receive 
common benefit, should be concluded. 331  Satow wrote 45, which was 
considered as the date April 5.332 He openly expressed his pleasure that 
there were several readers who had changed their opinions after reading his 
previous article.333 If true, this would indicate the emergence of several 
Japanese who both understood Satow’s intention and tried to base their 
actions on his proposal. In fact, from the response, Satow now wrote that his 
idea could be published freely. 334  He did not, however, indicate what 
response or what kind of people responded.  
     The main point was that Satow was indicating the declining authority 
and dignity of the Tycoon. To illustrate that, he pointed out the historical 
fact of the 14th Tycoon Tokugawa Iemochi’s visit to Kyoto in the spring of 
1863. Gubbins stated that the city of Kyoto had not seen the Tycoon for about 
250 years; 335  he also described the Tycoon’s visit as pathetic. 336  The 
situation for Tokugawa Iemochi was completely different from that for 
Tokugawa Iemitsu, who was the third Tycoon. In 1634 the latter visited 
Kyoto and at that time 300,000 soldiers followed him.337 By doing this, 
Iemitsu demonstrated both the political and military power of the Tycoon to 
the Imperial Court. After Iemitsu, however, no Tokugawa shoguns visited 
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Kyoto until Iemochi. The reason for that was that by distancing itself from 
the Imperial Court the Tycoon’s Government asserted the political 
superiority held since the time of Ieyasu. By contrast, Iemochi was now 
ordered to visit by the Emperor Komei. That was clear evidence that the 
Tycoon’s Government had lost its superiority, which was why Gubbins used 
the word pathetic to describe Iemochi’s situation. Gubbins, of course, was an 
eye-witness of that era. Thus, it would be natural not only that Satow but 
also intelligent Japanese should reach the same conclusion. Satow 
mentioned another historical incident: the fight at the Hamaguri gate to the 
imperial palace in 1864 when soldiers from Choshu had marched to and fired 
upon the Imperial Court, following the expulsion of Court nobles 
sympathetic to Choshu. The Tycoon’s Government declared war against 
Choshu in 1865, claiming that it was defending the Imperial Court. Yet 
although the Tycoon had declared his position and his wish to subjugate 
Choshu, most feudal lords had not obeyed. Indeed, the government started to 
think about making a peace settlement. He cited this fact as a major example 
of the collapse of dignity for the Tycoon.338 In addition, Satow referred to the 
Namamugi incident with Richardson in September 1862.339 By this method 
he showed how strong his complaint against the Tycoon’s Government was.  
     Satow’s criticism of the Tycoon was, however, too severe because it was 
the Tycoon with whom the British had officially established diplomatic 
relations. However, in his memoir, he explained his position as follows: 
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I suppose the idea of the foreign diplomatic representatives 
at that time was to support the Tycoon, whose claim to be considered  
           the sovereign of Japan had already been called in question by Rudolph 
           Lindau in his “Open Letter” of 1862, against the anti-foreign  
party consisting of the Mikado and Daimios, and if necessary to convert  
him into something more than a mere feudal ruler.340 
 
It was true that the Mikado and his Court nobles had been maintaining an 
anti-foreign policy and, for Satow, the attitude of foreign diplomats to 
support the Tycoon’s Government, whose inclination appeared to be more 
pro-foreign, was understandable. However, knowing Japanese history and 
cultural values, he suspected that diplomats had not understood the 
significance of supporting the Tycoon. To support the Tycoon effectively 
meant to be against the Mikado, which would lead to a situation where all 
foreigners became the enemy for the Japanese. Of course, the British 
Legation did not announce anti-Imperial Court sentiment officially, but 
Satow feared how that attitude might cause the above. Satow reflected: 
 
For we had as yet no idea of the immense potency that  
lay in the mere name of the sovereign de jure, and our studies  
in Japanese history had not yet enabled us to realize the truth  
that in the civil wars of Japan the victory had as a rule rested  
with the party that had managed to obtain possession of the  
person of Mikado and the regalia.341 
 
Without any understanding of international protocol, the Japanese held the 
existence of the Mikado as their guiding principle. That was crucial from 
Satow’s point of view, and Parkes did not seem to understand this properly. 
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Although the British declared neutrality regarding Japanese domestic 
affairs, that attitude would be meaningless if the Japanese came to define 
the British as a national enemy because they emphasised their diplomatic 
relationship with the Tycoon. If that happened, it was possible that British 
residents could no longer stay in Japan, even though their main concern was 
just international trade. In effect, Satow was warning his own nationals.  
     Satow concluded volume II by insisting that Japan’s unstable political 
situation was being caused by feudal lords denying the status of the Tycoon’s 
Government.342 ‘This matter’, was not yet completed, but by ‘your’ efforts, 
that would soon be reality. He ended by saying that the British always 
looked forward to trade freely with the Japanese.343 Satow did not write 
more specifically, but Hagiwara pointed out that this matter meant the 
treaties with the feudal lords and you meant the foreign representatives.344 
As in volume I, Satow again appealed to the foreign Ministers to point out 




Chapter V: Analysis of volume III of Eikoku Sakuron 
 
     The method of Satow’s argument carried by The Japan Times on 19 
May 1866, recognized as volume III, was totally different from his previous 
articles. He introduced the argument as follows: 
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WHILE advocating, lately, the abrogation of the existing  
Treaty with the Tycoon and the substitution of a more  
equitable and comprehensive convention with the MIKADO  
and the Confederated Daimios of Japan, we have hitherto  
contented ourselves with stating the broader arguments in  
favour of the measure.345 
 
He now introduced a discussion of the value of making a treaty with the 
Mikado and the Confederate of Daimios, for both foreigners and Japanese, 
above that with the Tycoon’s Government. In volumes I and II, Satow had 
consistently pointed out the inadequacy of the treaty with the Tycoon, but 
although he criticised the Tycoon, he did not compare the Mikado and 
Tycoon directly. However, in volume III, by writing the following, he changed 
his method of analysis: 
 
Our intention at present, is to go more into particulars  
than heretofore, and, taking the provisions of the existing  
Treaty in detail-to strengthen the position we have thought  
it right to take up, in opposition to the continuance of the present 
arrangements, by showing how completely wrong was the TYCOON  
in taking the first step of signing in a character which did not belong  
to him-how utterly incapable he has since proved himself to be of  
carrying out his own engagements-and finally, how generally  
insufficient are the Treaty and Trade Regulations for commercial  
as well as international purposes.346 
 
Satow decided to focus on the Tycoon’s questionable status, and also the 
serious problem which had emerged in terms of trade, rather than appealing 
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for a revision of the present treaty. In the meantime, he continued to study 
Japanese history and customs so that he could understand the relative 
positions of the Mikado and the Tycoon and thereby gain enough evidence for 
his criticisms. There were three contentious issues which Satow had already 
indicated: those were “revision of treaty”, “failure in politics by the Tycoon” 
and “inadequate conditions and regulations concerning international trade”. 
He explained that the first two topics had already been discussed,347 so did 
not include them in volume III. 
     Satow started by saying that Japanese scholars would blame foreigners 
if the latter did not appreciate that the title Tycoon should be applied only to 
the Mikado.348 In other words, the title was incorrectly used by the British. 
Tycoon in Japanese meant the Great Prince, so it seemed clear that the word 
must be reserved for the imperial family. Admittedly, the word was 
commonly used for the Shogun. For example, in the time of Alcock, both he 
and the British generally had already used Tycoon to indicate the Shogun, 
although, lacking any knowledge of Japanese history, they could not 
understand the origin of the word. Since the Shogun’s deputy had signed the 
treaty after diplomatic negotiation, by that fact the British might have 
thought that the Shogun was the true national sovereign or was a member of 
the imperial family. Long before, King James I of England had addressed 
Tokugawa Ieyasu as To the highe and mightie the emperor of Japan.349 In 
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the seventeenth century the British appeared to believe that his bloodline 
was that of the imperial family.  
     The British might perhaps be excused this misunderstanding since, 
given the long history of feudalism in Japan and dominance by Shoguns, the 
Japanese themselves had forgotten the importance of the Mikado. When 
even they considered their national hierarchy, nobody could define exactly 
what status the Mikado should possess-particularly since the Tycoon’s 
Government could control the Mikado and the Imperial Court. Neither 
British nor Japanese seemed able to explain the true meaning of the word 
Tycoon, and as few Japanese could use English after establishing diplomatic 
relations with the British, there was no opportunity for discussion about its 
usage. Gubbins suggested that because the Japanese had no diplomatic 
relationship with foreigners, the mistaken identity of the Tycoon was 
commonplace among the Europeans.350  
     The Japanese had not recognized this as a serious problem until 1867 
when they had to face up to its difficulties. In that year, for the purpose of 
establishing a diplomatic position in Europe, the 15th Tycoon Tokugawa 
Yoshinobu sent his young brother, Akitake, to Europe as his deputy. Among 
the Japanese staff was Shibusawa Eiichi. When he interviewed Tokugawa 
Yoshinobu in 1911, he raised the point that no British Ministers in London 
used the word Majesty for the Tycoon. When asked the reason for this, the 
British had replied that it was because there was someone whose status was 
higher than that of the Tycoon, so the Tycoon should be referred to as 
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Highness.351 Thus, according to Shibusawa, for the purpose of compromise, 
the Japanese used the word Tycoon for the first time in their history.352 
Shibusawa stated honestly during the interview why the Japanese had 
compromised so easily. It was because whatever English words were used, 
everything would mean Majesty in Japanese.353  
     However, Shibusawa’s account is hard to verify because Dickins 
recalled the following: 
 
The word ‘taikun’(Tycoon) is found in the Japanese text  
of the 1858 Treaty. It is merely descriptive, meaning ‘Great Lord’,  
and is not a title or name at all.354 
 
     If this were true, then the Japanese had already used the word Tycoon 
in diplomacy before 1858, and had a sense of its meaning. True, the Japanese 
did not use the word Tycoon until the arrival of the foreigners, because it 
served no function under the Tokugawa Shogunate. Shibusawa must have 
known that, but possibly chose in 1911 to protect the dignity of the last 
Tycoon, expressing in the interview the great sense of crisis which he had felt 
in 1867. He confessed that had the Japanese used the word Highness, the 
Tycoon’s Government would have lost standing in Europe, because highness 
would mean that the Tycoon was one rank lower than any head of a 
European state.355  
     On that point, Satow wrote critically: 
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THE SHOGOON, or SJOGOON, or SIEGOON, as his  
name is indifferently spelt, has signed a treaty with the  
representatives of foreign powers under another and more  
dignified appellation, to which he has no right.356 
 
For Satow, since the Tycoon should not be acknowledged as the head of 
Japan, any other title should therefore be fine for him. He insisted that 
nobody should criticise European diplomats for misunderstandings in the 
past; they should not feel that they had been deceived by the Shogun.357 He 
exonerated them by the following statement: 
 
It was a matter of total indifference to them (as may be  
proved by reference to Lord ELGIN’s dispatches on the  
subject) by what title he chose to be called, so long as he really  
was, as he pretended to be, and as they believed him to be,  
the real and bona fide Sovereign of Japan.358 
 
For Satow, the question was primarily whether the Tycoon was qualified to 
govern Japan. The title, Tycoon, was merely the first step in this wider 
discussion.  
When developing his argument Satow mentioned Lord Elgin and the 
titles of both sovereigns used in the treaty of 1858. The first part of the 1858 
Treaty stated: 
 
HER Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of  
Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the Tycoon of  
Japan, being desirous to place the relations between the two  
                                                 





countries on a permanent and friendly footing, and to facilitate  
commercial intercourse between their respective subjects, and  
having for that purpose resolved to enter into a Treaty of Peace,  
Amity and Commerce, have named as their Plenipotentiaries.359 
 
     Now, in 1866, Satow wrote as follows: 
 
If TOKUGAWA is Majesty-what is the Mikado? The  
Mikado, who is always spoken of as the supreme dignitary  
of the Empire, and the extortion of whose real or pretended  
sanction to the Treaty made with the SHOGOON is held to  
be the great diplomatic success of the past year.360 
 
     This was the point which Satow was trying to stress most in his essay; 
it was also the point which the Japanese had never confronted in their 
history, because no Japanese had ever compared the authority of the Mikado 
and that of the Tycoon in any detail. This was largely because the Tycoon’s 
Government had hidden the Mikado, as was recognized in minutes kept at 
the British Legation wherein staff reported to Alcock that the Mikado had no 
method of communicating outside the Imperial Court.361 Longford expressed 
the astonishment among the citizens of Kyoto when they watched the 
Emperor Komei take the 14th Tycoon, Tokugawa Iemochi, to the Shrine of 
Kamo in 1863. Even people in Kyoto had never seen the Mikado.362 Except 
for this incident, until the foundation of the Meiji Government it was rare 
that the Mikado left the Imperial Court throughout Japanese history. The 
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Mikado was neither criticised nor compared to ordinary people on account of 
his divinity.  
 Although the Mikado’s spiritual role was clear, his secular status was, 
of course, less certain. Satow did not provide a clear definition of the 
Mikado’s position in The Japan Times; the best description was by Joseph 
Longford, who defined the Mikado as follows: 
 
At Kioto, there was always the Emperor, the legitimate  
sovereign the sole legal source of honour and of all authority,  
sacred as the descendant of the gods in the eyes of all his subjects,  
but as powerless in fact as he was supreme in name.363 
 
In contrast to the Mikado, he defined the Tycoon as follows: 
 
At Kamakura firstly, after its fall at Kioto, and later at Yedo,  
was the Shogun, the vassal of the Emperor but the de facto  
ruler of the Empire, rich and powerful, living in such splendor,  
dignity and authority that he was believed by Europeans to be  
the Emperor.364 
 
Longford used the phrase de facto, thereby indicating that although the 
Tycoon was recognized as possessing the same political authority and dignity 
as the Mikado, it was effective only as long as the Tycoon honoured the 
Mikado. The Tycoon could never be the national representative by himself, 
and was himself a courtier of the Mikado, as defined by Longford. However, 
no Japanese could clearly appreciate that idea in the 1860s. Satow’s appeal 
in The Japan Times appeared therefore almost too radical.  
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     Continuing his analysis, Satow pointed out that the Tycoon had 
already been styled Highness by the Japanese, so concluded that the 
Tycoon’s status could not be more than that.365 Regarding this, though, one 
thing must be made clear. The title of Highness was used not only for the 
Tycoon but also for members of the imperial family and for the highest 
nobility at the Imperial Court. Highness was thus applied to people of the 
highest social classes in Japan. Although Satow indicated the Tycoon’s 
status by using the title Highness, that did not mean that the term Highness 
was invented for the Tycoon, nor that the Tycoon had deceived the foreigners 
by posing as a member of the imperial family when using it. Perhaps Satow 
merely tried to assert that, by designating him Highness, the Tycoon could 
never be equal to the Mikado. 
     Meanwhile, Nobutoshi Hagiwara, who has examined the translated 
version of the 1858 Treaty, has shown proof of deception by the Government. 
It lay in the titles of both national heads when translated into Japanese. In 
the Japanese version, Tycoon was translated as A Tycoon of Japan and A 
Tycoon of the Great Empire of Japan.366 In the English version, the word 
Majesty was used to express the status of the Tycoon, but in the Japanese 
version, they did not use the word, Heika. What is Heika? Satow explained: 
 
Usually translated by “Emperor” in all the Chinese- 
English dictionaries, but really meaning “supreme sovereign”,  
and applicable to both sexes.367 
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Satow used the phrase supreme sovereign to refer to a head of the state. So, 
had the government wished to define the Tycoon as national sovereign they 
would have used Heika in the Japanese version. However, they did not. The 
reason was that if Heika was used for the Tycoon, all Japanese would be 
severely critical because Heika could apply only to the Mikado. Officials 
avoided that word in the Japanese version.  
     Therein lay the problem, both domestically and internationally. For the 
British, the Tycoon used the word Majesty, but for the Japanese, he did not. 
However, the Tycoon had to engage in this deception, otherwise the Western 
states would have noticed that there was an authority superior to the 
Tycoon, in which case, they would have started to negotiate directly with the 
Mikado and intelligent Japanese would have realised again the legitimacy of 
the Imperial Court. Consequently, Daimios and samurais would begin to 
reject the dominance of the Tokugawa Shogunate and place themselves 
under the direct influence of the Mikado.  
     In the meantime, the Tycoon’s Government also made a false statement 
regarding Queen Victoria. She was described in the official Japanese 
documents as A Queen of Britannia and Ireland. 368  That meant the 
Japanese documents did not use the word Heika for her, thereby trying to 
put her on the same level as the Tycoon. Had they used Heika, she would 
have been recognized as having the same status as the Mikado. And there 
was an advantage in using the word Queen. For the Japanese, the word 
Jyo-o which means Queen, was historically familiar because, since ancient 
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times, the ladies of the imperial family had been addressed in that manner. 
Therefore, when Japanese in the nineteenth century heard Queen, they 
would have understood that Queen Victoria was a member of the royal 
family, but not necessarily the national sovereign of Britain. That was what 
the Tycoon’s Government intended. Since the Middle Ages there had been no 
female Emperors and the Japanese would not have assumed that a woman 
could be head of state. This vocabulary had implications for domestic affairs, 
especially in the relationship between the Imperial Court and the Tycoon’s 
Government. It was just a word, but using the word Heika or not called into 
question the reason for the existence of the Tycoon’s Government.  
 
For Satow, this was at the root of the ineffective commercial 
relationship because, when the Tycoon’s Government misrepresented the 
status of both rulers, an important trust had already been broken. He 
certainly did not intend to discuss the niceties of social status. Rather, he 
wanted to explain why such matters had to be considered a serious problem. 
After he had analysed the first part of the Treaty of 1858 he wrote: 
 
Here is evidenced the assumption of sovereign power over  
the whole of Japan, a mistake carefully avoided afterwards,  
because, －though the TYCOON of Japan is spoken of throughout  
the whole treaty －reference to the country is always made  
by the expression “his territories” or “his dominions”－phrases which,  
to the Japanese had a meaning widely different to that assigned to  
them by our diplomatists.369 
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Satow thereby pointed out a significant truth: a Tycoon declared himself 
sovereign of Japan, yet the region which he could govern effectively was 
expressed merely as territories and dominions. Specifically, in Article I of the 
Treaty: 
 
There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between  
Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain  
and Ireland, her heirs and successors, and His Majesty the Tycoon  
of Japan, and between their respective dominions and subjects.370 
 
In Article I, neither state nor country was mentioned. In English, dominion 
might have been appropriate for a country under a feudal structure of 
government, however, in the Japanese version, instead of dominion, the 
word, Shoryo was used.371 This word means that that region was in private 
possession, as if to show that all regions were under the direct governance of 
the Tycoon. Also, in Article IV, it was stipulated that British nationals who 
committed crimes in the Tycoon’s region should be tried under British laws, 
but in that Article, dominion was used.372 From the British point of view, the 
region of the Tycoon was dominion, not Shoryo.  
     For Satow, this shrewd method of using Japanese words was ample 
proof of the Tycoon’s deception. Therefore, in 1866, he proposed to revise 
Article I to the following: 
 
Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great  
Britain and Ireland and his Highness the SHOGOON being  
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desirous of placing the relations between their respective  
dominions and territories on a friendly footing & c.373 
 
He had been criticising the Tycoon for using the words, territory and 
dominion because the latter had been asserting the status of Majesty, but if 
the Tycoon used the style Highness, then use of territory and dominion could 
be justified. Satow’s analysis was correct because there were many feudal 
lords in Japan, and the Tycoon’s Government did not govern their regions 
directly.  
     Brinkley, as indicated earlier, noted the existence of Han-satsu since 
1661, which means paper currency in each feudal region.374 Admittedly, the 
Tycoon’s Government issued official gold and silver coins, but at the same 
time it permitted each feudal lord to issue paper currency effective only in 
his region. The Government thereby implicitly acknowledged their 
independence because these paper currencies were symbols of their fiefs. 
Satow clearly shared this view, believing the Tycoon to be simply the 
representative of all the Japanese feudal lords. When he defined himself as 
sovereign of Japan, the Tycoon deceived not only the British but also the 
Japanese about the nation’s governance, as indicated by the following 
statement: 
 
Thus the words of the Treaty would have corresponded to 
what is actually the fact:－that we have a treaty with the 
master of Yedo and the eight provinces round it and with 
a few outlying spots scattered through the islands of DAI 
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NIPPON-but with SENDAI, CHIOSHU, SATSUMA and the 
other great Daimios, we can claim no more than what they may 
choose to consider the general duties of man to man may require.375 
 
     In the Japanese version of Eikoku Sakuron, this paragraph was 
translated more bluntly. It became: although the Tycoon was the ruler of 
Edo, eight provinces of Kanto and the other cities, but I was not sure how he 
would explain his status to the feudal lords of Sendai and Satsuma who 
claimed themselves to be major feudal lords.376 Judging from this passage 
alone, it could be surmised that he denied the Tycoon not only status as 
national head of state but also any superiority to other feudal lords. Eikoku 
Sakuron was perhaps translated in this way to express criticism of the 
Tycoon indirectly. 
Yet even if Satow already had a vision for a future political system for 
Japan, so far, neither the Japanese nor the foreigners had accepted the need 
for it. Alcock, for instance, had seemed to believe that if Westerners gave 
more time, the Japanese would correct everything effectively by themselves. 
Alcock was said to have made the London Protocol of 1862 based on that 
assumption,377 and this might well have been a common idea even among 
those foreigners who believed that without changing the national system of 
governance the Japanese could never achieve modernization. However, 
Satow did not think this. For him, Japan’s backwardness was caused not 
because it had been a closed state for about 250 years but by the deception 
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over the Tycoon’s status. That was the origin of all current difficulties, as he 
described when writing: 
 
This is absolutely our position at present-one of great  
difficulty and from which we see no means of extrication but  
that which we suggest-the additional complication of the question  
when OSAKA is opened and we find ourselves in the immediate 
neighbourhood of the MIKADO and several powerful chiefs, all  
busily intriguing against the Yedo usurper-we leave our readers  
to imagine.378 
 
The final phrase, we leave our readers to imagine, reflected his fundamental 
fears. He argued that the current Japanese situation could be resolved only if 
both the foreigners and the Japanese shared a common ideal － the 
Confederate Daimios. That was why, in his essay, he used the word, usurper 
for the Tycoon. That word insulted the Tycoon, but, for Satow, the Tycoon 
had already lost legitimacy as the national sovereign, so he had no hesitation 
in using it.  
Satow also mentioned Article III of the 1858 Treaty which provided for 
the opening of ports and their regulations, although he did not discuss this in 
depth. He was more concerned about Articles IV and V. The main issue of 
Article IV was the legal status of British nationals in Japan; however, since 
Satow did not accept the Tycoon as national sovereign, he insisted on the 
following hypothesis: 
 
This is very good as far as the “dominions” of his “Majesty” the  
SHOGOON are concerned, but it does not preclude nor would it in 
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         the least degree prevent the Prince of OWARI379 from decapitating  
         any British subject who ventured to land in his “dominions” nor him 
         of HIZEN380 from putting to death with agonizing torture any unfortunates 
         shipwrecked on his coasts, whose skulls he might wish to place in his  
         museum of European curiosities.381 
 
After that, he referred to Article V, which stipulated that Japanese who 
committed crimes against the British should be subjected to Japanese laws. 
His view was: 
 
The first clause of this has been occasionally put in force,  
when the offender has happened to live under the jurisdiction 
of the Yedo officials, but it is a dead letter as regards the retainers  
of other Daimios-as has been proved in the cases of SATSUMA  
and CHOSHIU.382 
 
     By referring to these two Articles, Satow pointed out a serious 
contradiction: a British criminal in Japan would be protected by the Article if 
in the Tycoon’s region, but, if in a feudal lord’s region, that person would not 
be protected by the Article. This was correct. The British had made the 1858 
Treaty with the Tycoon, not with other feudal lords. Therefore, if the British 
Legation expected to protect its citizens in Japan, Britain would have to 
make treaties with all the other feudal lords. However, in reality, this would 
be impossible. As a result, Articles IV and V applied only in the Tycoon’s 
region because it was apparent that the Edo Government could do nothing 
against Satsuma and Choshu. Had the Tycoon been the national sovereign in 
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Japan, then the bombardments of Kagoshima in August 1863 and 
Shimonoseki in September 1864 could never have occurred. Those incidents 
were taken to be proof of the Tycoon’s status, which was why Satow 
emphasised Article V in his discussion.  
     After this, Satow mentioned Articles XI to XIII, but in few words, 
suggesting that these Articles were not important for his argument. Then he 
came to Article XIV, which he had already been stressing via The Japan 
Times. He wrote about Article XIV: 
 
At these open ports, British subjects may freely import  
and export goods and trade freely with “all classes of Japanese “,  
and without the “intervention of any Japanese authorities in such  
purchase or sale, or in making or receiving payments for same”.  
This is the most important commercial article in the Treaty.383 
 
Satow thereby emphasised that neither British nor Japanese should be 
disturbed in their commercial activities by officials. However, in reality, 
what happened? 
 
From the opening of the ports it has been consistently 
 violated. Scores of well-authenticated cases can be quoted of  
its infraction; our trade with Japan is crippled by its being a  
dead letter, our social intercourse with the people checked,  
and all advance towards amity rendered impossible.384 
 
This paragraph was the one he wished to emphasise most because if the 
Tycoon was admitted to be head of state, then Article XIV could not be 
                                                 




effective. The Times of 19 August 1864 reported the total amount of trade in 
1863. Total exports from Japan to Britain were worth ￡2,149,000 while 
imports totalled ￡635,000.385 These figures certainly indicated commercial 
activity, but for Satow it was not enough and he considered that if all 
Japanese could engage in international trade then the figures would be 
higher. He predicted the potential for trade between Britain and Japan. 
Indeed, by 1867 total exportation to Britain had risen to ￡3,030,000 while 
imports from Britain were worth ￡ 4,620,000. 386  One factor in this 
improvement was the 1866 Tariff Convention, Articles IX and X of which 
confirmed that all Japanese could participate in international trade.387 With 
this increase in trade, Satow might have thought that his opinion was 
vindicated. However, from the Japanese point of view, the Tariff Convention 
of 1866 became a major problem because, after it, feudalism, which had been 
declining slowly, now started to move decisively towards its final collapse.388 
In fact, in the following year, the Tycoon’s Government collapsed largely 
because its governance system could not bear the strain of international 
trade.  
     Did Satow insist that his ideas were based on this truth about the 1858 
Treaty? He wrote about it as follows;  
 
The non-observance of this article is one of the strongest  
points the Ministers have for demanding a new Treaty, and  
until reform in this particular is obtained, neither our own  
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trade, nor the resources of this empire can ever be developed.389 
 
In The Japan Times he stressed this argument, but in the Japanese version 
of Eikoku Sakuron this paragraph was the final one. In the latter, he 
described how all the foreign Ministers considered that the present treaties 
should be abolished and that new treaties should be made urgently, 
otherwise commercial activities could not flourish and the Japanese 
themselves could receive no benefit.390 It was necessary to break the present 
deadlock. Yet in The Japan Times, although he had raised questions about 
the Japanese system, he did not insist on breaking with the present. Only in 
the Japanese version did he insist that all the Ministers were expecting an 
alternative. Satow may have ended with that paragraph intentionally in the 
Japanese version, thereby changing the thrust of his opinion indirectly. By 
so doing, the Japanese had the impression that he was on the anti-Tycoon’s 
Government side. Consequently, the Japanese concluded that the British 
were on the side of the Imperial Court after the Meiji Restoration. Whatever 
Satow’s intention, readers of the Japanese version must have formed a 
different view point from those of The Japan Times.  
     After mentioning, in passing, Articles XVI to XXIII of the 1858 Treaty, 
Satow ended with the following statement: 
 
But our subject is exhausted. In the series of articles  
published in these columns on the question, we have-we  
maintain-fully and conclusively proved that the SHOGOON  
has deceived the representatives of the Western Powers and  
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fraudulently concluded Treaties, many of whose provisions he is  
unable to carry out-that other clauses, which he can observe if  
he will, he persistently violates-that the continuance of the  
existing arrangements are likely to lead to political crisis in Japan 
           and the great disturbance of our trade and that this trade can never,  
under present regulations, acquire the importance and value which  
is its due. We leave the question now in the hands of those who have  
the power of bringing it to a solution; in the earnest hope that at no  
distant date we may see the present Treaty abrogated, in favour of a  
more comprehensive and satisfactory one-a fair and equitable  
Convention with the MIKADO and the Confederate Daimios-the real  
ruler of Japan.391 
 
Herschel Webb, who studied the Imperial Court under the Tokugawa 
Shogunate, stated that although the Mikado was expected to govern, that did 
not mean that the Mikado would govern by controlling the government.392 
He pointed out an important Japanese national idea. This was that the 
Japanese expected the Mikado to be the national sovereign of Japan, while 
at the same time the Mikado would govern directly as a representative of the 
government.  
In the Japanese version, Satow ends his argument by appealing to the 
Japanese, but in The Japan Times he ends his argument by addressing those 
who have the power of bringing it to a solution. Who did he mean? Nobutoshi 
Hagiwara pointed out that it could be Parkes.393 Why him? Considering 
international affairs in 1866, the Americans could not maintain any effective 
diplomatic relationship because of their civil war. The Russians had been 
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focusing only on Hakodate for trading with the Japanese, not on all ports in 
Japan, and had no interest in opening other ports and cities. That applied 
also to the Dutch who focused only on Nagasaki. There were other Western 
states with which the Tycoon’s Government had established diplomatic 
relations, for example, Prussia, Switzerland and Italy, but they did not have 
enough naval power to influence Japanese diplomacy. Thus, the British and 
French were the major Western states which could be influential with the 
Japanese, and, when comparing naval power, the British were 
overwhelmingly superior. If the British took an initiative all the other 
Westerners would follow. Satow knew this, which was why he appealed to 
Parkes via The Japan Times.  
     It cannot be proved that Parkes read Satow’s essays. Parkes did not 
mention them and, since Satow wrote anonymously, Parkes could not have 
known everything about them in detail. However, five months after Eikoku 
Sakuron had been published, Parkes sent his letter to Marcus Flowers on 14 
October 1866 which admitted the Mikado as the sovereign of Japan. Parkes 
thereby obviously shared the same idea as Satow, which was why Shibusawa 
Eiichi testified that although the French Minister, Leon Roches (1809-1900), 
called the Tycoon ‘Majesty’, Parkes addressed him as ‘Highness’.394 It cannot 
be proved that his changed attitude was due to Satow; nevertheless, Parkes 
could now analyse Japanese domestic affairs more accurately. On 29 April 
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1867, therefore, when he met 15th Tycoon, Tokugawa Yoshinobu, at Osaka 
castle, he officially addressed him as Highness.395  
     Chapters four and five have examined in considerable detail Satow’s 
thinking, as published in Eikoku Sakuron. Satow was determined to unravel 
the confusing relationship between the Mikado and the Shogun, both 
historically and as it remained in 1866, to assess how their respective roles 
were perceived by the Japanese, and to explain how the tensions inherent in 
what appeared to Westerners to be a dual power system impacted upon the 
ability of foreigners to enter into effective diplomatic and commercial 
agreements. Critical as Satow was of the pretensions and growing 
ineffectiveness of the Tycoon’s Government, he nevertheless understood that 
constitutional change could and should only come about within the 
framework of existing political and social structures; hence the need to 
incorporate the feudal daimyos and the wider samurai class into any 
settlement and, in all probability, to find a place for the Tokugawa family in 
any new Japan. To the extent that his ideas would assist the opening of 
Japan to greater Western contact and commercial opportunity they had an 
obvious appeal among the foreign trading the diplomatic communities. But 
his ideas also resonated with some Japanese, particularly with those who 
recognised that the nation’s isolation and technological deficiencies had 
made it vulnerable in international affairs and also with those who soon 
realised that Satow’s writings could be interpreted selectively to suit their 
own domestic political ambitions. Satow may well have influenced the 
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attitude of Harry Parkes, leading the British Minister to acknowledge in 
correspondence in 1866 that the Mikado was the true sovereign of Japan. 
Thereafter, Parkes formally rejected any notion that Japanese sovereignty 
lay with the Shogun when addressing the latter at Osaka castle in 1867. This 
careful analysis of Eikoku Sakuron being now completed, the next chapter 
will attempt to place Satow’s ideas in context and to confront the question 
whether, despite the credit which he has since received for them, the ideas 
which he put forward were truly his own.   










Chapter VI: Eikoku Sakuron: A counter argument 
 
     Before discussing further aspects of Eikoku Sakuron one important 
issue must be clarified; the different acknowledgements between the British 
and Japanese concerning Eikoku Sakuron. On the Japanese side, although 
there was no title and it was written in anonymity, the essays carried in The 
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Japan Times were identified as writings by Satow. As proof, there was the 
Japanese version where his name was mentioned clearly. Perhaps the 
person who translated the essays added Satow’s name. In Satow’s memoir, 
regarding the Japanese version of Eikoku Sakuron, he admitted that it was 
his work. He wrote it for the purpose of handing it to the feudal lord of Awa; 
he produced the pamphlet by receiving the assistance of a retainer. 396 
However, reviewing his confession in detail, one thing is clear: he denied any 
involvement in the public distribution of his pamphlet.397 He admitted only 
the fact of the translation for a feudal lord, so it cannot be certain whether 
his pamphlet, as distributed in public, had the same content as the original. 
The common view about Eikoku Sakuron was entirely based on the Japanese 
version, and it is possible that the Japanese translator changed the meaning 
in a way which Satow had not intended. It is certain that the Japanese 
version of Eikoku Sakuron did not translate everything which was written in 
The Japan Times. The readers can follow every sentence of Eikoku Sakuron 
in The Japan Times, but they cannot follow those of The Japan Times in the 
Japanese version of Eikoku Sakuron. Japanese sources do not explain this 
difference.  
     Furthermore, the documents which prove the articles in The Japan 
Times to be Satow’s work are only Japanese documents, and even these are 
only secondary sources. No eye-witness of the Meiji Restoration mentioned 
it. The Japanese themselves therefore cannot be sure of the truth because 
their proofs are not primary sources. As for the British, they followed the 
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established Japanese position, not investigating it themselves, so there are 
several misunderstandings. For example, Grace Fox misunderstood this 
when writing about Eikoku Sakuron and insisted that after the three 
volumes of essays had been completed they were translated into Japanese 
and then handed to the feudal lord of Awa. After that, Satow’s pamphlet was 
distributed in public.398 If the British had researched the sequence of events 
that simple misunderstanding would not have happened. The Japanese 
themselves cannot be certain about the truth. In fact, there is no means to 
prove that the author of the articles in The Japan Times was Satow.  
     In which case, why have the Japanese always maintained their 
attitude? One thing might be considered. It is that one hero of the Meiji 
Restoration, Saigo Takamori, sent a letter to another, Ohkubo Toshimichi, 
and, based on his letter, the latter concluded that Satow must be the author 
of the essays in The Japan Times through ex post facto reasoning. The letter 
read: 
 
In the first place the English idea was that the sovereign  
of Japan should wield the governing power, and under him  
the daimios should be placed, and so the establishment  
of the constitution (or national policy) would be similar to the  
system of all other countries.399 
 
The context is not clear because it is just one paragraph in the letter, but the 
person whom Saigo described as Him was considered to be the Mikado. That 
means that the future Japanese political structure which Saigo described 
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was the same as Satow had discussed in the Japanese version of Eikoku 
Sakuron. Also, the content of the Japanese version was similar to the articles 
in The Japan Times. By this series of conjectures, Satow was defined as the 
author.  
     Satow explained British diplomatic policy in his memoir as follows: 
 
The British Legation, on the contrary, were determined  
that so far as their influence went, the Mikado should be  
restored to the head of the nation, so that our treaties might  
receive a sanction that no one would venture to dispute, and  
for this purpose it was necessary that the constitution of the  
Tycoon’s government should be modified in such a manner as to  
admit the principal daimios (or clans rather) to a share in the  
distribution of power.400 
 
This passage might have been taken as further proof, because he states that 
the British Legation had acknowledged the Mikado as national sovereign, 
and he emphasised the need to reform the Tycoon’s Government. This was 
what he had written in The Japan Times. His 1921 memoir was published 
about 60 years after the Meiji Restoration. During the period of the Meiji 
Restoration, the British Legation, of course, declared neutrality in Japanese 
domestic affairs, although, after 60 years, judging from this paragraph, the 
Japanese may have concluded that they relied on British diplomacy at that 
time. Based on that assumption, they became convinced that Satow was the 
author of the essays in The Japan Times. In the absence of specific evidence 
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to the contrary, Satow must be assumed to be the author of both Eikoku 
Sakuron and the articles in The Japan Times.  
 
     For the British, Satow’s essays were important because he broke with 
the existing diplomatic concept for maintaining the relationship with Japan 
by now suggesting that the Mikado should head a new political regime. 
Furthermore, in Eikoku Sakuron Satow questioned the value of treaties 
made with the Tycoon because it had been assumed that he governed all 
regions of Japan, whereas in reality his direct governance was limited. That 
meant that there were regions where the Articles could not be effective.  
     The above are the two major insights which Satow offered. However, 
there is one large question: whether those were really his original ideas. In 
his memoir, he admitted that because he had complained about the political 
attitude of the Tycoon’s Government, he wrote the pamphlet which 
advocated reform of the governance system.401 Thus, if his claim is accepted, 
those would be his original ideas. But there are several facts which question 
this. The first is that, as Satow mentioned, a Swiss consul Rudolph Lindau 
had already written a piece entitled Open Letter in 1862 in which he had 
questioned the role of the Tycoon as the national head of Japan. This, of 
course, was four years before the publication of Eikoku Sakuron. Also in 
1862, James Hope, vice-admiral in the Royal Navy, sent the following report 
to the Admiralty: 
 
In regards to the Mikado, I may further observe that a  
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well-written pamphlet has recently been published in Japan,  
in which the views advocated that the Tycoon’s Government had  
in reality, no power to make Treaties with foreigners without the  
sanction of Mikado, never having been obtained, the Treaties  
with foreigners are not valid, or at any rate, only so in the Tycoon’s  
special territories.402 
 
There are several curious points in his paragraph. Hope suggested that the 
Tycoon could not make a treaty with foreign states without imperial 
ratification. Furthermore, he observed that any treaty with the Tycoon 
would be effective only in the Tycoon’s regions. These two points are also the 
major issues for Satow. Is this similarity merely a coincidence? One other 
thing is clear: according to Hope, he conveyed those ideas only after he had 
read a well-written pamphlet. That means that at the foreign settlement in 
Yokohama those ideas had already spread among the Westerners. The 
existence of this pamphlet can be taken as proof that many foreigners shared 
the same idea.403 Thus, Eikoku Sakuron can be re-defined as essays which 
built upon existing ideas by applying logical thinking. Hope’s report was 
written one month before Satow’s arrival in Japan. Considering this, it is 
hard to conclude that Eikoku Sakuron was an original work.  
     For the purpose of strengthening this hypothesis, there is further proof: 
a letter which Russell sent to Parkes in August 1865. In it, he wrote: 
 
When Lord Elgin went to Japan he found the Tycoon  
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the de facto sovereign of the country, to whom obedience  
was generally yielded, and who appears to possess the  
power, as representing the Japanese nation, to enter into  
Treaties with foreign states.404 
 
When Elgin made the commercial treaty in 1858, he might have recognised 
that the Tycoon was not the true sovereign of Japan. Russell continued: 
 
It was discovered that there was a still higher power  
than that of the Tycoon, that the authority wielded by that  
prince was delegated to him by a spiritual Emperor, called the  
Mikado, and that there were great feudal lords who superior to  
the Tycoon in rank, only obeyed him when he had the means  
of enforcing obedience.405 
 
Russell misunderstood the existence of feudal lords whose political power 
was greater than that of the Tycoon. There were several nobles who were 
higher in social status than the Tycoon, but they did not have any political 
authority.  
     However, the British analysis of Japanese domestic governance since 
the 1858 Treaty was accurate. In 1858 the British had no confirmation of the 
Mikado’s superiority, but at least they recognized the existence of an 
authority superior to the Tycoon. Russell must have recognized this when 
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the Japanese were stressing the importance of imperial ratification.406 Also, 
a letter by Colonel Neale on 29 January1863 reported the serious situation 
caused by the Mikado’s political pressure on the Tycoon.407 Obviously the 
British could not ignore the existence of the Mikado. They must have begun 
to recognize that all Japanese shared the same vision of the Mikado. The 
letters of Hope and Russell in 1862 and 1865 prove that the British had 
already started to analyse Japanese identity and held ideas similar to those 
which Satow later developed. Satow arrived in Japan when such ideas had 
already circulated within the foreign settlement. Yet in The Japan Times, it 
was not mentioned that these ideas already existed among the foreigners, 
which was probably why the Japanese thought that Satow’s essays were 
original. Japanese in the nineteenth century were not acquainted with 
English, and Satow was effectively their only point of contact. 
     A second interesting point was that on 20 March 1866, at almost the 
same time as Volume I of Eikoku Sakuron appeared in The Japan Times, a 
surprising proposal was made by the Japanese. In Satsuma’s mission to 
Britain in 1866 was a samurai, Matsuki Kouan, who after the foundation of 
the Meiji Government changed his name to Terashima Munenori 
(1832-1893) and became the minister of foreign affairs. When in London, 
Matsuki visited Lord Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary, with a proposal the 
content of which was almost the same as Satow had written in The Japan 
Times. His main point was that Satsuma had been opposing the dominance 
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of international trade by the Tycoon’s Government.408 After explaining the 
position of Satsuma, he proposed the following: 
 
1. The foreign states which had made a treaty with the Japanese should 
request the Mikado to hold an assembly of major feudal lords. 
2. The major feudal lords should gather in Kyoto, and then they should sign 
a new treaty which had been ratified by the Mikado. Then samurais 
authorized by their feudal lords should move to Osaka and exchange the 
instrument of ratification with all the foreign ministers.409 
 
     Matsuki’s two suggestions meant that he tried to transfer the right of 
signing from the Tycoon to a confederation of Daimios under imperial 
authority. 410  The statement was revolutionary because to deprive the 
Tycoon of the right of signing meant that he lost supremacy in Japan by 
losing his official position. It had already been noted in diplomatic circles 
that even if the Tycoon signed a new treaty, without imperial ratification he 
could not enforce it. Therefore, the right of signing should be taken from him, 
in which case he could not assert himself as the official Japanese 
representative in either domestic or international affairs. By proposing the 
above, Matsuki was attempting a rapid change to the regime.411  
     It would have been impossible for Satow and Matsuki to arrange in 
advance a simultaneous announcement. It could be a coincidence, but that 
                                                 
408 Ishii, Meiji Ishin to Gaiatsu, 199. 
409 Ibid., 199. 
410 Ibid., 199. 
411 Ibid., 199. 
181 
 
would be surprising. In reality, Matsuki provides another proof that Eikoku 
Sakuron was not Satow’s original idea because, before the articles were 
translated into Japanese and spread among them, there were Japanese who 
already held the same views as Satow.  
     What were the similarities between their ideas? First, in the last part 
of Volume III, Satow insisted that the Mikado and Confederate Daimios 
should rule Japan.412 That was also what Matsuki suggested to Clarendon. 
Then, when should it be done? Matsuki predicted there would be civil war 
when the port of Hyogo was opened without reforming the treaty.413 Satow 
likewise wrote in Volume I Between the present time and Jan. 1st., 1868 on 
which date Hiogo is to be opened, and then worried, if there was no 
arrangement, in the foreign settlement there would be coercion and 
bloodshed.414 Both therefore mentioned the deadline for treaty revision as 
the date for opening the port of Hyogo, stipulated in the London Protocol of 
1862 as 1 January 1868. In fact, in November 1865, before Matsuki’s 
proposal and Eikoku Sakuron, the British, French and Dutch fleets had 
already gathered off Hyogo as Parkes had directed and requested imperial 
ratification for the 1858 Treaty and the opening of Hyogo even earlier than 
agreed. Both Satow and Matsuki had focused on Hyogo and considered that 
the opening of Hyogo would be the turning point for the Tokugawa 
Shogunate.  
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     There is another similarity regarding the eligibility of feudal lords to 
join the confederate under the Mikado. Matsuki specified that it should be 
Go-sanke and the other major feudal lords. 415  Satow did not say this 
directly, but he wrote, We must treat with the Daimios, for they are 
responsible rulers of the country of Japan.416 Therefore, he likely had the 
major feudal lords in mind. He wrote Confederate Daimios, and this phrase 
suggests that not all the feudal lords could join and that eligibility would be 
limited. Again, they appeared to share the same idea.  
     Was there any difference between them? There was one clear 
difference. Matsuki insisted that the Western states which had made 
treaties with the Tycoon should propose those ideas to the Mikado.417 This 
attitude was apparent in other situations: as already mentioned, in the 
conference between Parkes and Saigo in June 1866,418 and also in the 
meeting between Mitford and Komatsu in February 1867, 419  Satsuma 
samurais requested the British to make the first move. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that in Satsuma the samurais considered that nothing would arise 
from their own efforts. However, the British could be influential among both 
the Westerners and the Japanese, so it would be effective if they moved first. 
This being the common assumption in Satsuma, it was only natural that 
Matsuki should ask the British to act. By contrast, because of the neutral 
stance adopted by the British Legation, Satow wrote rather vaguely in The 
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Japan Times that We leave the question now in the hands of those who have 
the power of bringing it to a solution.420 
     How could Satow and Matsuki have shared similar ideas and with 
roughly the same approach? Satow was fluent in Japanese, and Matsuki, as 
one member of the mission which represented Satsuma, must have been an 
intellectual samurai. Thus, there is the possibility of contact before 1866. 
However, Matsuki did not leave any memoir and Satow did not mention him 
in his memoir, so it would be hard to prove a relationship. Even so, according 
to Takashi Ishii, who pointed out these similarities between Satow and 
Matsuki, there had to be a common nucleus from which each could develop 
his thoughts. He suggested that it could be the memorandum by Alcock on 22 
September 1864,421 which read as follows: 
 
The Tycoon may be regarded as the Treaty-making power,  
and theoretically be held responsible for their execution. But a  
long and sad experience has sufficiently shown that while this  
conflict of authority is going on with the Mikado, they will  
remain inoperative in a great degree; and the responsibility,  
if insisted upon, could only lead to war, both civil and foreign.422 
 
Alcock was blunt because in 1864 he had already judged the Tycoon’s 
governance to be inoperative. To illustrate his point, he stressed the 
existence of the Mikado. From his point of view it was clear who should be 
superior in Japan, and, worse, if the present situation continued there was 
the possibility of war. At the time of his memorandum, by cooperating with 
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the French, Dutch and American fleets, the British navy was bombarding 
Choshu which had fired against foreign ships passing the Shimonoseki strait 
in 1863. Therefore, his fear of full-scale war against the Japanese was 
realistic.  
     In the meantime, this action undertaken by Choshu in 1863 involved a 
serious problem: Choshu had followed the Mikado’s order, not the Tycoon’s. 
It had happened after the Imperial Court gave an official notice to the 
Tycoon’s Government whereby a conflict with the foreigners was officially 
acknowledged. The British had already recognized this.423 Whatever the 
exact procedure was, it was clear that the Tycoon had followed the Mikado. 
Thus, for Alcock, it was obvious who was superior. The Tycoon’s Government 
had been maintaining a diplomatic relationship with the Western states, 
but, by an imperial order, they indirectly broke those relations. Clearly the 
Tycoon’s Government could not be eligible to conduct Japan’s diplomacy.  
     Yet, if the Tycoon and his Government were inappropriate for national 
governance, what organization could be the replacement? Alcock wrote: 
 
It was probable that to effect such large and comprehensive  
           modifications in the relations at present existing between the  
           Japanese and foreign nations, and their respective Governments, 
           the assembling of a great Council of Daimios would be essential.424 
 
Alcock clearly urged the assembly of Daimios. Like Satow in Eikoku 
Sakuron, Alcock also must have realised that the Tycoon could not control all 
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Japan. The apparent proofs of that were the bombardment of Kagoshima in 
1863 and that of Shimonoseki in 1864, because the Tycoon’s Government 
could not control their feudal lords and the foreign military had to enact 
punishment. This meant that the Tycoon’s Government had lost credibility 
to control domestic affairs. Judging from all this, Alcock obviously concluded 
that it should not be the Tycoon’s Government but the Council of Daimios 
which should govern Japan. 
     What was the perceived advantage of such a governance system? 
Alcock defined it as follows: 
 
If it were possible under fear of impending dangers and  
calamities, to bring Mikado, Tycoon, and Daimios, in better  
accord on matters touching their material interests, and lead  
them all to accept as a fait accompli and a necessity, Treaties and  
foreign relations-the modifications of the terms of these to meet  
some of their objections could offer no serious difficulty.425 
 
By recognizing the existence of the Mikado, Tycoon and the Daimios, Alcock 
gave this example for constructing a new regime under the Mikado. In one 
way, his suggestion was reasonable. The Mikado had strong psychological 
authority for all Japanese, albeit no secular power. The Tycoon meanwhile 
had secular power and authority, but no spiritual identity. The Daimios 
could live only under the Tokugawa Shogunate. These facts meant all three 
of them had disadvantages with respect to each other, but their advantages 
if together, outweighed all the disadvantages. Considering these three 
entities, Alcock must have settled for the Confederate Daimios under the 




Mikado. He acknowledged the existence of the Tycoon, so that the latter 
might feel that he also could join that confederation, otherwise a new 
Japanese regime might cancel the treaties with the West on the abolition of 
the Tycoon’s Government. That situation was what Alcock most feared.  
     At this point in his memorandum, Alcock did not persist in discussing a 
new regime because he believed that the situation would only come about 
amid danger and calamity. In other words, except for a diplomatic failure or 
a disaster, no new regime would be founded. However, that did not mean 
that Alcock was content with the present situation. He warned: 
 
Failure in this direction means civil war, collision and  
contests with foreign Powers and at no distant period such  
complications as must lead to a general war for the maintenance  
of Treaties, altogether illusory and inoperative at present in  
their main provisions.426 
 
He discussed the possibility both of civil war and war against Western 
states, which was understandable because Satsuma and Choshu had already 
acted independently by ignoring the existence of the Tycoon’s Government. 
At the same time, the Tycoon’s Government had also lost the trust of the 
Western states. Therefore, Alcock must have anticipated that if this 
situation continued the Japanese administration would soon collapse. Such 
contradictory apprehensions, whereby he was afraid of changing the present 
structure but also anticipated the uncertainty of founding any new regime, 




must have been distressing when considering future diplomacy with the 
Japanese.  
     Alcock claimed that the reason why he concerned himself over any new 
regime in Japan was because he had noticed one essential thing: concluding 
the treaty with the Tycoon did not mean he had concluded a treaty with the 
state of Japan. 427  As a senior diplomat who had been facing various 
problems since the opening of ports for commerce, he must have realised why 
the Tycoon’s Government could not maintain satisfactory diplomatic 
relations. In fact, three years before this memorandum, Alcock had raised 
doubts about the Tycoon’s Government in a letter to Russell: 
 
With the danger the Tycoons, ever since the first appearance  
of foreigners to talk of Treaties under Commodore Perry in 1852-53, 
           seem to have been harassed.428 
 
Alcock had already understood the truth. The only reason why the Tycoon 
was able to govern all of Japan was because Japan had been a closed society 
for so long. Tensions and contradictions soon emerged within the Tokugawa 
Shogunate after the arrival of the Westerners. Alcock had added in his 1861 
letter that the existence of the Mikado was not a myth.429 Alcock was 
thereby perhaps the first to imagine Japan’s future political structure.  
     Alcock’s memorandum was said by Ishii to have been modified by 
Satow and Matsuki when they made their suggestions in 1866.430 Ishii did 
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not explain, however, how both of them had access to Alcock’s memorandum. 
Satow had possible access, since Alcock was his superior at the Legation. But 
Matsuki was neither at the British Legation nor in the Tycoon’s 
Government. Ishii’s discussion was merely ex post facto reasoning based on 
the fact that the suggestions of both Satow and Matsuki were similar to 
those in Alcock’s memorandum.  
     However, it is possible that Satow explained the content of Alcock’s 
memorandum to some Japanese intellectuals. In fact, in the very first part of 
his argument in The Japan Times on 16 March 1866, Satow provided an 
example of this by describing the ship of Satsuma.431 Also, in his 1921 
memoir, when he discussed the Tycoon’s Government, he referred to the ship 
of Satsuma.432 It is confirmed that Satow met with the samurais of Satsuma 
at various times. He may have explained the content of Alcock’s 
memorandum to them, although in documents neither at the National 
Archives nor in Japanese primary materials is there any specific mention. 
Yet according to a Japanese eye-witness, Matsuki was captured by the 
British army during the bombardment of Kagoshima.433 Satow was the only 
Briton who could speak Japanese, so he must have translated for Matsuki 
and there could be an acquaintance dating from that time.434 After the 
foundation of the Meiji Government, Matsuki became the minister of foreign 
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affairs; he was clearly an able samurai, and Satow would likely have 
recognised his intelligence. Japanese material proves that they met, 435 
albeit the date of their recorded talks was January 1867, 436  after the 
publication of Eikoku Sakuron.  
     Finally, although it may be outside the main argument in relation to 
Satow’s Eikoku Sakuron, one further question might be suggested. This is 
the relationship between Satow’s essay and Mitogaku, the principal ideology 
of Jyoi. As already explained, the essence of Mitogaku was to define the 
Mikado as at the top of the hierarchy in Japan and that all Japanese should 
obey the imperial authority. And as a result of the wide spread of Mitogaku 
thinking, the promotion of Jyoi was energetic until 1865 when the Emperor 
Komei issued the imperial ratification for the 1858 Treaty. That is one 
perspective of Japanese history, but considering all this from another point 
of view, the question emerges: because the essence of Mitogaku had already 
spread among the Japanese, would they now receive any psychological 
impact from Eikoku Sakuron? This question needs to be analysed.  
     First of all, what was the definitive ideology of Mitogaku? It is hard to 
answer that question because Mitogaku was an academy which had been 
established right after the foundation of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Since 
then, academic research and argument had continued and it was the 
nineteenth-century Mito scholars who developed the ideology. Thus, in its 
strict meaning, Mitogaku is divided into “former Mitogaku” and “later 
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Mitogaku”,437 each with its own essence. In fact, it is “later Mitogaku” which 
has been commonly described as Mitogaku in Japanese history. Later 
Mitogaku defined itself as possessing a different nationalistic scholarship 
from the other.438 In this thesis, the later Mitogaku thinking is referred to as 
Mitogaku.  
     One of the major scholars who contributed to the ideology of Mitogaku 
was Aizawa Seishisai (1782-1863). He was a scholar of Mito and, at that 
time, the feudal lord of the Mito-Tokugawa family was Tokugawa Nariaki. In 
1825 he wrote Shinron (New Ideology) and his book became one of the 
fundamentals of Mitogaku. The Cambridge History of Japan defines him as 
follows: 
 
         Aizawa Seishisai’s Shinron (1825) provided in particularly 
         compelling form a warning of the power of the West, insistence 
         on the sacred nature of Japan and its imperial party, and reminders  
         that that superiority was based on the benefits of the imperial  
         family.439 
 
Shinron was judged to be widely read by the Japanese in the 1840s and 
1850s.440 Thus, his book was the point at which Mitogaku and Jyoi became 
both academically linked and also widely spread among nineteenth-century 
educated Japanese.  
     What, then, was Aizawa’s focus? It has been considered that he tried to 
connect nationalistic scholarship and traditional values and then 
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systematically tried to establish the ideology of Sonno-Jyoi. As a background, 
this situation can indeed be considered. Around the 1820s, the foreigners 
had started to visit Japan to open ports for commerce, and so, to react to 
them, the Japanese needed to be united under one definite set of ideas. That 
was why Mitogaku appealed to many nineteenth-century Japanese. In fact, 
the reason why Aizawa felt it necessary to write Shinron was because he was 
said to have believed that the foreigners were trying to invade Japanese 
soil.441 Because of Shinron, nineteenth-century Japanese could have easily 
recognised the need for an increased nationalism. The effect of Shinron has 
been summed up as follows: 
 
         After Aizawa’s Shinron, perhaps, for the first time in  
         nearly two centuries, the legitimacy of the shogunal institution  
         was specifically tied to its performance in foreign policy.442 
 
The perceived need for Mitogaku and Shinron arose, therefore, from the 
arrival of the foreigners and continued to the foundation of the modern state. 
Otherwise, such ideas were not really necessary for the Japanese. Mitogaku 
became the major influence for the foundation of the modern Imperial 
system,443 because it deified the existence of the Emperor. Thus, this is the 
point on which Mitogaku was focused during the Meiji Restoration period. 
However, although it can be held that Mitogaku was necessary for the 
process of political modernization, it is equally the case that Mitogaku 
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cannot provide all the sources of inspiration for modern Japan.444 That was 
because the essence of Mitogaku was never defined completely and stopped 
in the midst of forming theoretical arguments.445 As a result, because of the 
varieties of intellectual trends and persons at the time, Mitogaku came to 
incorporate a vague logical thinking which could be understood in almost 
any way.446  
     There is, however, one common element between Mitogaku and Eikoku 
Sakuron: both honoured the existence of the Mikado and defined the Tycoon, 
who was considered as the national representative at that time, lower in 
status than the Mikado. Thus, focusing only on that point, it must be 
concluded that nineteenth-century Japanese could not likely receive much 
psychological impact from Eikoku Sakuron. However, by analysing the 
differences between them, the reason why the Japanese received an impact 
from Satow can be realised. While Satow asserted that the Tycoon could not 
be the national sovereign of Japan, at the same time Mitogaku did not deny 
the status of the Tycoon at all.  
     In general, Mitogaku is misunderstood academically because Mitogaku 
honoured the position of the Mikado. It is true that the Meiji Restoration was 
promoted using the ideology of Sonno, and that the essence of Sonno was 
defined by Mitogaku. Thus, it is commonly believed that Mitogaku was an 
anti-Tycoon ideology. Indeed, Tohyama admitted that Mitogaku was the 
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ideological propulsion for the Meiji Restoration.447 However, this is a huge 
misunderstanding. While it is true that the essence of Mitogaku was Sonno, 
in fact that was a justification for the Tycoon to be the national 
representative of Japan.448 This means that the reason why Aizawa tried to 
establish the specific ideology of Mitogaku was neither to cause the Meiji 
Restoration nor to cause the collapse of the Tycoon’s Government. He argued 
that the Tycoon’s Government should be reformed under Imperial authority, 
even if that meant that the structure of the Tokugawa Shogunate would be 
changed. So, what was the plan by which Aizawa wished to promote internal 
reform? The following were its major points: 
 
1. To define the Mikado as the pinnacle of social status and then to promote 
the reform of the Tokugawa Shogunate. In this reform, the social status 
and the social order should be changed if necessary.  
2. The Tycoon should work for the Mikado voluntarily while citizens should 
also act under the leadership of the Tycoon on behalf of the Mikado.449 
 
In essence, then, although foreigners had arrived in Japan, Aizawa did not 
suggest promoting rapid modernization. He tried to maintain the Shogunate, 
but by allowing the Tycoon to work for the Mikado. By redefining the Tycoon 
as a retainer of the Mikado, the Mikado’s status would thus become absolute 
and more sacred than before. It must be noted that Aizawa was a scholar of 
the Mito-Tokugawa family whose feudal status was next to that of the 
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Tycoon, and comparable with the leading Owari and Kii Tokugawa families. 
Even so, he respected the Mikado, contending that the Tycoon’s Government 
could not hold equal status with the Imperial Court, and, more than that, 
insisting that the Tycoon’s Government should have to contribute to the 
Imperial Court. 450  Implicitly, if the Tycoon’s Government could not 
contribute to the Imperial Court then the raison d’etre for the Tycoon would 
be lost. To be the national representative of Japan, the Tycoon must willingly 
work for the Mikado. In short:  
 
         Aizawa was concerned, after all, not to challenge Edo’s  
         monopoly on the conduct of external relations, but to shore 
         it up by reference to the Shogun’s source of authority.451 
 
Strengthening the Tycoon, via this focus on the place of the Mikado, would 
become the only method which would allow the Japanese to conduct affairs 
effectively with the Westerners.452 Although the relationships between the 
Mikado, the Tycoon and the feudal lords would be changed, Aizawa was still 
trying to establish absolute feudalism.  
     After the promotion of ideas leading to the Meiji Restoration, however, 
although the essence of Aizawa’s thinking was acknowledged, the direction 
taken was not what he had intended. This was especially so after 1865 when 
the Emperor Komei granted imperial ratification for the 1858 Treaty and 
events began to move in the direction of a collapse of the Tycoon’s 
Government. After the abolition of Jyoi, the only idea which remained was 
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Sonno, and promoting Sonno could only mean the end of the Tycoon, 
otherwise Sonno could not be achieved. It was this that led Japanese 
historiography to assume that Mitogaku became a major inspiration for the 
Meiji Restoration.  
     Yet the truth is different. According to Tohyama, the reason why that 
situation had developed was because radical samurais interpreted the ideas 
of Aizawa and other scholars of Mitogaku more violently.453 Many Japanese 
who promoted the Meiji Restoration thus claimed that the slogan of Sonno 
was based on Mitogaku thought, but in reality their beliefs did not reflect the 
true meaning of Sonno but reflected instead an opportunistic interpretation 
of Sonno which would justify their actions. In other words, Shinron became 
the evidence needed to justify their own attitude. Historically, it has been 
said that although Shinron became the bible for the samurais, its most 
important section－the idea to reinforce the standing of the Tycoon－was 
completely ignored.454  
     The true meaning of Sonno was to unify not only the regions but also all 
social status under Imperial authority.455 According to Mitogaku, the rank 
of the Tycoon would admittedly be lower compared with that which 
Tokugawa Ieyasu had established, but still Sonno could never be seen as an 
ideology to destroy the Shogunate.456 However, since in the name of Sonno, 
feudalism became completely wiped out, it can, on that point, be concluded 
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that Mitogaku and Shinron were exploited by Satsuma and Choshu and, as a 
result, Mitogaku came to be regarded as essential for the Meiji Restoration.  
     By the above arguments, it can be shown that when Aizawa wrote 
Shinron, or when Mito scholars promoted the ideals of Sonno, none of them 
remotely aimed at the collapse of the Tycoon’s Government. And that is the 
major difference compared with Eikoku Sakuron. Satow claimed that it was 
not the Tycoon but the Mikado who was the national sovereign of Japan. On 
that simple point, he did not specifically deny the existence of the Tycoon. 
However, he clearly stated that the confederate of Daimios under the Mikado 
would be the most appropriate regime for the future Japan, and that did 
constitute a denial of the Tycoon’s position. It is there that Eikoku Sakuron 
likely provided its psychological impact on those Japanese hostile to the 
Tycoon.  
     Because Shinron contained a degree of questioning the Tokugawa 
Shogunate,457 notwithstanding that its final goal was to strengthen the 
Tycoon under the Mikado, those Japanese influenced by Shinron at first 
promoted Jyoi. That was also a big difference. Shinron directed the Japanese 
towards Jyoi, whereas Eikoku Sakuron directed them towards Sonno, and 
the directions were different. So, it cannot be said that because the Japanese 
could already have read Shinron since 1825, they received no psychological 
impact from Eikoku Sakuron in 1866.  
     Indeed, by 1866 times were very different. In 1825 Jyoi was traditional 
ideology and all Japanese would have considered that it was possible to 
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promote Jyoi. However, after the bombardments of both Kagoshima and 
Shimonoseki, the Japanese had to face the fact that promoting Jyoi against 
the Westerners was now impossible. Then, finally in 1865, with the imperial 
ratification, the idea of Jyoi was completely demolished. That meant that the 
raison d’etre of Shinron was also diminished. At that moment the Japanese 
encountered Eikoku Sakuron. Satow appeared to argue for the collapse of 
the Tycoon’s government implicitly and thereby justify the Japanese who 
tried to achieve it. As a result, following Eikoku Sakuron, the Japanese 
started to look towards the Meiji Restoration, while at the same time 
endorsing those parts of Shinron which would justify their cultural attitudes. 
In other words, everything about the Meiji Restoration was ex post facto 
reasoning. In fact, it has been summed up as follows: 
 
         If the definition of the Meiji Restoration is limited to the  
         events of 1867 and 1868, it continued little more than a coup 
         that shifted rule from one sector of the ruling class to another.458 
 
One principal characteristic of the Meiji Restoration was that there was no 
consistency throughout that period. Thus it can be concluded that at the time 
Satow wrote Eikoku Sakuron the essence of Shinron had already 
diminished. Hence there could be many Japanese who were impressed by his 
essays, or, at least to justify their actions and status after the Meiji 
Restoration, were prepared to claim such a thing in public.  
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In conclusion, the existence of Alcock’s memorandum, the suggestions 
of Matsuki, and also Hope’s letter all suggested that Eikoku Sakuron was 
not entirely Satow’s own work. There were various guidelines for Japanese 
modernization already being considered by the British and Satow might 
simply have followed those. In Japanese academic writing, however, the 
existence of Alcock’s memorandum, Hope’s letter and Matsuki’s suggestions 
are forgotten and only Eikoku Sakuron is focused upon. It is true that the 
Japanese subsequently founded the Meiji Government whose political 
structure was not so different from Eikoku Sakuron, and the Japanese have 
always insisted that Satow’s essays provided the guideline for this 
modernization. The truth, however, may be obscured by that assumption.  
 








Chapter VII: Alcock’s Memorandum 
      
     The previous chapter explained how in Eikoku Sakuron Satow was not 
the first Westerner in Japan to question whether binding international 
agreements could properly be made with the Tycoon’s Government. The 
originality of Satow’s ideas is also called into doubt on account of 
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simultaneous representations made by Matsuki Kouan in London in March 
1866. Kouan likewise suggested that treaty legality and enforcement could 
only be assured if international agreements were endorsed by an assembly of 
daimyos under imperial authority. In his writings, Satow could well have 
been influenced by other foreign accounts of Japanese society and political 
organisation published in 1862 and 1864 and, crucially, by a memorandum 
written by Rutherford Alcock at the British Legation. To provide, therefore, 
the fullest context for Eikoku Sakuron, Alcock’s earlier assessment of 
Japanese politics, of Britain’s relations with Japan, and of the dangers which 
he believed had arisen, requires a careful evaluation.  
     As indicated earlier, Alcock wrote his 1864 memorandum about two 
weeks after the British, French, Dutch and American fleets bombarded 
Shimonoseki, because in 1863, in the name of Jyoi, Choshu had fired on 
foreign vessels passing through the Shimonoseki strait. In 1863 the British 
fleet had also bombarded Kagoshima, so for Alcock these two incidents 
required an urgent consideration of the diplomatic relationship with the 
Tycoon’s Government. For Alcock, it was time to consider Japan’s future, and 
to hope that after those bombardments, radical Japanese would give up the 
idea of Jyoi.  
     In the first paragraph of the memorandum, Alcock wrote Sako.459 This 
word means to close the port and it was a major goal for those Japanese who 
promoted Jyoi. In fact, the Imperial Court had strongly pressured the 
Tycoon’s Government to achieve Jyoi, and a mission was sent to Europe to 
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negotiate the closure of the port of Yokohama in February 1864. In that 
context, the word Sako spread among the Japanese. The mission, however, 
could not achieve its purpose and returned to Japan in August, but by this 
incident Alcock probably started to distrust the diplomatic attitude of the 
Tycoon’s Government because the object of its negotiation was out of the 
question in international law. He also might have feared that the Tycoon’s 
Government would arbitrarily cancel the treaties of 1854 and 1858 because 
it lacked any notion of diplomatic relations. That was why he referred to 
Sako. Using armed force against Choshu reflected his distrust of the 
Tycoon’s Government, and might serve as a warning to all Japanese of the 
impossibility of promoting Jyoi.  
      
     In 1864 Alcock concluded that the Tycoon could not be the ruler of 
Japan, either in name or in reality. However, that did not mean that Alcock 
believed the Mikado should replace him. In fact, he went on to say that 
giving control of finances to the Mikado would cause great danger.460 He 
recognized both Japanese tradition and Japanese national identity, which 
was why he insisted that the Mikado should not be associated with secular 
matters. Alcock seemed to question whether the Imperial Court had ever 
been under strict surveillance by the Tycoon’s Government, which was why 
the Imperial Court now had to become subordinate to the Government in 
return for financial support. Therefore, for the purpose of clarifying and 
securing the status of the Mikado, he suggested that 10-20% of the benefits 
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from foreign trade should become the Mikado’s income in the name of 
Royalty.461 Yet if Alcock thought that by contributing a certain amount of 
money this would be a first step towards the Mikado’s independence and to 
the Mikado becoming sovereign of Japan, he appeared to ignore the fact that 
the Tycoon’s Government had succeeded in its 260 years of governance by 
hiding the existence of the Mikado from the public.  
     Alcock stressed the advantage to be gained by changing the present 
political situation: 
 
By publicly and effectively renouncing all pretensions or right  
         to exclude any produce coming to the Consular ports, thus freely  
         permitting the Daimios to share in the proofs of foreign trade  
         hitherto monopolised in a very impolite manner by the Tycoon  
         himself.462 
 
In other words, by allowing other feudal lords to participate in international 
trade the vested interests which had been dominated by the Tycoon would 
collapse. Satow followed Alcock’s idea and in The Japan Times on 16 March 
and 19 May 1866 he criticised the Tycoon by highlighting Article XIV of the 
1858 Treaty.463 The logic was different but Alcock and Satow shared the 
same idea for the same purpose: they both criticised the Tycoon for 
monopolising international trade by excluding other feudal lords, thereby 
strengthening his own economic and political power. Although they both 
acknowledged the existence of the Tycoon, they denied his sovereign status 
and so could not turn a blind eye to anything which would reinforce his 
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position. As for other feudal lords being able to participate in Japan’s 
international trade, Alcock wrote:  
 
         In which case, Kagoshima and Shimonoseki might be opened  
         with many collateral advantages. 464 
 
It will recalled that in 1862 Her Majesty’s Government had concluded 
the London Protocol with the Tycoon’s Government, the major agreement of 
which was to postpone for five years opening the cities of Edo and Osaka, and 
the ports of Hyogo and Niigata. That meant that in 1864 the only ports 
which were open for international trade were Yokohama, Hakodate and 
Nagasaki. Alcock doubtless assumed that these three ports would not be 
sufficient for trade, which was why he stipulated Kagoshima and 
Shimonoseki. Admittedly these were the places which had been bombarded, 
but they nevertheless looked appropriate for increasing trade. Perhaps 
Satow simply followed Alcock when in The Japan Times on 16 March 1866 
he wrote that, in case of allowing the feudal lords to participate in 
international trade, one or two more ports would be enough.465 Satow did 
not mention, however, which ports to open.  
     After that, for the purpose of warning about Jyoi, Alcock suggested the 
foundation of the Corps Diplomatique.466 He did not provide much detail, 
insisting only that the Corps Diplomatique should have the right to live in 
Edo and also to use the Tokaido connecting Edo with Nagoya.467 It is hard to 
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understand why exactly he proposed this, although it might be assumed that 
it was to unite the foreign ministers and their staffs, thereby to strengthen 
their diplomatic privileges in Japan and perhaps to protect their lives and 
property. When Alcock proposed that only the Corps Diplomatique should 
have the right to use the Tokaido, however, his suggestion was important. 
He was trying to avoid further conflict between Japanese and foreigners and 
wrote as follows: 
 
          So, as to travelling in the interior or on the tokaido, where  
         Daimios suffer the greatest mortification in meeting and being  
         hustled by foreigners of all demonstrations-merchants, storekeepers  
         butchers coloured and white-all the motley and promiscuous denizens 
         of a sea-port in the East.468 
 
Alcock’s comments were naturally influenced by the events of September 
1862 when Richardson had been killed near Namamugi, which had resulted 
in the bombardment of Kagoshima in 1863. Faced with advanced British 
military technology, the Richardson affair may have provided an opportunity 
for Japanese to consider the need for modernization, but, from Alcock’s point 
of view, it was best to avoid any repetition. Hence only the Corps 
Diplomatique had the right to use Tokaido; other foreigners should use a 
road which was located four or five miles away.469 In the event of another 
such incident Alcock feared having to negotiate with the Tycoon’s 
Government, which had already shown itself unable to govern effectively, 
and then there was a possibility that the British fleet would be in action 
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again. That would mean a significant delay and cost for the British in 
promoting active trade with Japan. It would also mean that the Tycoon’s 
Government’s inability to deal with both domestic affairs and diplomacy 
would again be revealed and, as a result, the Japanese would become even 
more distrustful of the Tycoon, making civil war more likely. These outcomes 
remained only as possibilities but, either way, not only Japanese but also the 
British would suffer a great disadvantage in both diplomacy and commerce. 
As long as the idea of Jyoi remained prevalent among the Japanese, Alcock 
tried to avoid any trouble between Japanese and foreigners.  
     With this object in view, Alcock also wrote the following: 
 
         Finally, there should be a distinct act of the Mikado and  
Tycoon conjoined, repealing the ancient law of Gongen-sama  
hostile to foreigners.470 
 
Gongen-sama meant Tokugawa Ieyasu, the founder of the Tokugawa 
Shogunate in 1603, whom the Japanese revered. The major code and laws to 
maintain the Tokugawa Shogunate had been created by him, so Alcock 
clearly thought that by altering the code and laws of Tokugawa Ieyasu, he 
could try to change the political conditions in Japan. The final goal was, as 
he mentioned, the unification of the Mikado and the Tycoon. In fact, in 
March 1862, a sister of Emperor Komei, princess Kazunomiya, had married 
the 14th Tycoon, Tokugawa Iemochi, and as a result the Japanese considered 
that a new political structure was already formed. However, for Alcock, that 
might not be enough, because, although the Imperial Court and the Tycoon’s 




Government now had closer relations, still the traditional laws and values 
existed. In reality and ideologically, their ties by a marriage agreement 




         Partly by law and partly by direct intervention of authority  
         on the free intercourse of foreigners and Japanese, whatever  
         the rank or position of the latter. Nor should any Daimio be restricted  
         in giving, or foreigner in accepting, invitations to visit him within  
         his own territories, and to reside there in such Daimio’s employment.471 
 
In saying this, Alcock argued that without intercourse with foreigners, the 
Japanese could not reconsider their national identity and traditional values. 
Because the Japanese state had been closed for about 260 years, the 
population held the strong conservative ideas which had created Jyoi. If Jyoi 
remained a force it was possible that the Tycoon’s Government could retain a 
secular and intellectual credibility, which would mean that a Government 
characterized by diplomatic failures would continue as the national 
authority in Japan. The Tycoon’s Government was characteristic of 
feudalism, so while feudalism existed so would the Government. Also, Jyoi 
would exist too. By communicating with foreigners, feudalistic elements 
would disappear because the Japanese could develop a new sense of values. 
Hence both Alcock and Satow insisted that all the feudal lords should freely 
participate in international trade independently of any rights under treaty 
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articles. In this way they wished to give the Japanese an opportunity to 
promote modernization by their own efforts after they had experienced the 
more advanced elements of Western civilization; having experienced western  
culture and technology, the Japanese would abandon feudalism on their own 
initiative. In fact, Alcock concluded: 
 
But it is of infinite importance, not only as an outlet for hot  
         blood and the more adventurous and restless spirits, a safety  
         value of by which an excess of explosive power might be got rid  
         of; but as also opening the way for new light to penetrate into the  
         country through Japanese minds, and for the removal of procedures, 
         much more safely and effectually than by foreigners travelling  
         among them.472 
 
It could be argued that Alcock’s discussion of Japan’s future in such a 
one-sided way displayed haughtiness and that his attitude went against the 
diplomatic stance of Her Majesty’s Government, which was neutrality in 
domestic affairs in Japan. However, his assumption was that if the Japanese 
did not promote modernization themselves, then the Western states which 
had relations with Japan would endure diplomatic struggles and also that 
foreigners in Japan would be in constant fear of their lives or property. For 
Alcock, to construct a regime which was not feudal would be beneficial for 
everybody in Japan, and the first step was greater intercourse between 
Japanese and foreigners. Alcock’s other notion, to let the radical Japanese 
become dejected by demonstrating advanced western military power, was 
continued by his successor, Harry Parkes. Alcock explained as follows: 





         If some outward show of the importance attached to such  
action on the part of the four Representatives were made,  
by a squadron of ships under their respective flags accompanying  
them and anchoring opposite Yeddo, their task, and that of  
the Gorogio also, might be all the easier.473 
 
That was why, in November 1865, under Parkes’s leadership, British, 
French and Dutch warships anchored in the Sea of Hyogo to demand 
imperial ratification for the 1858 Treaty and also an early opening of the port 
of Hyogo. 
 
Alcock had previously advised that this action should occur in the Sea 
of Edo, but although Parkes followed the same policy, the place was 
different. Hyogo (modern Kobe) was a suburb of Kyoto, and Kyoto was the 
centre for the idea of Sonno-Jyoi. The Emperor Komei had been insisting on 
the promotion of Jyoi, and had been pressuring the Tycoon’s Government. 
That was one of the factors which had led the Government into recent 
diplomatic failures. Parkes arrived in Japan just four months before the 
action in the Sea of Hyogo, but he must have recognized beforehand the 
domestic situation. Because the Imperial Court was causing diplomatic 
difficulties, so to change its awareness of diplomacy, Alcock’s policy would 
not be altered. Of course, the British did not have any intention to start a 
war, but, following Alcock’s guideline, Parkes nonetheless sent the fleets to 
Hyogo. As a result, after this show of military force, the Imperial Court 




abandoned the idea of Sonno-Jyoi, and although they refused to open the 
port of Hyogo earlier than agreed, they did ratify the 1858 Treaty. Had 
Parkes not sent the navy, arguably nothing would have changed because the 
Court nobles understood nothing about the Westerners and would have 
remained as conservative as before.  
     Finally, Alcock suggested A great Council of Daimios as a new political 
organization, although this idea needs careful analysis. He did not suggest it 
as the replacement for the Tycoon’s Government to be a responsible regime 
representing the national sovereignty of Japan. This is clear because in the 
next paragraph he wrote: If the ratification of existing Treaties by the 
Mikado, and their acceptance by the Daimios, could be obtained as a first 
result.474 Judging from this statement, he focused on imperial ratification, 
not any new regime. Alcock had always sensed that the treaties with the 
Tycoon’s Government were meaningless because there was no imperial 
ratification and also because there was no participation from the other 
feudal lords. 
     Satow, of course, was also influenced by this idea when he suggested 
the Confederate Daimios. Its purpose was the same as Alcock had suggested: 
the British should give up the treaty with the Tycoon and then deal with the 
major feudal lords. 475  While this approach might also be construed 
somewhat arrogant because it involved manipulating Japanese domestic 
affairs, nevertheless Satow was essentially discussing potential 
developments in Japan’s political future. It was correct as a general analysis, 
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although not in detail. Like Alcock, Satow complained about the treaty with 
the Tycoon’s Government and the diplomatic problem which had been caused 
by it. However, were present conditions reformed, the British would not then 
have any complaint. They were focusing on changing the political situation, 
not intending to cause a collapse of the Tycoon’s Government.  
     In fact, Alcock wrote about the purpose of the Council of Daimios as 
follows: 
 
         In that case their place of meeting should, if possible, be Osaca 
         rather than Kyoto, and there at the same time the four Representatives 
         might be ready freely to discuss with the Gorogio, and leading members  
         of the Daimio class who might desire it, the relative merits of these  
         various propositions for the advantage of all, and the preservation  
         of peace.476 
 
Gorogio means Rojyu, who were the chiefs of the cabinet in the Tycoon’s 
Government, which was why Alcock suggested that not only major feudal 
lords but also Rojyu should be invited to attend that council. He probably 
considered that was the only means to create what was called the total 
Japanese will. In addition, Alcock added observations concerning the 
effectiveness of that council: 
 
         That such fundamental changes in the foreign policy of the 
 country should be only attainable by a certain pressure, in which  
force or intimidation can hardly be said to be altogether absent,  
is not peculiar to Japan.477 
 
                                                 




The bombardments at both Kagoshima and Shimonoseki and also anchoring 
the fleets in the Sea of Hyogo were effective for showing military superiority, 
but in the meantime there were clear disadvantages. For example, the 
British could not keep repeating that option, which in any case always 
contained the possibility of a war with the Japanese. To avoid that, he 
suggested the assembly of major feudal lords as a priority. He used the word 
Conciliatory, so must have considered that showing a moderate as well as 
sometimes a severe attitude would encourage the Japanese to give up radical 
ideas themselves without any enforcement by the foreigners. Judging from 
this, Alcock had no wish for conflict with Japan and tried to provide an 
opportunity for the Japanese to start their own modernization.  
     Although Alcock wrote A great Council of Daimios, he did not specify 
which daimios would be chosen. This was, however, his first step to move 
away from maintaining diplomatic relations only with the Tycoon’s 
Government. That was why he wrote as follows: 
 
         Unhappy domestic relations lead almost inevitably, and by a  
         natural process, to unsatisfactory intercourse with strangers; 
         and with States and Empires, to unwise foreign policy. 478 
 
Alcock recognized that the present situation could only cause relations to 
deteriorate. Yet he was not allowed to become involved in Japanese domestic 
affairs. The only thing he could do was to write this memorandum, send it to 
Her Majesty’s Government, and let the cabinet understand the present 
situation in Japan. He also expected the British Government to be concerned 




about Japan’s future. As it was, his ideas had a big impact on Satow, 
Matsuki and Parkes.  
 
Alcock was clearly not an optimist nor was he sure whether his 
proposals could establish a good diplomatic relationship with the Japanese. 
However, maintaining the present situation, could only make matters worse. 
That was why he mentioned the possibility of war, and his fear of this was 
evidence of how Japanese domestic politics had become chaotic. As Minister 
in Japan since the ports had been opened under the 1858 Treaty, he knew 
the Japanese political situation better than any other British observer.  
     Reviewing Satow’s Eikoku Sakuron and the proposals by Matsuki in 
1866, there were several points apparently influenced by Alcock’s 1864 
memorandum. Although nobody, including Parkes, mentioned the 
importance of this memorandum, judging by their actions it seems obvious 
that without it they could not have achieved what they did. Without Alcock’s 
memorandum, the Japanese might never have promoted modernization by 
their own efforts, and, in the meantime, the British could not have 
established acceptable diplomatic relations. By that logic, not only the 
Japanese but also the British were greatly influenced by Alcock.  
     One last thing must be clarified: Alcock did not discuss either a Two 
House system of Parliament or elections in his memorandum. Nor did he 
show any sense of creating a constitutional monarchy. That was also true 
with Eikoku Sakuron. Since the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese have 
commonly understood that by Satow’s effort and Eikoku Sakuron their 
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nation could move towards political modernization. As a result, they have 
long thought that Satow considered a constitutional monarchy and a 
parliamentary system in detail. However, that idea is wrong. Neither Alcock 
nor Satow discussed the future Japanese regime at all. Furthermore, 
although they criticised the Tycoon’s Government, they did not agitate the 
Japanese towards any revolution. In an ideological sense, Eikoku Sakuron 
became defined as the turning point in the Meiji Restoration, and as a result, 
Satow was deemed to be the person whose efforts made a significant 
contribution. That idea, however, is based often only on guesswork or an 
incomplete knowledge of the evidence available. 
     Indeed, after analysing Alcock’s memorandum, it can be shown that the 
British had never contemplated the collapse of the Tycoon’s Government. 
Alcock seriously worried about the future of Japan, and in some detail, so, on 
that point alone, it might look as if he were involving himself in Japanese 
domestic affairs. However, Alcock focused not only on the benefits for Britain 
which would be created by free trade but also considered strengthening the 
Tycoon’s Government as part of any future regime. In fact, when explaining 
the reason why he had sanctioned the bombardment of Shimonoseki to the 
British Government, he claimed that there was a need to secure the Tycoon’s 
Government from collapse as much as possible.479 Unlike the bombardment 
of Kagoshima in 1863, the bombardment of Shimonoseki was not approved in 
Britain, because no British lives were threatened. Again, then, Alcock’s 
action might be considered as a proof of his involvement in Japanese 
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domestic affairs. Yet, the true purpose of his bombardment of Shimonoseki 
was to support the Tycoon’s Government indirectly by defeating Choshu, 
which at the time manifested a strong attitude of Jyoi. Thus, Alcock’s 
memorandum is evidence that not only did the British not involve 
themselves in Japanese domestic affairs, but, if anything, they indirectly 
supported the Tycoon.  
     There was no constitutional revolution immediately after 1868. It was 
only in 1890 that the Japanese founded a Two House system of Parliament 
and promulgated the constitution which had been established in 1889. By 
considering that, it becomes easy to understand why Goto Shojiro, who was 
considered to be the man most influenced by Satow, could not achieve his 
plan right after the civil war. Alcock and Satow neither discussed the future 
of the Japanese regime in detail nor did they force their ideas on the 
Japanese. As James Hoare concluded in 2000: 
 
          There was in reality no British plot to ‘sabotage the Shogun’  
         and the clever Mr. Satow’s articles in the Japan Times may have  
         been widely read in Japan as ‘Eikoku Sakuron’, but they seemed to 
         have had no effect on official policy.480 
 
This seems to be the prevailing attitude among British historians regarding 
Eikoku Sakuron. It took about 30 years to found the constitutional 
monarchy. That is a point the Japanese still misunderstand about the 
influence of Satow. 
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Chapter VIII: The Meiji Restoration 
 
     When Satow advocated a future Japanese political system as 
Confederate Daimios under imperial authority in The Japan Times in March 
and May 1866, he, of course, was not British Minister. His job was to 
translate, and when he wrote Eikoku Sakuron he was only 23 years old. To 
that extent, his actions and the content of his argument might seem 
surprising.  
     How was Satow regarded by the British? Mitford, who was a diplomatic 
colleague at the British Legation, wrote in his memoir: 
 
He it was who swept away the cobwebs of the old Dutch  
diplomacy, and by an accurate study of Japanese history and  
of Japanese customs and traditions realized and gave true  
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value to the position of the Shogun, showing that the Mikado  
alone was the sovereign of Japan.481 
 
Mitford thus saw Satow as the person who brought British diplomatic 
influence to bear on the Tycoon’s Government. Traditionally, the Tycoon’s 
Government had maintained relations with the Dutch, hence Satow’s 
political approach influenced not only the Japanese but also the British. As 
evidence of that, Mitford referred to the 15th Tycoon Tokugawa Yoshinobu as 
an Anachronism.482 The British had recognized the Tycoon as the national 
sovereign of Japan since making the 1854 treaty and subsequently tried to 
maintain a good diplomatic relationship with the Tycoon’s Government. 
However, after Eikoku Sakuron, the British started to alter their attitude 
and gradually broke with the Tycoon. Mitford’s expression showed that 
change vividly. The difficulty, however, was to imagine what would be a 
suitable future political structure for Japan, which was why the British 
could do nothing but maintain their existing relations with the Tycoon, even 
though his Government showed inability to exercise national sovereignty.  
 
     Satow’s appeal for reform in Japanese domestic affairs did not address 
any particular person or cite any individual. He tried to appeal more widely 
in the hope of reaching sympathizers in Japan. So who sympathized with his 
essay? Mitford wrote: 
 
The Prince of Awa swears that he is the Admiral’s son  
and elder brother to Sir Harry Parkes; Awaji no kami, the  
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Prince’s son, claims intimate relationship with Satow.483 
 
The name, the Prince of Awa, also appeared in a different place: in Satow’s 
memoir. There, Satow wrote that he had written the essay about reducing 
the Tycoon’s social status for the purpose of handing it to the Prince of 
Awa.484 Judging from the writings of Satow and Mitford, it could be assumed 
that there was a strong relationship between Satow and the Prince of Awa, 
not only in public but also in private. In addition, Harry Parkes also had a 
relationship with him, because, by following the life of Satow, it can be 
confirmed that Parkes and Admiral Keppel had visited Hachisuka Narihiro 
(1821-68), who was the Prince of Awa, in August 1867. It is not certain that 
Satow was present, but, since his main work was to interpret, he probably 
was. In fact, in the month after that meeting, he visited Kouchi Castle to 
meet Yamauchi Youdou, who was the former Prince of Tosa. Tosa was 
adjacent to Awa, so, considering transport difficulties in the nineteenth 
century, Satow likely visited Tosa right after visiting Awa. This would 
suggest that after Eikoku Sakuron the relationship between Satow and the 
Prince of Awa strengthened.  
     Judging from the above, it might be concluded that, based on his 
relationship with the British, the Prince of Awa contributed much to promote 
the Meiji Restoration. However, in historical accounts, there is no mention of 
him in the Meiji Restoration. Neither he nor his samurais joined either the 
Battle of Toba-Fushimi on 27-30 January 1868 or attended the conference on 
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3 January 1868 which opened after Tokugawa Yoshinobu had returned his 
political authority to the Imperial Court. These incidents are both defined as 
turning points in Japanese history. By the former incident, the ex-Tycoon’s 
Government was defeated completely and as a result their collapse was 
proved vividly to all Japanese. By the latter incident, the Japanese could 
completely wipe out both feudalism and the traditional nobility system of the 
Imperial Court, and, as a result, create the groundwork to establish a 
modern political structure. 
     When Mitford analysed Japanese domestic affairs at the time of the 
civil war in 1868-69 he wrote: 
 
Aidzu485: Men who were ready to lay down their lives, and did  
Actually die, for the honour of the Tokugawa. 
            Satsuma, Choshiu486, Tosa, Uwajima: Moving heaven and earth for the 
                                            deposition of the Shogun.487 
 
Mitford’s description also indicates that the Prince of Awa did not involve 
himself in the Meiji Restoration. Therefore, although Hachisuka clearly did 
have a private relationship with both Parkes and Satow, that did not mean 
that he was strongly influenced by the British concerning Japan’s future.  
     So, which influential Japanese did sympathize with and were 
influenced by Satow’s ideas? There was certainly one samurai: Goto Shojiro 
of Tosa. This is known because his name appears in the memoirs of both 
Satow and Mitford. According to Satow: 
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After dinner Goto came on board to have a talk on politics.  
He spoke his idea of establishing a parliament, and a constitution  
on the English model, and said that Saigo entertained similar notions.488 
 
Several Japanese names appear in his memoir, but regarding political 
discussion, Satow wrote only of Goto. That might suggest that Goto was the 
only Japanese who had been seriously considering a future political 
structure, and also who could discuss political affairs with an equal 
understanding to the British. Goto was judged to be a knowledgeable 
samurai by Satow. Mitford also had a high regard for Goto and described 
him as follows: 
 
Like famous Saigo, of Satsuma, and others of the  
leaders in the various clans, Goto expressed himself as  
keenly anxious to establish a Gi-ji-in, or parliament.489 
 
The name of Saigo also appears in both memoirs. This was, of course, Saigo 
Takamori. Because Goto is not one of the three major heroes of the Meiji 
Restoration, for the Japanese, Saigo is much better known.490 However, 
judging from the descriptions by Satow and Mitford, Goto was perhaps more 
insightful than Saigo because Goto had already been studying the British 
political structure, hence Satow’s discussion of political affairs with Goto.  
     What was Goto’s plan for modernization? In Japanese history, it has 
always been accepted that the reason why Tokugawa Yoshinobu returned his 
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political authority to the Imperial Court was that he had been petitioned by 
Yamauchi Youdou. And the person who had handed that petition to 
Yamauchi was Goto. So what was the content of Goto’s petition? The first 
issue was to return the Tycoon’s political authority to the Imperial Court.491 
This was called Taisei-Houkan in Japanese.  
     According to most of the material written by the British, two historical 
incidents, Taisei-Houkan and Osei-Fukko (which means the recovery of 
ancient imperial authority) were together defined as The Restoration of 
Imperial rule. However, for the Japanese, Taisei-Houkan and Osei-Fukko 
were separate and could not be recognized as one event. Thus, some 
discussion of Taisei-Houkan is necessary.  
     Judging from Mitford’s memoir, Tosa was a fief displaying anti-Tycoon 
Government sentiment from the beginning of the Meiji Restoration. That 
was not true, however, in the strict sense of the word. It was true that Tosa 
had been on the side of the Imperial Court, but in the meantime Tosa also 
sympathized with the Tycoon’s Government. In fact, Tosa had played the 
role of intermediary between them since 1854. At the time of the Battle of 
Toba-Fushimi in January 1868, Tosa maintained neutrality until the 
imperial flag was given to the Satsuma and Choshu side. Only after 
Tokugawa Yoshinobu was defined as enemy of the state by the Imperial 
Court did Tosa give up supporting him. 
     Why in the petition did Goto insist on Taisei-Houkan? The reason was 
that, on the anti-Tycoon side, there were various radical samurais who 
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would not hesitate to provoke civil war. His colleague, Inui Taisuke 
(1837-1919), who changed his name to Itagaki Taisuke and promoted the 
movement for demanding democratic rights under the Meiji Government, 
was one example.492 After Eikoku Sakuron, unlike before, no Japanese 
considered the existing Tycoon’s Government as a future regime. All 
Japanese contemplated its elimination; the only difference among them was 
whether it would be done peacefully or not. Goto chose the peaceful method 
and Taisei-Houkan was the only solution for this. Goto did not write any 
memoir, so it is hard to analyse his decision in detail, but, considering his 
political activities, one important principle can be guessed. It was that his 
goal was to found the new regime without a battle. Civil war caused nothing 
but disaster in domestic affairs. This attitude might well have been 
influenced by the British. 
     After the achievement of Taisei-Houkan, Goto next considered the 
foundation of Giji-in, which means Parliament in Japanese. That idea 
appeared in the articles of an alliance between Tosa and Satsuma in 1867. 
According to their alliance, they agreed to co-operate for the purpose of 
achieving a two House system of Parliament which imitated the British 
model. Eligibility for political office should range from feudal lords and Court 
nobles to ordinary citizens and social status should not be questioned.493 
Goto considered that for the purpose of founding the new regime under 
imperial authority, not only Court nobles who supported the Mikado but also 
feudal lords and samurais should attend the Parliament. Therefore, he 
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planned that Court nobles and feudal lords should be in an upper House 
while samurais should form a lower House.494 In Eikoku Sakuron, Satow 
proposed the creation of Confederate Daimios under the Mikado, but he did 
not say anything about a Parliament. Thus, different from Satow’s proposal, 
Goto envisaged a new regime which would be more consistent with Japanese 
tradition and customs. The only common points between Satow and Goto 
were placing the new regime under imperial authority and maintaining the 
existence of feudal lords.  
In the meantime, for the British Legation the priority was to avoid civil 
war, otherwise active commercial relations between the British and 
Japanese since the Tariff Convention of 1866 would be destroyed. Satow 
would certainly have considered that danger, which was why he discussed 
British political structures with Goto. Following Goto’s petition, Tokugawa 
Yoshinobu returned his political authority to the Imperial Court on 9 
November 1867, and, as a result, nominally, the Tycoon’s Government was 
abolished peacefully. That was what Goto, and probably Satow, had expected 
and was their purpose in advocating change.  
     Judging from the above, then, the Japanese who was influenced most 
by Eikoku Sakuron was Goto Shojiro, and the Japanese, it appeared, were 
moving toward a future based on British influence. However, considering 
political events after Taisei-Houkan, this process could not develop along the 
lines which Goto and Satow had contemplated. The details will be discussed 
later, but essentially the Meiji Government which was founded by the 
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Japanese was moderated neither by Goto nor Satow. In fact, it was very 
different from what Satow had urged in 1866 in The Japan Times. Until 
1890 the Japanese failed to establish a constitutional monarchy based on two 
Houses of Parliament and a national election system. Since it was in May 
1868 that, as an act of unconditional surrender, Tokugawa Yoshinobu left 
Edo Castle after the Battle of Toba-Fushimi, and in May 1869 that the 
ex-Tycoon’s Government remaining military force at Hakodate surrendered 
to the Imperial Court, it therefore took about 20 years to found the modern 
political structure following Taisei-Houkan. In the meantime, the new 
regime had tried to establish a modern structure by trial and error, at the 
end of which neither ordinary citizens nor feudal lords and samurais who 
had not been on the side of the Imperial Court from the beginning could 
participate in national politics. Furthermore, there had been a power 
struggle among the victors. None of this had featured in the ideas of Satow 
and Goto. 
     Although Goto was one Japanese who could understand Satow’s vision 
and had his own for the future of Japan, there was no political base from 
which to promote his ideas. Furthermore, the Japanese who could 
understand his vision were not the majority. That was why Goto was never 
considered to be a major hero of the Meiji Restoration. In Japan, ironically, 
the person who perhaps best understood British policy and tried to found a 
new regime based on it could not be recognized as a hero, but those who 
willingly promoted civil war were considered to be so. Aside from the power 
struggle among them, Japanese at the time were initially reluctant to 
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acknowledge British influence to achieve the Meiji Restoration, because the 
Meiji Restoration was the first step towards Japanese modernization and 
they did not wish to admit any foreign influence for the sake of bolstering 
their national identity. Perhaps that was to be expected; nevertheless, it took 
20 years to achieve that result. There are, of course, various opinions and 
historical viewpoints about the Meiji Restoration, but they do have one 
common notion. It is that Eikoku Sakuron by Satow has come to be regarded 
as the key for Japanese modernization, even though Japanese in the late 
nineteenth century largely ignored his plan. Japanese historiography 
continues strongly to define him as an important person in the Meiji 
Restoration.  
 
     As discussed, Tokugawa Yoshinobu returned his political authority to 
the Imperial Court by accepting Goto’s petition. What, though, was the 
ideological dimension to that decision? Tycoon was the title by which the 
foreigners had referred to the Shogun. The official designation was 
Sei-i-Tai-Shogun; in English, that title translates as 
Barbarian-quelling-Generalissimo, 495  and it contained an important 
message. The origin of the Shogun was for the purpose of subjugating the 
barbarians, and the Mikado gave that title to the major warrior to act as the 
Mikado’s deputy. As time passed and after the decline of the Mikado and the 
Imperial Court, that title began to acquire a stronger political authority. As a 
result, although Shoguns did not fight against barbarians, they retained that 
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status. In the early modern era, the concept of the Shogun had thus changed 
from its origins.  
     However, although in this secular aspect the concept had changed, the 
title was still given from the Imperial Court for the notional purpose of 
fighting the barbarians. In fact, Alcock wrote as follows in 1863: 
 
That the Mikado is the hereditary sovereign of the empire,  
the descendant of a long and uninterrupted line of sovereigns of  
the same dynasty, and the only sovereign de jure recognized true  
sovereign in all the legal attributes of sovereignty; and that the  
Tycoon receives investiture from him as his Lieutenant or  
Generalissimo, and as such only, the head of the Executive,  
－is known to most readers of the present day.496 
 
His statement was the best analysis available of the relationship between 
the Mikado and the Shogun. Alcock pointed out the Mikado’s superiority 
when in London on leave. That was four years before Tokugawa Yoshinobu 
returned his political authority to the Mikado. Yet although under the 
Tokugawa Shogunate the authority and activities of the Mikado and the 
Imperial Court had been severely restricted by the codes, that did not mean 
that imperial dignity had declined. Although the Imperial Court was 
restricted, the Tycoon’s Government existed by virtue of trust from the 
Mikado, otherwise the regime itself could not be justified.497 However, as a 
result of diplomatic failures after 1853, the system of domestic governance 
had started to collapse. Therefore, according to established ideology, the 
Tycoon would now have to give political authority back to the Mikado by way 
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of taking responsibility for domestic confusion; if the Tycoon showed inability 
to be the national representative of Japan then the Mikado could cancel his 
status. The title of Shogun was given for the purpose of maintaining 
domestic peace and order, not for the Shogun’s own self-respect. Tokugawa 
Yoshinobu had to return his authority because the major feudal lords were 
ceasing to co-operate in maintaining the feudal Tokugawa Shogunate. 
     These factors formed the background to why Goto handed his petition 
to Tokugawa Yoshinobu. His action was neither revolt nor revolution. In 
both secular and ideological aspects, Goto saw no choice but to return 
political authority to the Imperial Court, otherwise there would be a civil 
war. Goto’s plan was successful to the point of returning political authority, 
but thereafter the situation did not develop as he had planned. Goto was far 
too optimistic.498 Goto had persisted with ideological thinking and, as a 
result, there were important points which it would be impossible to realise. 
     One major issue was the actual method of returning political authority. 
Although Tokugawa Yoshinobu did return authority based on Goto’s 
petition, he did not abolish feudalism. 499  That meant his action was 
nominal, and, in reality, Tokugawa Yoshinobu retained his huge lands and 
noble status for the purpose of becoming political leader in the new regime. 
In fact, considering the economic and military power provided by his lands, 
he could be the only future political leader because nobody could effectively 
challenge him. In the meantime, the Imperial Court itself could not 
implement Goto’s plan. It had been isolated for hundreds of years under the 
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Tokugawa regime and, furthermore, only a limited number of noble houses 
had been eligible to be Court nobles for 800 years.500  That meant the 
Imperial Court had neither the know-how to conduct politics nor could 
provide able nobles. For the Imperial Court, Tokugawa Yoshinobu’s political 
decision was welcomed, but in reality the Court could not create a new 
political structure. As a result, they would be forced to accept that in the end 
only Tokugawa Yoshinobu could lead any new regime.  
     It was said that Tokugawa Yoshinobu had predicted this after 
analyzing the political quality of the Imperial Court, which was why he 
agreed to Taisei-Houkan. In fact, when interviewed in 1909, he admitted 
that when he took a look at Goto’s petition, he thought the time for 
promoting his will had finally come.501 Subsequently, it has been considered 
that Tokugawa Yoshinobu had pondered founding a Two House system of 
Parliament, whereby Court nobles and feudal lords would be members of the 
Upper House with all their retainers in the Lower House, and he saw himself 
as chairman of the Upper House.502 Also, he was said to have felt the need to 
found a centralized state by adopting the British style, for which purpose he 
was supposedly willing to abolish feudalism.503 Nevertheless, in the book 
Sekimukaihikki which ran all the interviews with Tokugawa Yoshinobu, he 
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never mentioned the above plans so it is impossible to determine whether 
they were true or not.  
     Goto’s petition, ideologically correct but flawed in reality, was probably 
formed in such a way that Tokugawa Yoshinobu could accept it without 
resistance. However, at this point the attitude of Satsuma was critical. They 
had already seen through the intention of Tokugawa Yoshinobu regarding 
the next stage. The samurais of Satsuma had favoured Taisei-Houkan which 
was why they had supported his initial action. In fact, without their 
co-operation, Tokugawa Yoshinobu could not have returned his political 
authority so smoothly. 504  But equally they opposed some provisions of 
Taisei-Houkan because, if operated as Tokugawa Yoshinobu planned, he 
would still be the leading figure in Japan. Hence, after he had returned his 
political authority, the samurais of Satsuma insisted that he also return his 
noble status and feudal lands to the Imperial Court.505 With the failure of 
this negotiation, the civil war started in 1868. Tokugawa Yoshinobu would 
not yield on the above two points. 
     Tosa and Satsuma shared the same political ideology, which was why 
they made their alliance in the 3rd year of Keio (1867). In September of the 
same year, however, it was cancelled.506 Tosa and Satsuma could easily 
agree with the necessity of Taisei-Houkan for modernization, but not over 
the details. In October 1867 Tokugawa Yoshinobu enacted Taisei-Houkan 
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based on Tosa’s plan.507 As a result, the samurais of Satsuma decided on 
civil war. This split became the main reason why the samurais of Tosa could 
not subsequently hold major positions in the Meiji Government.  
     The huge disadvantage arising from Taisei-Houkan for Tokugawa 
Yoshinobu was not necessarily to give up the status of Shogun but to abolish 
feudalism. The relationship of master and man between Tokugawa 
Yoshinobu and the other feudal lords would thereby be cancelled. 508 
Tokugawa Yoshinobu had focused on the advantage of Taisei-Houkan. 
According to Goto’s petition, there was no reference to the administrative 
system under any new regime, which meant that, although the Tycoon’s 
Government was abolished, it was apparent that no new regime could 
establish a nation-wide administrative system except by using either the 
ex-government system or Tokugawa’s support. 509  Tokugawa Yoshinobu 
knew that, as did some of the major feudal lords, including Tosa, who 
supported him because he was considered to possess the required leadership.  
     In consequence, the samurais of Satsuma decided to abolish feudalism 
not by a peaceful method but now by civil war. Thus, they started to 
strengthen their relationship with Choshu which had been fumbling around 
for a way of founding a new regime without Tokugawa. In February of the 
2nd year of Keio, they had already made a pact for the purpose of supporting 
Choshu to fight against the Tycoon’s Government. This time, they expanded 
on the purpose of their pact. In fact, in Article XI, they agreed that Satsuma 
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and Choshu should make a combined effort to restore the authority of the 
imperial state.510 It was therefore for the purpose of excluding Tokugawa 
Yoshinobu from any new regime that they made this alliance in 1866. This 
pact would have two significant historical consequences. First, the 
emergence of a new power which would not hesitate to fight a civil war and, 
secondly, that they would eventually become the majority in the Meiji 
Government.  
     Goto’s petition contained another significant problem. Even though his 
new regime would establish a parliament, it would still be based on 
feudalism. As a result, even if all the feudal lords and their retainers 
attended the parliament, they would not embrace national politics because 
they were foremost the representatives of their own fiefs.511 That caveat was 
critical, since it meant that they would never promote centralization. As long 
as feudal lands remained, each feudal lord and his retainers would possess 
political influence there, and political decisions by the central government 
could not be enacted or enforced. Central government might expect notional 
obedience from all the feudal lords, but such obedience would inevitably be 
seen as interference in their domestic affairs because all feudal lords were 
independent. By keeping the feudal lords, parliamentary politics could not 
develop. Whatever the situation, feudalism and centralization were 
incompatible. A major criticism of Goto is therefore that he conceded the 
survival of feudal status.  
                                                 
510 Sakaki, 325-331. 
511 Isao Inoue, 177-179. 
230 
 
     Perhaps Tokugawa Yoshinobu, Goto Shojiro and his master, Yamauchi 
Youdou, could not envisage a society without that feudalistic element. That 
tendency could be seen not only among them but also among other Japanese. 
In fact, the ex-feudal lord of Echizen (modern Fukui), Matsudaira Shungaku, 
who was later recognized as one of four good feudal lords, also delivered a 
proposal to Tokugawa Yoshinobu on 13 August of 2nd year of Keio (1866) in 
which he advocated a reform of the Tycoon’s Government but one still based 
on maintaining feudalism.512 That attitude could be seen as Satow’s opinion 
too, because he proposed the Confederate Daimios. However these men 
envisaged a new regime, the essence of feudalism remained, whether it was 
proposed by the Japanese or the British. The Japanese were only able to 
establish a constitutional monarchy in 1890 because they could all finally 
abolish the model of feudalism from their minds. 
     Another overly optimistic point in Goto’s plan was that, although a 
parliament would be founded, there was no realistic administrative 
organization which could implement political decisions.513 A new regime 
could therefore neither promote national policy nor punish violators. If that 
was the reality then it could not really be defined as a political regime. In 
Goto’s new regime, feudal territories could be the only administrative 
organization.514 Therefore, success in creating national politics depended 
entirely on whether all the feudal lords would follow the lead of parliament.  
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     Of course, even under the Tokugawa Shogunate, a similar problem had 
already occurred surrounding the bombardments of Kagoshima in 1863 and 
Shimonoseki in 1864. If both Satsuma and Choshu had obeyed the Tycoon’s 
Government, those incidents would not have happened. Furthermore, the 
Japanese had already founded a conference, similar to Goto’s plan. This was 
the conference of San-yo (which means counsellor) in 1863 and the 
conference of Shi-ko (which means four feudal lords) in 1867. The 
participants of the former were Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu, the guardian of 14th 
Tycoon Tokugawa Iemochi at that time, Matsudaira Katamori of Aizu 
(modern Fukushima), who was the main supporter of the Tycoon’s 
Government, Shimazu Hisamitsu, the father of the feudal lord of Satsuma, 
Matsudaira Shungaku, ex-feudal lord of Echizen, Yamauchi Youdou, 
ex-feudal lord of Tosa, and Date Munenari, the ex-feudal lord of Uwajima. 
The participants of the latter were mostly the same, except that Matsudaira 
Katamori did not attend. These conferences could be regarded as 
Confederate Daimios, such as Satow proposed. So, what had happened at 
those conferences? They collapsed in a short period because, in each case, 
Hitotsubashi (Tokugawa) Yoshinobu could not agree with the other feudal 
lords about making political decisions, and as a result the conferences 
became meaningless. These historical events demonstrated the weakness of 
Goto’s plan. Because social status was still based on feudalism, only the 
Tycoon could bring together the major feudal lords. Unfortunately, because 
the dignity of the Tycoon had already declined, whatever the situation there 
was no method of creating a new regime as long as feudalism existed. Every 
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feudal lord possessed independent political and military power, and now 
there was nobody above them. The only authority was the Mikado, but the 
Mikado had only a remote existence and so could not be their direct leader. 
The Japanese did not have the notion of an imperial army under the Court. 
There were soldiers who guarded the nine gates of the Imperial Court at 
Kyoto, but they were only samurais who had been sent by their feudal 
lords.515 Their role was to protect the gates and, whatever happened in 
Japan, they would not react. That meant there was no leader for a new 
regime. 
     Also, in terms of military affairs, there was naivety in Goto’s plan. For 
Goto, a national army should exist for the purpose of maintaining uniformity 
in domestic affairs.516 But for the samurais of Satsuma and Choshu, a 
national army should exist to further their plans.517 They did not share the 
same political values, which was why Satsuma had opposed Taisei-Houkan 
after Tokugawa Yoshinobu had accepted Tosa’s idea and not Satsuma’s.  
 
     After the battle of Toba-Fushimi in 1868, the samurais of Satsuma and 
Choshu, and also the Court nobles who were on their side, founded the new 
regime of the Emperor Meiji (1852-1912). Only then did Osei-Fukko occur. 
Osei-Fukko means, ideologically, to restore the imperial authority of the 
ancient era, and the new regime was based on that principle. But the essence 
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of the new regime changed from that which had been planned before the 
battle. The comparative details were as follows:518 
 
The discipline of political organization in the new regime 
 
Before: An organization which would make an effort to reach national  
decisions by debate.  
After: An organization to protect the victor’s political power by laws.  
 
The elements to form the new regime 
 
Before: To maintain the existence of the Imperial Court, the Tycoon’s  
Government and feudal lords. 
After: Everything above was abolished.  
 
About the Tycoon’s Government 
 
Before: The Tokugawa family would remain and the chairman of the  
       new regime would be the head of their family. 
After: Not only their social status, but also their noble status and their  
feudal lands were cancelled.  
 
About the Imperial Court 
 
Before: Reform, based on maintaining traditional customs, status and  
       sense of values.  
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After: Except for the Emperor Meiji, everything was cancelled.  
 
The members of the new regime 
 
Before: All the feudal lords and retainers had an eligibility to join. 
After: The samurais of Satsuma and Choshu became the majority and the  
rest were the people who had sided with them.  
 
     Before the battle of Toba-Fushimi, then, for the purpose of avoiding 
civil war, all Japanese were deemed eligible to join the new regime and all 
existing organizational structures were to be preserved. However, after the 
battle, because Satsuma and Choshu were victorious, they took the political 
initiative and, as a result, Owari, Echizen, Tosa and Uwajima, which were 
also major feudal powers, could no longer form a part of the majority. Having 
made efforts to avoid the war, they did not share the values of Satsuma and 
Choshu. Now they had to obey Satsuma and Choshu in the new regime. The 
Tokugawa family was abolished. The civil war continued until 1869, but at 
the battle of Toba-Fushimi Japan’s future was effectively decided.  
     When discussing Osei-Fukko, one further point requires attention. It is 
that Iwakura Tomomi (1825-83), who became a leader of the Imperial Court, 
declared the restoration of the era of Emperor Jinmu.519 Emperor Jinmu 
was the first Mikado of Japan, albeit confirmed only in legend. Why did 
Iwakura declare the era of Emperor Jinmu? It was because of its ideological 
significance. When the Tycoon’s Government decided to open ports to the 
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Westerners, they justified it according to a political rationale going back to 
the seventeenth century. The seventeenth century was when the Tokugawa 
Shogunate had closed off the state. Thus, for the purpose of maintaining the 
dignity of the Tokugawa Shogunate, they had to proclaim that everything 
would revert to the situation before closing the state. However, the samurais 
who swore loyalty to the Mikado insisted that everything should return to 
the twelfth century.520 That was when the warriors founded their regime by 
isolating the Mikado. These ideals symbolized the dispute over whether the 
essence of the Tokugawa Shogunate or of the traditional Imperial Court 
system would be preserved. But if there was any ideological trace at all from 
the Middle Ages, then surely it seemed impossible to found a modern state? 
Iwakura resolved this problem by stressing the existence of the Emperor 
Jinmu for the purpose of denying both; otherwise, vested interests would 
remain. To deny both traditions from earlier ages, the Imperial Court had to 
make that declaration. After the battle it was apparent that the Imperial 
Court had achieved victory, but the Japanese were (and remain) people who 
always emphasise ideology. For that purpose, Osei-Fukko was important; it 
was not just to announce the Court’s triumph but to provide a milestone for 
the future. Nevertheless, although that was one background to the Meiji 
Restoration, the samurais who supported the restoration of Imperial 
authority could not establish the modern state immediately. The following 
assessment gives a good account of the situation: 
 
        Ten years before the Meiji Restoration the emperor had become  
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         a political figure, but there was still much to be accomplished  
         before Japanese political society could regard him 
         unequivocally as the ultimate power in the effective  
         government.521 
 
This statement indeed captures the idea that the purpose of the Meiji 
Restoration was not simply to restore the national status of the Mikado.  
 
     When analyzing the political developments of the Meiji Restoration era, 
one phrase always appears: imperial ratification. Judged from the view point 
of the modern state, any treaty without imperial ratification would be 
meaningless and, as a result, its articles would not be effective. In Eikoku 
Sakuron, Satow criticized the Tycoon’s Government because it made the 
treaty with the British in 1858 without imperial ratification, and thereby, 
caused commercial difficulties. That was why, in 1865, under the British, 
foreign fleets off Hyogo demanded from the Tycoon’s Government imperial 
ratification for the 1858 treaty, otherwise they would negotiate with the 
Imperial Court directly.  
     When considering that event, one aspect is interesting: the Japanese 
themselves actually criticised Ii Naosuke, who was Tairo of the Tycoon’s 
Government, for making commercial treaties without imperial ratification. 
However, in contrast to Parkes’s action with the fleets in 1865, there was no 
large protest movement, which suggests that although the Japanese had 
worshipped and respected the Mikado since ancient times, they did not feel it 
so serious to ignore the Mikado’s existence in the diplomatic field. After the 
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publication of Eikoku Sakuron in 1866 the Japanese started to contemplate 
a new regime where the Mikado would head its hierarchy, but until then no 
Japanese realistically considered such a change, which was why they did not 
attach much importance to imperial ratification. Because the Mikado had 
been so long excluded from national politics, the Japanese still accepted the 
Tycoon as national sovereign both in a nominal and practical sense. Hence, 
when negotiating with the Europeans, no Japanese doubted that the 
Tycoon’s Government was in charge.  
     The 15th Tycoon, Tokugawa Yoshinobu, recalled his experience when 
later interviewed. He had explained to the Westerners that Japan was 
governed by the Shogun and that he was in charge of national politics, but 
however much he tried to help the Westerners understand that, they had 
never grasped it. 522  His statement illustrated the significant difference 
between the Japanese and the Westerners over the existence of the Emperor. 
For the Westerners, Japanese attitudes seemed strange, since they did not 
understand the concept of the Mikado in the first place. For them, the Tycoon 
was merely the deputy of the Mikado, so even though he could negotiate with 
the Westerners, he did not have the right to sign. The reality was that 
although the Japanese did define the Mikado as the symbol of national 
identity, that was done only in any significant measure after the foundation 
of the Meiji Government. Until then, even though the Japanese did begin to 
emphasise the existence of the Mikado, they did not actively promote the 
Mikado as the symbol of national identity. That ambiguity was reflected at 
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the time of and after making the 1858 Treaty. Although the feudal lords 
criticised Ii Naosuke for signing it without imperial ratification, that did not 
mean those feudal lords concerned themselves with the importance of the 
Mikado. They mentioned the Mikado only for the purpose of accusing Ii 
Naosuke.523 Thus, the reason why the Japanese started to take an interest 
in the need for imperial ratification was to attack the Tycoon and his 
Government, not to stress the political status of the Mikado.  
     After the foundation of the Meiji Government, indeed until 1945, 
Emperors were considered to have a sacred existence, and, based on that 
concept, the political circumstances surrounding the Meiji Restoration were 
consistently analysed and discussed. As a result, later and present Japanese 
concluded that to understand the importance of imperial ratification was to 
understand the first step towards Japanese modernization. However, that is 
not correct, and after 1945, with guaranteed freedom of speech, Japanese 
scholars, free from this taboo, could analyse the political circumstance of the 
Meiji Restoration era more openly.524 
     As a result, one great truth has emerged: in 1858 no Japanese 
considered that treaties without the imperial ratification were illegal and, 
furthermore, the Emperor Komei was not enraged following the Tycoon’s 
action. The traditional historical account is this: in February 1858 the 
Tycoon’s Government decided to open the ports for commerce, but for the 
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purpose of suppressing any opposition from other feudal lords, they decided 
to ask the Court for imperial ratification. In March 1858 the Emperor Komei 
refused to give imperial ratification for the treaty. Meanwhile, the American 
envoy, Townsend Harris, stressed the current activities of British and 
French naval forces in China and urged the government to sign his 
commercial treaty before they arrived in Japan. As a result, Ii Naosuke 
signed the commercial treaty with the US, without imperial ratification, 
which was why the Tycoon’s Government started to be criticized by the 
Imperial Court and by radical Japanese. This series of historical events is 
what the Japanese have since accepted as a historical truth. Yet that was 
because the Meiji Government so elevated the position of the Emperor. In 
recent years, a new understanding has emerged.  
     One basis for this new understanding emerged from Tokugawa 
Yoshinobu’s answers in his interview in 1911. He said that since the Tycoon’s 
Government had been in charge of politics, they should have stated publicly 
that the state would have to be opened. Then, after everything had been 
completed, they should simply have reported to the Imperial Court.525 Also, 
Tanabe Taichi, the Japanese historian, and also an eye-witness, insisted that 
there was no reason to involve the Mikado, otherwise the situation would 
have become more complicated.526 Their statements proved one essential 
matter: that the Japanese at that time did not recognize the vital role of the 
Mikado, compared with the era of the Meiji Government. In short, the 
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Japanese under the Tokugawa Shogunate did not attach importance to 
imperial ratification in the diplomatic field.  
     This attitude of not considering the need for imperial ratification 
obviously caused a diplomatic problem with the foreigners, but it proved at 
least that the Japanese at that time did not emphasize the status of the 
Mikado. Tokugawa Yoshinobu, whose name at that time was Hitotsubashi 
Yoshinobu, Tokugawa Nariaki, who was the father of Yoshinobu and a lord 
of Mito, Tokugawa Yoshikumi, who was a lord of Owari, and Matsudaira 
Yoshinaga, who was a lord of Echizen, all accused Ii Naosuke of concluding 
the 1858 treaty without imperial ratification, but that was only an excuse for 
attacking him.527  The truth was that they had been struggling among 
themselves about who would be the 14th Tycoon. They were concerned about 
that matter, not with imperial ratification.528 In fact, when Ii told them that 
his action was inevitable to keep up with international affairs, their dispute 
about it was ended by that simple statement.529 
     Accepted history gives the reason why the Emperor Komei refused to 
issue the imperial ratification as his fear of Japanese soil being violated by 
foreigners. However, that understanding has now changed. The Emperor 
Komei objected not to opening the ports but acted to prevent the possibility 
of a collapsing domestic order. 530  The Emperor Komei would not have 
rejected ratification if domestic order could be maintained as it had been 
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before.531 The concept of domestic order was similar to that which the 
Chinese possessed as integral to their national identity. Admittedly, when 
the Westerners arrived, ordinary Japanese saw this as the barbarians’ 
arrival. Yet although the Japanese defined foreigners as barbarians, they 
had not closed all international relations. Even in the seventeenth century, 
when the Tycoon’s Government had closed the state, they still allowed 
limited trade with the Dutch and Chinese at Nagasaki. Also, the Japanese 
had diplomatic relations with the Ryukyu and Korean dynasties. The latter 
relationships were described as Communication, but as translated from 
nineteenth-century Japanese, the true meaning was Tributary state, which 
meant the people of Ryukyu and Korea were allowed to have diplomatic 
relations in return for their payment of tribute.532 Since the Dutch and 
Chinese did not pay tribute, they were not allowed diplomatic relations, 
which was why they were confined to Nagasaki under close surveillance. 
                                                 
531 The political vision of the Emperor Komei was to maintain the Tycoon’s Government 
while also maintaining the standing of the Imperial Court in the national hierarchy. In 
supporting the Tycoon’s Government, the Emperor Komei sanctioned the promotion of 
Jyoi towards the Western states. On that point, Emperor Komei never considered or 
wished the collapse of the Tycoon’s Government. Whatever the situation, the Emperor 
Komei wanted to preserve the feudal structure, as did the Tycoon, with the feudal lords 
and the samurais. (Ki-jae Shim, Nitcho Gaikoushi no Kenkyu (Kyoto: Rinkawa Shoten, 
1997), 7). 
532 However, this analysis was adopted by the Tycoon’s Government for the purpose of 
asserting Japan’s national standing in East Asia. The states which had diplomatic 
relations with Japan, such as Ryukyu, China, the Netherlands and Korea, however, had 
different points of view. (Aoyama, Meiji Ishin no Gengo to Shiryo, 195). The South 
Korean historian, Ki-Jae Shim, has claimed that the Japanese-Korean diplomatic 
relationship existed on the basis of equal status. (Shim, 6). Even so, Shim described the 
diplomatic relationship with the Netherlands and China as Tsusho, while that with 




Foreigners who rejected both these types of relationship were liable to be 
expelled from Japan. In conclusion, it was the Tycoon’s Government which 
defined Trade relations without diplomatic relations as Tsusho, and only 
Diplomatic relations as Tsushin. The intention was to hold a psychological 
advantage over other Asian states, consistent with traditional Japanese 
ideology. It thereby reinforced the sacredness of Japan’s national identity533 
whereby its lands were defined as the most divine in the world. Such a view 
clearly necessitated such a diplomatic distinction. In fact, in 1621 the 
Japanese ended their diplomatic relations with China because the diplomacy 
was based on Sino centrism.534 However, to withdraw from Sino centrism, 
which was the predominant diplomatic system in East Asia, did not mean 
that Japan was completely isolated. The Japanese established their own 
version of Sino centrism.535 In the present, Sino centrism is defined as 
follows: 
 
By claiming to be the ‘centre’ of the social order, the challenger  
         is merely taking over China’s role in ‘promoting cosmic and social 
         harmony’, while the ‘moral purpose of the state’ remains the same.536 
 
And for the purpose of achieving and maintaining the above essence, the 
Japanese had to define their own diplomatic system strictly, especially 
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towards Korea.537 The following statement illustrates the background to this 
Japanese attitude: 
 
From the Japanese end, that order would be constructed on 
         the premise of Japanese centrality, of complete autonomy 
         to control Japan’s external affairs.538 
 
The Japanese version of Sino centrism therefore required strict definitions of 
both Tsushin and Tsusho which were successfully maintained until the 
arrival of the Westerners. In fact, Shim concluded that the 1860s was the 
time when relations based on Tsushin and Tsusho collapsed and Japan was 
forced to shift to a new diplomatic relationship with the Westerners.539  
     In 1853, Perry indeed rejected both. He requested free trade, but the 
Japanese did not understand that concept. This meant that the Americans 
and Japanese could not even start negotiations because their concepts of 
diplomacy were so different. The Tycoon’s Government feared that once they 
admitted Perry’s request, traditional domestic order would collapse in a 
short period. Perry and the Tycoon’s Government could not therefore achieve 
any agreement; they made a treaty of peace, amity and friendship only in 
1854. That was the product of compromise by both sides. The Tycoon’s 
Government agreed to provide food and water for the Americans and opened 
ports of call for them. In return, Perry gave up the idea of free trade. For the 
Americans, and also for the British, French, Dutch and Russians, who made 
the same treaty with the Tycoon’s Government in 1854, that treaty was the 
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first step for establishing diplomacy. They all considered that for the purpose 
of establishing friendly relations, they had made treaties with the Japanese. 
However, the Japanese did not think like that. They had a different point of 
view from the Westerners.  
     After the Meiji Restoration, it became accepted wisdom that these early 
treaties of peace, amity and friendship were the beginning of a process 
whereby the Tycoon’s Government would cause a political disaster leading to 
Japan being colonised by Western states. However, that fear was really 
caused only by the later treaty of 1858 which acknowledged 
extraterritoriality, introduced a low rate of tariff and a most-favoured-nation 
clause for the Europeans. In fact, Tanabe Taichi defined Perry’s treaty as 
being based on universal laws.540 Therefore, it is now hard to accept the 
Meiji Government assertion that Japan was in danger of colonisation from 
1854.  
     Historical facts may support that. When the Tycoon’s Government 
signed the treaties of peace, amity and friendship with the West, the 
Emperor Komei did not issue any imperial ratification. Nor did the Tycoon’s 
Government request it from the Imperial Court. That was because domestic 
order would not be challenged by those treaties. For the Japanese, although 
they had opened the ports, that was not for any commercial purpose. It was 
just for cases of emergency; hence there was no possibility of causing a 
political disaster. That was why the Emperor Komei expressed honestly a 
                                                 
540 Tanabe, Bakumatsu Gaikoudan, Vol I, 8. 
245 
 
feeling of satisfaction.541 Although the treaty with Perry was the first time 
the Japanese had made a treaty according to modern diplomatic concepts, no 
Japanese questioned the need for imperial ratification and not even the 
Mikado considered it to be illegal. 
     What was the meaning for the Japanese, of peace, amity and 
friendship? For them, those treaties were certainly not to establish 
diplomatic relations. In short, they made those treaties for the purpose of 
gaining time to promote Jyoi to expel the barbarians. 542  Their main 
consideration was to maintain domestic order. After Perry, the Westerners 
refused to establish diplomatic contacts based on Japanese values, which 
meant they refused both communicate and commercial relations. The 
Westerners would not admit the formal classifications which the Tycoon’s 
Government had established as the conditions for official diplomatic 
relations. As a result, their existence came to represent a serious threat to 
the domestic order. The Japanese had to resist them; otherwise, neither the 
Tycoon’s Government nor the Imperial Court would maintain their standing 
and both would be endangered. From the Western point of view, this attitude 
doubtless looked strange, but for the Japanese the foreigners had either to 
obey the Japanese order or leave. Therefore, with a view to expelling the 
foreigners, the Tycoon’s Government made treaties of peace, amity and 
friendship as an act of appeasement, later to wage war against them to 
restore the traditional order. Since the Emperor Komei could understand 
that intention, the Imperial Court did not question the Government’s 
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actions. Only when Ii Naosuke made the treaty with Townsend Harris in 
1858 did the Emperor Komei criticise his action － but not because Ii had 
signed without imperial ratification. The Emperor Komei was afraid of a 
collapse of domestic order on account of its specific terms. The Emperor 
Komei did not care who had authority as national sovereign. Thereafter the 
major feudal lords criticised Ii for the purpose of encouraging the samurais 
and citizens to understand a national crisis, and they raised the issue of 
imperial ratification. And under the Meiji Government, the Japanese 
severely criticised Ii, and also the Tycoon’s Government for pretending to be 
the national sovereign. Concluding treaties without Imperial ratification was 
cited as proof of it. However, the truth is that Japanese at the time focused 
on traditional order and identity, and did not regard imperial ratification to 
be as important as did those who came after the Meiji Restoration.  
 
     Traditional history also asserts that Ii Naosuke signed the 1858 treaty 
without imperial ratification because he understood Western military 
superiority. He was said to be afraid of wasting any time either in 
negotiations or by receiving imperial ratification. However an alternative 
analysis has recently emerged. According to this, Ii signed without enough 
knowledge about the opening of Japanese ports for commerce.543 Although 
he had signed a commercial treaty, he believed the situation would be the 
same as after the Government had signed the treaties of peace, amity and 
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friendship.544 That analysis is plausible, because right after Ii had made the 
commercial treaties with the Western states, he instituted a severe political 
repression in 1858-59 known as the Purge of Ansei. His oppression was, in 
fact, too severe; not only feudal lords but also samurais were punished. In 
the meantime, he also punished the Court nobles. The Court was under the 
Mikado’s control, but Ii could still pursue his measures against them because 
the Emperor Komei supported him.545 The Court nobles who were punished 
were the people who had expected free trade.546 The Emperor Komei had to 
punish them otherwise order would disappear within the Imperial Court.  
     Not only did the Emperor Komei cooperate with the Purge of Ansei. In 
March 1862 the Mikado’s sister, Princess Kazunomiya, was allowed to marry 
the 14th Tycoon, Tokugawa Iemochi. By these means the Emperor Komei was 
trying to become closer to the Tycoon’s Government in order to recover 
traditional order, just as the Tycoon’s Government looked to the past for 
traditional identity. The Emperor Komei even ordered Tokugawa Iemochi to 
visit Kyoto in 1863 and officially instructed him to promote Jyoi. The 
Emperor Komei made these decisions based on one principle: to restore the 
traditional order which was now endangered by the 1858 commercial 
treaties. By analyzing the Mikado’s actions according to that idea, every 
historical incident becomes clearer. In the meantime, the Tycoon’s 
Government was losing any clear vision in either domestic politics or 
diplomacy. In each case, it changed its approach in the years which followed 
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yet did not solve any essential problem. That was why it increasingly lost 
credibility in the eyes of both the Japanese and the Westerners, and the 
origin of this was the fact that it had made commercial treaties with Western 
states without a proper understanding. Imperial ratification itself was not at 
the heart of the problem.  
     The commercial treaties which the Tycoon’s Government had signed for 
the purpose of suiting the occasion were now causing severe problems of 
domestic order for the Tycoon’s Government. As a result of entering into the 
international free trade system, the domestic market system of the 
Shogunate was collapsing, the status of the Tycoon was declining, and the 
military system of the Tokugawa Shogunate was weakened.547 This was 
because the Tycoon’s Government could not devise any means to connect 
local markets with Osaka, which was at the centre of the Japanese economy, 
because the Japanese started to doubt the Tycoon’s competence after a series 
of mismanagements in domestic politics and diplomacy, and because, after 
the commercial treaties, contradictions in social status in Japan started to 
appear. Yet with the Purge of Ansei, much opposition to the Tycoon’s 
Government had been eliminated and it could still insist that it was the 
sovereign body in Japan despite its mistakes in both domestic and diplomatic 
affairs. 
     In November 1865, after the foreign naval display to demand 
ratification for the 1858 treaty, the Court finally issued an imperial 
ratification. This had significance for both Westerners and the Japanese. 
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From the Western point of view, under universal laws, the true national 
sovereign had accepted the treaties, so all articles could now be effective for 
promoting international trade. Their activities in Japan thereby became 
legal. For the Japanese, however, the fact that the Emperor Komei issued his 
imperial ratification meant an end to their traditional identity. The idea of 
defining Japanese soil as sacred and foreigners as barbarians was 
diminished, because the traditional order had ended. As a result of issuing 
the imperial ratification, the Mikado acknowledged the existence of the 
foreigners in Japan, hence the Japanese had now to give up the idea of 
Jyoi. 548  The Japanese could no longer regard foreign states as either 
communicate or commercial. 
     In conclusion, then, before the Meiji Restoration, the idea of imperial 
ratification in itself did not have any psychological impact for the Japanese; 
criticism arose later for the purpose of discrediting the Tycoon’s Government, 
especially by the Meiji regime. Raising and debating such complex political 
ideologies was never likely to agitate citizens to participate in a mass 
movement. Because of feudalism, few Japanese could even make the decision 
to join in political affairs. Everybody had their defined social place under the 
Tokugawa Shogunate, and to join any anti-establishment movement meant 
losing their status. However, because, imperial ratification was the Mikado’s 
business, and all Japanese shared a reverence for the view of the Mikado, to 
criticise the Tycoon’s Government on behalf of the Mikado was a powerful 
idea. Despite that, no Japanese before 1868 attached much importance to 
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imperial ratification even when they understood the notion of imperial 
authority, any more than they could understand the essential points of 
universal laws. New ideas about the Mikado were formed after the Meiji 
Government took power, and have influenced Japanese thinking ever since. 
Since the Middle Ages, the Mikado and the Imperial Court had been 
abandoned, so the arrival of the Westerners could scarcely in itself bring 
about a revival of imperial authority. Therefore, although Satow was 
emphasizing the ideological importance of the 1865 imperial ratification in 
Eikoku Sakuron, the Japanese would scarcely have understood his meaning. 
They might, however, better appreciate the existence and value of the 
Mikado from those 1866 essays.  
     Next, British diplomatic relations during the civil war in 1867-69 must 
be analysed. By doing so, it will be shown how Japanese historiography 





Chapter IX: British diplomacy during the civil war, 1867-1869 
 
     The civil war, called the Boshin War in Japan, started on 27 January 
1868 when the army of the ex-Tycoon’s Government fought that from 
Satsuma-Choshu at Toba-Fushimi. It continued until 27 June 1869 when the 
residue of the ex-Tycoon’s forces surrendered at Hakodate. The war was a 
struggle between the Imperial Court and the ex-Tycoon’s regime, even 
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though both sides had already agreed to construct a modern state over which 
the Mikado would be national sovereign. However, the Imperial Court side, 
and especially Satsuma, wished to exclude the personnel of the Tycoon’s 
Government from the new regime and refused to allow the last Tycoon, 
Tokugawa Yoshinobu, to join. That was not acceptable to the ex-Tycoon’s 
supporters.  
     The origin of this civil conflict was the arrangement whereby 
Tokugawa Yoshinobu had returned his political power and authority to the 
Imperial Court on 9 November 1867, after which radical Satsuma samurais 
had demanded that he also return his noble status and all feudal lands. The 
Government side then stiffened its political stance. In the meantime, to 
provoke the ex-Tycoon’s Government, Satsuma samurais committed several 
outrages in Edo. Following these actions, civil war could not be avoided. The 
ex-Government, whose military force mainly consisted of Aizu and Kuwana, 
moved towards Kyoto and against the military force of the Imperial Court 
defending Toba and Fushimi.   
The general understanding of the war is that the ex-Government tried 
to crush the forces of Satsuma-Choshu, but that when the latter proved well 
trained and possessed modern weapons the ex-Government force gave up 
advancing to Kyoto. In recognition of this, the Imperial Court officially gave 
the imperial flag to the Satsuma and Choshu side. This effectively decided 
the general nature of the civil war, because Satsuma and Choshu assumed a 
legitimacy and whoever fought against them would be defined as an enemy 
of the state. As a result, the feudal lords who maintained neutrality or those 
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who were initially on the side of the ex-Government soon shifted their 
support to the Imperial Court. Three days later, Tokugawa Yoshinobu was 
officially declared an enemy of the state. To try to avoid that situation, he left 
Osaka the day before and as a result the military situation became worse for 
the ex-Government because its supreme commander had fled and the morale 
of his army collapsed. The Imperial Court side, which already controlled 
western Japan completely, then moved towards the east, reaching Edo in 
March 1868. By that time, the radical Satsuma samurais had already 
decided on a full attack on Edo castle, but, after negotiation with the 
ex-Government, Edo castle was opened peacefully on 3 May. Tokugawa 
Yoshinobu was spared his life but forced to retire to Mito, his birth place. The 
Tycoon’s Government thereby disappeared both in name and in reality. 
However, the remaining military force of the ex-Government refused to 
surrender and still resisted the Imperial Court. That was Aizu and the forces 
at Hakodate, but they were defeated soon after. As a result, the civil war was 
over in a year and a half.  
When Japanese today are asked about the diplomacy of Western states 
at that time almost all will answer that the British supported the Imperial 
Court while the French supported the Tycoon’s Government and that the 
Boshin war was a proxy war between them, as if a form of colonial war 
occurred in the Far East. This is the orthodox historical view and there is a 
tendency not to question it. But if proof is required then this academic 
argument is at once weakened because it mostly relies on secondary sources 
and discussion after the events. Even if British support for the Imperial 
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Court is considered to have existed, the evidence for it was too vague. 
Frequently cited evidence is Satow’s diary of 22 March 1868. In it, he wrote 
that Iwakura Tomomi told him that Iwakura understood Britain’s decision 
because the British were the first to acknowledge the Mikado as the national 
sovereign of Japan. 549  Judging from only this statement, it could be 
surmised that the British had been supporting the Mikado from an early 
period. The orthodox historical view assumes that the Japanese were in 
danger of colonisation by Western states because of the political failures of 
the Tycoon’s Government but that thanks to a great effort by the Imperial 
Court, and also Satsuma and Choshu, the Japanese were saved. The Meiji 
Restoration has long been analysed and discussed in this context and, as a 
result, Ernest Satow has become misunderstood. Some historians even 
accuse him of instigating the Japanese civil war. Of course, there is no 
evidence for such an assertion. In reality, did the British really support the 
Imperial Court? And did they want to create a puppet regime by interfering 
in Japanese domestic affairs? In this chapter, traditional Japanese 
assumptions which have become academic orthodoxy will be discussed. 
 
First of all, why did the Japanese define the Boshin war as the critical 
moment regarding colonisation? The Japanese historian, Fukuchi 
Gen’ichiro, who had experience working under the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in the Tycoon’s Government as a translator, worked as a journalist in 
the Meiji era, and later became a major figure in Japanese historiography, 
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wrote that the principal fear at that time had been interference by foreign 
states. In fact, in the Government, there were strong advocates of requesting 
French support for the purpose of counter-attacking Satsuma and Choshu. 
However, had this opinion prevailed, the Japanese would regret it forever,550 
since if the Japanese asked help from foreigners they would not be 
independent even after the war because, by so doing, the Japanese would 
have abandoned reconstructing their own state. Government samurais who 
wanted French support thereby endangered Japan. Fukuchi was an 
eye-witness of the Restoration, so from his statement emerged the idea in 
scholarship that the Tycoon’s Government had asked help from the French 
and were somehow supported by them.  
Also Osatake Takeki (1880-1946), who was a jurist under the Meiji 
regime, said much the same in a speech on 3 December 1928: that had the 
Japanese invited support from the British and French there might have been 
significant repercussions for Japan’s future.551 By implication, at the time of 
the civil war there were some Japanese who had been nervous about 
interference by foreign states.  
These two sources testified that there were advocates of asking help 
from the foreigners. In reality, though, foreign involvement never happened; 
neither can their statements be taken as evidence of any real danger. They 
simply pointed out some opinions, and their statements are not evidence of 
any likelihood of foreign intervention.  
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Is there any other proof? Both Hayashi Tadasu, who negotiated the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance in London in 1902 and who became Japan’s first 
Ambassador to Britain in 1905, and Tokutomi Soho, who is another major 
figure in Japanese historiography, suggested British involvement in the 
Boshin war. Hayashi recalled in his memoir what he had found while he was 
in London. He claimed to have found a significant document in a British blue 
book. This was Harry Parkes’s report to Her Majesty’s Government where he 
wrote that Britain should support the Japanese to found their new regime in 
order to create a legacy of British involvement. Hayashi concluded that, 
considering the fact that the French supported the Tycoon’s Government, 
Parkes’s suggestion should be accepted as true.552 Although his analysis of 
British involvement was pretty vague, albeit different from the previous two 
historians, Hayashi apparently concluded that the Tycoon’s Government had 
been supported by the French. Since he was a samurai of the Government 
and a prominent diplomat, his statement was considered definitive and as a 
result, relying on his opinion, subsequent historians could justify similar 
points of view.  
However, a counter-argument against Hayashi is easily constructed. In 
terms of French involvement, Tokugawa Yoshinobu also testified in a 1911 
interview that, after he had returned to Edo, the French Minister, Leon 
Roches, persistently recommended that he counter-attack the Imperial 
Court.553  Even if true, that would not be proof of French involvement 
because Roches simply offered his opinion. Shibusawa Eiichi later wrote 
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about Roches. According to him, Roches assured Yoshinobu that if he decided 
to counter-attack, the French would willingly produce battleships, weapons 
and other necessary materials.554 Perhaps, only this aspect was focused 
upon by later generations and, as a result, it was assumed that the 
Government had been supported by the French. Shibusawa concluded this 
episode with a statement by Frederick Dickins, who had written a life of 
Parkes, whereby Roches had tried to cajole the Tycoon for the purpose of 
transforming the Government into a French protectorate.555 It is uncertain 
whether Roches really had that intention, but since both British and 
Japanese eye-witnesses testified similarly regarding Roches’s action, it 
appeared logical for Yoshinobu to regard French diplomacy in much the 
same way.  
However, Shibusawa also clearly indicated that Yoshinobu rejected 
Roches’s suggestion. 556  Shibusawa was a major figure in the Tycoon’s 
Government and accompanied Yoshinobu’s younger brother, Akitake, when 
visiting Europe. As a leading official samurai, his statement was 
trustworthy. Because Yoshinobu rejected completely Roche’s suggestion it 
must be accepted that the Government officially turned down any offer of 
French support. As Tycoon, Yoshinobu possessed a well developed political 
sense. As Fukuchi and Osatake insisted, if the foreigners became involved in 
Japanese domestic affairs then the Japanese would cease to be independent.  
Yoshinobu would certainly have recognized this.  
                                                 
554 Eiichi Shibusawa, Tokugawa Yoshinobukou Den , Vol. IV (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1968), 
227. 
555 Shibusawa, Tokugawa Yoshinobukou Den , Vol. III, 306. 
556 Shibusawa, Tokugawa Yoshinobukou Den , Vol. IV, 228. 
257 
 
In fact, when Roches met with Yoshinobu, the latter had already been 
defined as an enemy of the state and might still have been tempted by 
Roches’s suggestion for the purpose of recovering his political status and 
dignity, or at least continuing to resist in Edo. However, he did not. 
Furthermore, he rejected everything which could be interpreted as French 
involvement in any aspect of Japan’s future. Perhaps, therefore, he should be 
regarded more highly in Japanese history.  
 
Hayashi served the Meiji regime in Britain between 1900 and 1906 
before returning home to become Japanese Foreign Minister. From being a 
samurai of the Tycoon’s Government, his situation had now changed, which 
might well explain his eagerness to point out earlier failings of the Tycoon’s 
Government above all else. Considering that, should Hayashi’s material be 
judged worthless? Perhaps not, because indirectly he acknowledged British 
support for the Imperial Court and was not simply criticising the Tycoon’s 
Government for the purpose of honouring his new masters. Nevertheless, he 
produced no evidence to show that either side in the civil war had been 
supported by the British or French.  
How did Tokutomi Soho analyse these same historical events? As 
discussed in Chapter III, Tokutomi was a historian who had suggested the 
secret relationship between Ernest Satow and Saigo Takamori, and, based 
on that assumption, he had concluded that the British were involved in 
Japanese domestic affairs and insisted that they interfered in the civil war. 
He argued that from this private relationship between Satow and Saigo, it 
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could easily be understood how Satow might have encouraged Saigo to 
support the anti-Government movement, and that this was not just his 
personal attitude but that he represented the British Legation.557  
There could be another possibility: by picking up on Satow’s simple 
statement, nineteenth-century Japanese and modern Japanese 
historiography have both come to see him as if he were on the side of 
Satsuma. One example of this is Saigo’s letter to Komatsu Tatewaki, a 
retainer of Satsuma, on 9 December 1866. The main content of this letter 
was the conversation with Satow wherein Satow was said to have expressed 
his honest feeling to Saigo: “Three years will be too long to wait” and in 
conclusion, Satow said, “Satsuma would have to be the leading figure”.558 
Saigo sent a letter to Katsura Hisatake, also a Satsuma samurai, on 4 
August 1867, in which he wrote that it was a great shame for him to consult 
about the future political regime of Japan with a foreigner.559 Judging only 
from Saigo’s letters, it could be concluded that Satow expected Satsuma to 
replace the Tycoon’s Government and also that he expected to endorse the 
Meiji Restoration as soon as possible. That is why Satow’s statement, “Three 
years will be too long to wait”, became evidence that he had involved himself 
in Japanese domestic affairs.  
     It was the case that Satow also wrote about the conversation with Saigo 
in his diary on 12 January 1867, but the content there was different from 
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Saigo’s letters. When Satow met Saigo, he asked Saigo about the general 
Japanese evaluation of the 15th Shogun, Tokugawa Yoshinobu. Saigo 
answered that within three years, Yoshinobu’s abilities would be exposed, 
only after which Satow said, “Three years will be too long to wait”.560 Satow 
was likely trying to assess the political ability of the new Tycoon, Tokugawa 
Yoshinobu, which was why he told Saigo that he could not wait for three 
years. However, the Japanese focused attention not on the whole 
conversation but only on Satow’s statement for the purpose of showing 
evidence of British involvement, and, as a result, for the Japanese, not only 
Satow but also the British more widely were judged to be involved in the 
Meiji Restoration. Satow’s words might be strong evidence for orthodox 
Japanese historiography, but this was its only evidence for Satow’s 
involvement. Thus, by selective quotation and by enforced speculation, 
Japanese historiography tried to justify its standing position.  
Yet as for British involvement in the civil war, Tokutomi did not show 
any evidence for his opinions. In fact, although Tokutomi is regarded as a 
contemporary of the Meiji Restoration, he was not an adult at that time and 
was not a reliable eye-witness. That is one major point of counter-argument 
against him. Despite that, his material has always been treated as valuable 
for discussion of the Restoration. Perhaps that was because it was linked 
with the achievements of Tokutomi. His historical works, Kindai 
Kokuminshi (The History of Modern Japanese Citizens), in 100 volumes, was 
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started in 1918 and only completed in 1952.561 Why such an effort? It was 
because he wished to remain the biographical authority for Japanese citizens 
in the future.562 And above all his efforts to establish the significance of the 
Meiji Restoration led later Japanese historians to trust his books 
unconditionally.  
Why then did the Japanese continue to insist on foreign involvement? 
Shibusawa noted one event which might provide a clue: Parkes’s visit to 
Kagoshima in July 1866. As an historical event it did not look important, but 
for the eye-witnesses it raised serious questions because Parkes was British 
Minister and thus represented British policy in Japan. Kagoshima was not 
within the direct governance region of the Tycoon’s Government. The feudal 
lord of Satsuma represented only that region and not Japan, but the British 
Minister nonetheless visited officially. As a result, Shibusawa claimed that 
after Parkes’s visit the Satsuma samurais in Edo started to develop an 
individual relationship with the British at variance with the samurais of the 
Government. 563  The Japanese, naturally, regarded the Government as 
representing their national sovereignty, whereby all the foreigners should 
maintain diplomatic relations only with the Tycoon. Parkes’s official visit to 
Kagoshima was thus unacceptable and, naturally, the samurais of the 
Government suspected British interference in Satsuma. Furthermore, 
Parkes’s action could be interpreted as insulting the Government’s dignity, 
since it suggested to the Japanese that the British were trying to establish a 
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close relationship with Satsuma, rather than with the Tycoon. Whether 
Parkes really considered his actions carefully or was just thoughtless, the 
fact remains that by his visit to Kagoshima a Japanese historiography 
evolved whereby the British had promised assistance for Satsuma to 
promote the Restoration.564  
Mitford’s following statement might also be considered as evidence that 
the British had supported Satsuma: 
 
         We have the most lovely weather. Yedo with all its flowering  
         shrubs and fruit trees is a sight to see. Unfortunately, we poor 
         prisoners can only be tantalized by it, and long to escape from  
         spies and rush into the first wood with a book and a cigar to  
         enjoy ourselves by ourselves without those infernal yakunins  
         running after us. We are like caged larks looking out upon  
         sunshine.565 
 
Judging from just this passage, it can be guessed that the officials of the 
Tycoon’s Government were worried about British diplomacy. For officials of 
the Tycoon’s Government, spying on diplomats might be a routine job, but it 
can equally be assumed that because the Tycoon’s Government thought that 
the British were on the side of Satsuma, they were particularly sensitive to 
the movement of British diplomats.  
In the meantime, although it is only a secondary source, one work 
which traced the achievements of the French Minister, Leon Roches, during 
the Restoration era agreed with Shibusawa’s analysis. Its author, 
Jean-Pierre Lehmann, wrote that Roches was said to have criticised Parkes 
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severely because the latter acted outside the norms of diplomacy.566 Not only 
from a Japanese point of view but also from an international perspective, 
Parkes’s behaviour thus lacked fairness and neutrality. That might be why, 
when Roches suspected British support for the Imperial Court, the samurais 
of the Government did not disagree with him and, in fact, the cabinet of the 
Government showed its appreciation for Roches. 567  As for Satsuma 
samurais, for the purpose of raising their political profile, they might have 
spread the rumour of a British connection, while Roches’s criticism made the 
Government samurais suspicious. Together, these factors might well have 
established the notion that Satsuma had been supported by the British and, 
once established, evidence would be unnecessary because the propaganda of 
Satsuma and the conviction of the Government would henceforth lead all 
Japanese to believe that it was true.  
However, analysing events from Parkes’s point of view, things appear 
different. In August 1867 he visited Awa, and in the next month he visited 
Tosa. In fact, judging from Satow’s memoir, Parkes visited various places in 
Japan, which means he did not focus only on Satsuma. Parkes, indeed, 
appeared to gather information by visiting various places. He had already 
verified some information via the Government, but for him, that was 
probably not enough, and to gain a deeper understanding of Japanese 
domestic affairs he likely felt that he would have to act independently. His 
years in the country were when the Japanese started to move towards the 
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Restoration, and Parkes, though officially neutral, was inevitably sensitive 
to these changes. He therefore could not rely upon information only from the 
Government, even if, from his attitude and actions, the Japanese drew 
conclusions to justify their own points of view.  
The main idea contained in Eikoku Sakuron was also used to justify 
Japanese opinion. Osatake mentioned this in his speech on 3 December 
1928. He cited Satow as the British official who had insisted in Eikoku 
Sakuron that the Tycoon simply represented the Confederate Daimyos and 
was not Japan’s national sovereign.568 Osatake did not actually state that 
the British had supported Satsuma and the Imperial Court, but his whole 
speech left the audience with that impression. Osatake’s analysis was thus 
that, through Eikoku Sakuron, Satow too had interfered in Japanese 
domestic affairs. Few Japanese in 1928 would have understood much about 
Satow and Eikoku Sakuron, and hence would have taken Osatake’s assertion 
of British involvement as a fact. Eikoku Sakuron was, of course, only an 
essay which tried to define the relative constitutional positions of the Mikado 
and the Tycoon, and was not about British involvement. However, the fact 
that a British diplomat wrote that essay made an impact on the Japanese. 
They could not understand Satow’s reason for writing other than British 
involvement.  
When the Japanese discussed British interference in Japanese 
domestic affairs, one symbolic event is always used as an example: the plan 
to attack Edo castle in March 1868. The Japanese interpret it like this: 
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Satsuma and Choshu had persisted in their attack on the castle, but 
suddenly gave up. The reason was that Saigo sent a messenger to the British 
Legation to explain the necessity of attacking the castle. Parkes strongly 
opposed this, and as a result, Saigo abandoned the original plan because he 
was afraid that Satsuma would lose British support. That was why he agreed 
to negotiations with the ex-Government for a peaceful settlement. This 
version is widely accepted by modern Japanese, the key incident being 
Parkes’s objection. Japanese historiography has thereby stressed a strong 
relationship between the British and Satsuma.  
However, according to this account, one question needs answering: why 
did Saigo send a messenger to Parkes? Japanese historiography says it was 
because Satsuma was being supported by the British. Around this time, it 
can be said that Parkes might have been involved in the civil war because, 
before the Imperial army attacked Edo castle, Parkes sent Satow to Katsu 
Kaishu, who was the representative of the ex-Tycoon’s Government.569 More 
than that, Parkes expressed his honest feeling. In his report to Stanley on 9 
April 1868, Parkes wrote that the conditions of surrender given to the 
ex-Tycoon by the Imperial Court were too severe, and that it would be a great 
sadness if he was given the maximum penalty. 570  Judging from these 
statements, it may therefore be a little difficult to conclude that Parkes had 
never involved himself in Japanese domestic affairs. However, it cannot be 
taken as evidence that he was on the side of Satsuma. By what evidence can 
the Japanese prove this relationship? It is certainly hard to prove it using 
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Japanese materials. In fact, one Japanese scholar has challenged this 
traditional interpretation. According to Takashi Ishii in 1975, Saigo simply 
misunderstood the diplomatic policy of the British Legation.571 This idea is 
significant because nobody had previously advanced that point of view. It is 
also valid because the Japanese had hitherto been discussing British 
involvement by analysing only Japanese materials and assumptions. Ishii 
proposed that Eikoku Sakuron represented the attitude of Alcock towards 
the Japanese, not that of Parkes, and that the samurais of Satsuma 
misunderstood this and mistook it for official British diplomacy.572 That was 
why Saigo sent a messenger to the British Legation before a full attack on 
Edo castle. By this logic, Japanese in the nineteenth century were just 
confused about British diplomacy and Ishii explains Saigo’s action in this 
way rather than any dependence on Parkes’s support.573 This might well be 
true; indeed Saigo would not have sent a messenger otherwise, since it can 
be established from British records that the British did not support Satsuma 
in the civil war. In addition, Ishii suggested another drastic idea in the 
context of Japanese historiography: that the British still recognised the 
ex-Government and not the Imperial Court, because it was the Tycoon’s 
Government which had officially signed the treaty with the British. Hence, 
for the British, the ex-Government remained the national government.574 
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Ishii’s position is a minority opinion in Japanese historiography, yet at least 
it shows that there are some who do not accept the academic orthodoxy.  
 
An analysis from the British point of view is now needed. After 
Tokugawa Yoshinobu surrendered his political power and authority, Parkes 
reported to Her Majesty’s Government: ‘I expressed great satisfaction on 
receiving this announcement.’575 Relying only on this statement, which is 
what Japanese historiography expected to hear, the Japanese concluded that 
Parkes was pleased with Yoshinobu’s decision. Indeed he was, but the reason 
was different from what the Japanese assumed. In another report, Parkes 
analysed Japanese domestic affairs thus: 
 
The powers of the Tycoon were insufficient for the  
establishment of an efficient Government, and his position  
in relation to the Mikado was anomalous.576 
 
Then he concluded: 
 
         The Tycoon had carefully weighed this plan, and, believed 
it to be the best for the country, had determined that his personal  
interests should not stand in the way of its adoption, and he had  
accordingly taken the first steps towards carrying it into  
execution by resigning the direction of affairs and subordinating all  
his acts to the authority of the Mikado. 577 
 
                                                 
575 FO410/12, Parkes to Stanley, 14 November 1867. 




Parkes was satisfied with Yoshinobu’s decision because he had taken it for 
the future benefit of Japan and because it avoided further conspiracy. 
     In that report, Parkes also considered the reason for the current 
instability in Japanese domestic affairs, claiming that it was all because of 
the dual governance system caused by having two power sources.578 He had 
long recognized that, but, not being Japanese, he could not resolve the 
problem, hoping instead that the Japanese themselves could reform their 
political structure. In fact, when Parkes sent the report to Hammond on 28 
November 1867, he expressed his frank opinion in respect of the restoration 
of Imperial rule. In it, he stated that the political struggle would now be 
solved because the Tycoon had bowed to the Mikado, and, as a result, civil 
war could be avoided.579 Parkes had never really expected this crisis to cause 
a civil war. In his report to Hammond on 31 October 1866 he wrote that if the 
Mikado, the Tycoon and the feudal lords could make an agreement without 
conflict, then there would be great cause to honour the common sense and 
moderation of all concerned.580 That was why Parkes expressed ‘satisfaction’ 
when he heard the news. Parkes had no ill-feeling towards Yoshinobu. In 
fact, he appeared to evaluate him highly when he wrote: 
 
         The reputation he had thus gained would be greatly  
enhanced by the adoption of such a liberal and enlightened  
policy on home affairs.581 
 
                                                 
578 Ibid. 
579 FO391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 28 November 1867. 
580 FO391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 31 October 1866. 
581 FO410/12, Parkes to Stanley, 14 November 1867.  
268 
 
Parkes came to be defined as anti-Government by the Japanese simply 
because he had addressed Yoshinobu as Highness rather than Majesty at 
Osaka castle on 29 April 1867. Also, stemming from this single historical 
fact, the Japanese came to define Yoshinobu as anti-British.  
     However, that view was created only by following a selective pattern of 
events. In fact, as Shibusawa recorded, Yoshinobu had invited Parkes to 
Osaka in April 1867, at which point Parkes told Yoshinobu that he had never 
been welcomed so warmly since arriving in Japan. This, arguably, was the 
beginning of a satisfactory diplomatic relationship between the British and 
Japanese. 582  From Shibusawa’s account, it could be said that the 
relationship between Parkes and Yoshinobu was quite good and that there 
was no element of antagonism. In fact, what Parkes had told Yoshinobu was 
not merely superficial pleasantry, as from a British diplomat. Parkes wrote 
to Hammond on 6 May 1867 expressing his personal feeling that whatever 
Yoshinobu’s social status would be, he would like to support Yoshinobu as 
much as possible because Yoshinobu was the most intelligent person whom 
he had ever met in Japan, and also because Yoshinobu would be a person to 
leave his name in history.583 Parkes’s evaluation of Yoshinobu was thus 
excellent; Parkes never offered such a high evaluation for any other 
Japanese. Parkes and Yoshinobu seemed to share both traits of personality 
and a comparable political ability.  
     Of course, Parkes had already recognised that the Tycoon could not be 
the national sovereign of Japan, and had indeed so informed Hammond. He 
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wrote that although the Tycoon expected to be recognised at the top of the 
national political hierarchy in Japan, the Mikado’s status should always be 
higher.584 Thus, although Parkes rated Yoshinobu highly, it did not mean he 
expected Yoshinobu to be the sovereign. He simply esteemed Yoshinobu 
personally, and this is the point where Parkes’s diplomacy must be 
considered to be different from that of Roches. Roches did involve himself in 
domestic affairs at the time of the civil war. Parkes never mixed official 
business with personal affairs. Parkes later met with Yoshinobu on 8 
January 1868 when it was explained to him why Yoshinobu had returned his 
political authority. And when they talked about who was the national 
sovereign of Japan, Yoshinobu said that it was the Mikado and that nobody 
would disagree.585 He also told Parkes that he had made his decision for the 
future good of Japan.586 
     Considering the above, Parkes did not judge Yoshinobu’s action as 
unwilling, and Yoshinobu appeared to convey his feelings because he 
recognized that Parkes understood him perfectly. They even seemed to have 
the same vision for Japan’s future, which was why, when the Battle of 
Toba-Fushimi had begun, Parkes had sent a report to London expressing his 
Regret. 587  Parkes had been anticipating the founding of a new regime 
without any conflict, and feared that civil war would cause nothing but 
confusion and disorder-an attitude indicating that Parkes had no intention of 
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interfering in Japanese domestic affairs or taking advantage of any civil war. 
The Foreign Secretary, Stanley, replied that Parkes’s analysis was entirely 
appropriate and that all members of the British Government agreed.588 
Another reason why Stanley trusted Parkes’s decision might be related to 
the statement which Parkes had sent to Stanley on 15 February 1868. 
Parkes wrote that in terms of the relationship between the Mikado and the 
Tycoon, and also in terms of how their respective status should be defined, no 
foreigners should be involved. The Japanese themselves should make the 
decision. 589  From this statement, Parkes’s determination to maintain 
neutrality was apparent and, as a result, not only Stanley but also the 
British Government could trust his political judgement. Had Parkes acted 
from an arbitrary decision or made a misjudgement, Stanley would not have 
written that. In 1864, in contrast, when Alcock had advocated the 
bombardment of Shimonoseki before receiving any orders from Her 
Majesty’s Government, he had been recalled. Stanley clearly trusted 
Parkes’s conduct, and reminded him:  
      
         Her Majesty’s Government have only one object in Japan, the  
         maintenance of friendly intercourse and trade with the ruling Powers 
         and the people of the country. They have no intention of indentifying  
         themselves with any party that may spring up, or of aiming at any  
         influence beyond what is required for upholding their Treaty right.590 
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The British thereby showed their diplomatic approach. They wanted only 
commercial activities, and Stanley wrote nothing about colonisation. 
Admittedly, he wrote ‘the ruling Powers’ and did not stipulate the Tycoon’s 
Government. The hypothesis whereby the British indirectly approved of the 
Imperial Court could be explained by that, although only by interpreting the 
words used in a particular way. The Japanese historical point of view 
notwithstanding, there appears to be no indication that the British favoured 
the Imperial Court.  
     Although Stanley focused only on commercial activities, he did allow 
Parkes to use naval power for the purpose of protecting British subjects and 
property during the civil war. 591  Apart from that, though, the British 
Government officially prohibited the use of any military force. In fact, 
Austen H. Layard, an under-secretary at the Foreign Office between 1861 
and 1866, questioned the bombardment of Shimonoseki, as directed by 
Alcock in 1864.592 Layard worried that the following situation might follow 
from Alcock’s diplomacy: 
 
          If the intended attack upon Prince Choshiu shall have taken  
         place and shall have led to hostilities in the neighbourhood of 
         Yokohama, or should an attack have been made in Yokohama 
 for any other cause or any other pretext, it may be necessary to  
occupy temporarily the heights surrounding that place, in order  
to prevent the Japanese from success in such hostilities. 593 
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His statement suggests that once the British interfered in Japanese internal 
affairs with military force, there would arise another situation in which the 
British would have to use further military force to maintain their foothold in 
Japan. If so, how could British merchants promote their commercial 
activities? Therefore, unless British subjects and their properties were 
threatened, the British Government would not give permission to use any 
military force, and had no intention to intervene in Japanese domestic 
affairs.  
And, unlike Alcock, Parkes followed this order; after the civil war he 
was still Minister in Japan. Had he acted as most Japanese historians have 
claimed, he would not have remained in Japan. The British, it transpired, 
never interfered in Japan’s domestic affairs. The episode whereby Satow was 
said to suggest to Saigo that the British Legation could send troops to help 
the Imperial Court emerged only later for internal Japanese justification 
purposes. And, before the attack on Edo castle, when Satow met Katsu 
Kaishu from the ex-Tycoon’s Government, Satow never told Katsu that the 
British had any specific interest in the outcome of the civil war nor hinted 
that they might side with the ex-Tycoon’s Government. He merely wished to 
confirm Katsu’s political plan for the next step.594 Had Satow been regarded 
as a British spy, Katsu would probably not have surrendered Edo castle so 
soon, hoping instead for British military help.  
     There is one further traditional Japanese historical belief. It is that 
because the British supported the Imperial Court they were able to establish 
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a strong diplomatic relationship with the new Meiji Government, while, 
because the French had supported the Tycoon’s Government, they lost all 
credibility in Japan. How should this idea be treated? According to 
Lehmann, Roches did not deserve to be the Imperial agent of Napoleon III595 
because of his catastrophic and one-sided diplomacy, hence his successor, 
Max Outrey, had no influence in Japan.596 This suggests that it was not just 
by virtue of the victory of the Imperial Court but also due to Roches’s 
diplomatic failures that the British established their close relationship with 
the Meiji Government. It was a case of French self-destruction, but, because 
the Japanese have not focused on the French, this aspect was forgotten. 
Lehmann clearly criticises Roches as an incompetent adventurer. 597 
Furthermore, although it was not directly expressed, Parkes described the 
diplomatic attitude of Roches in his report to Hammond on 22 July 1867. It 
was that Roches supported the rootless idea that the Tycoon was Japan’s 
national sovereign and also its supreme being.598 
     As both Tokugawa Yoshinobu and Shibusawa Eiichi testified, Roches 
had been urging Yoshinobu to counter-attack the Imperial Court. In so 
doing, however, he did not represent the French Government. It was his own 
idea, but because of it the Japanese naturally assumed that the French were 
trying to involve themselves in Japanese domestic affairs via support for the 
Tycoon’s Government. The main concern for French diplomacy was in reality 
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to promote an active silk trade.599 Like the British, therefore, the French 
Government did not expect its envoy to involve France in Japanese matters. 
However, at the time of civil war Roches suddenly began to support the 
Tycoon’s Government. Lehmann defined the guidelines for French 
diplomacy: 
 
France harboured no colonial aims in Japan and Roches was 
not an imperialist agent of Napoleon III in the Far East.600 
 
Like the British, the French tried to focus only on commercial activities. 
Roches had to be recalled because he violated official French guidelines and 
was subsequently discredited as not being a well trained diplomat. This 
alone would explain the collapse of French diplomatic influence in Japan. 
There is no need for the idea that Britain’s superior diplomatic standing was 
because they had supported the Imperial Court.  
     Strangely enough, considering the behaviour of these diplomats during 
the civil war, Parkes was criticised more than Roches because many 
journalists considered that it was Parkes who had been supporting the 
Tycoon unnecessarily. The North China Herald of 31 January 1868 cited an 
article from The Japan Times which condemned Parkes for focusing on 
relations only with the Tycoon, and not making enough effort to establish a 
relationship with the other side.601 The North China Herald even concluded 
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that as a personal favour to Hitotsubashi (Yoshinobu. Before he became 
Tycoon that was his family name), Parkes chose to take the losing side, 
rather than the winning side.602 Analysis of this article is bound to arouse 
controversy within some Japanese academic circles, because, from this third 
viewpoint, Parkes was clearly identified as a man on the side of the Tycoon’s 
Government. Yet because Parkes was not involved in Japanese affairs at all, 
this journalistic criticism was misplaced. However, it showed one thing: that 
the orthodox Japanese historical perspective does not reflect any obvious 
truth.  
     In May 1868 Parkes handed his credentials to the Mikado; his action 
was sooner than that of other diplomats. The civil war still raged, which was 
why this action by Parkes has also been cited by Japanese to justify the idea 
of British support for the Imperial Court. In his report to Hammond on 9 
April 1868 Parkes acknowledgement this swift action by the British 
Government. He wrote that he truly appreciated receiving new credentials to 
the Mikado in such a short period, because in the current situation this 
would confer great advantages.603 Looking at this statement on its own, it 
could be interpreted as Parkes welcoming the defeat of the Tycoon’s 
Government. By that logic, it could be concluded that the British were on the 
side of the Imperial Court. However, according to the official document, 
Stanley sent the credentials to Parkes on 18 February 1868.604 Considering 
that it took three months to communicate between Britain and Japan, 
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presumably Parkes requested these new credentials from Her Majesty’s 
Government at the time when Tokugawa Yoshinobu first returned his 
political authority to the Mikado in November 1867. This means that for 
him, it did not seem to matter which side prevailed because, whether the 
ex-Tycoon or Satsuma, they would equally establish a regime under the 
Mikado, and there would no longer be the dual authority as under the 
Tokugawa Shogunate. Indeed, Tokugawa Yoshinobu seems already to have 
told Parkes that the Mikado was the national sovereign. Since that was 
certain, Parkes did not hesitate to request new credentials. A regime under 
the Mikado was what he expected. Thus, this decision was not because he 
had any secret agreement with Satsuma but precisely because he was not 
involved in domestic affairs. To have followed Roches’s example would have 
risked a significant diplomatic failure in which case he could never have 
presented his credentials. From this aspect too, the Japanese orthodox 
analysis can be refuted.  
     What, then, of the relationship between Satow and Saigo mentioned in 
earlier chapters? Eye-witness and modern Japanese accounts both point to 
their special relationship, and, as a result, Satow is deemed to have meddled 
in the civil war. In Satow’s memoir Saigo’s name appears, so certainly there 
was a relationship between them. However, as stated previously, other 
Japanese names are in there too. In addition to that, in terms of political 
debate and the challenge to construct a modern state, one Japanese was 
mentioned by both Satow and Mitford in their memoirs. This was the Tosa 
samurai, Goto Shojiro. They advised him about the British political structure 
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and its Parliamentary system and discussed the essentials of a modern 
state.605 By contrast, there is no record of any similar discussion with Saigo. 
Furthermore, when Mitford compared Goto with Saigo, he evaluated Goto 
more highly by using the word ‘Conspicuous’.606  
For Japanese, Saigo has always been defined as one of the three heroes 
of the Meiji Restoration and hence they consider him the more able. Their 
evaluation, however, rests largely on the testimony of Tokugawa Yoshinobu 
in an interview in 1907 when the ex-Shogun expressed the view that no 
samurai in his government matched Saigo’s political qualities. 607  The 
British, though, did not appear to evaluate Saigo in quite the same way. 
Admittedly, Satow’s memoir rated Saigo above Goto in terms of intellectual 
calibre608 although in his diary on 4 September 1867 Satow certainly judged 
Goto to be clever and noted that the two men promised unchangeable 
friendship.609 Interestingly, in the same diary entry, although he rated 
Saigo higher than Goto, 610  Satow did not record any promise of 
unchangeable friendship with Saigo. Thus, in terms of political ability, 
Satow thought highly of Saigo but, in terms of personality, Satow preferred 
Goto. Even so, in September 1867 when Parkes met the ex-feudal lord, 
Yamauchi Youdo, the British praised Goto’s ideas, and it was Goto’s vision 
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for the future of Japan which was said to have been supported by the 
British.611  
As a practical politician to construct a modern state, however, Satow 
did not value Goto. In fact, when it came to implementing political change, 
Satow appeared not to have a high opinion of Saigo either. For example, after 
Saigo proposed constructing a parliament of the whole nation to replace the 
Tycoon’s Government, Satow, when he heard about it, concluded that Saigo’s 
idea sounded ridiculous.612 As for Goto’s plan, which was almost the same, 
Mitford considered that it was too hasty because the Japanese were not 
sufficiently matured, politically, to handle rapid change.613  Like Satow, 
Mitford had respect for Goto but neither diplomat could agree with Goto 
either.  
     Furthermore, there is a reference which may prove that Parkes too did 
not think so well of Saigo. It was in a report which Parkes sent to Stanley on 
22 December 1867. In it, Parkes described his nervous feeling that the 
foreigners were not protected effectively, and then wrote that Saigo did not 
seem to take this matter so seriously.614 Parkes said no more, but from this 
statement it can be guessed that he had reservations about Saigo’s political 
reliability.  
                                                 
611 Katsuo Inoue, Bakumatsu Ishin Seijishi no Kenkyu (Tokyo: Haniwa Shobo, 1994), 
344.  
612 Takashi Ishii, Meiji Ishin no Kokusaiteki Kankyo, Vol. III (Tokyo: Yoshikawa 
Koubunkan, 1973), 723. 
613 Redesdale, Memories, Vol. II, 417. 
614 FO46/83, Parkes to Stanley, 22 December 1867, inclosure, Parkes to Stanley, 29 
December 1867.  
279 
 
Comparing these responses, Satow was perhaps too severe on Saigo’s 
plan. Satow did not explain why, but in all likelihood it was because Satow 
simply did not esteem Saigo above Goto. Unlike Goto, Saigo did not have any 
well matured political knowledge and could not explain effectively his views 
about a modern Japanese state. Saigo’s plan lacked an informed political 
background and much by way of future vision, and, as a result, Satow 
dismissed it as ‘insane’.615 Regarding Saigo’s political views, Mounsey stated 
that he did not wish to retain the feudal system in its entirety, but, whilst 
Satsuma governed Japan, Saigo championed Satsuma.616 Writing in 1879, 
Mounsey thought that Saigo’s attitude was one of the factors in causing the 
rebellion and civil war in 1877, so it is possible that at the time of the Meiji 
Restoration Satow might have had such an idea in his mind. That too could 
be why Satow did not evaluate Sago so highly in terms of political ability. 
Thus, although Saigo had a relationship with Satow, Satow did not trust his 
political judgment. As for the episode when Satow reportedly suggested to 
Saigo sending British troops, that was either created by Japanese of a later 
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generation for the purpose of honouring Saigo, or invented by Saigo for the 
purpose of raising his own standing.617 
     It can be shown that the British were never involved in Japanese 
politics. In addition, on 26 February 1867 Parkes wrote to Stanley that it 
was important that Mitford had received retainers from Aizu because it 
could thereby be shown that the British were neutral in the conflict and 
would welcome any Japanese.618 Because Aizu was a fief which supported 
the Tycoon’s Government and fought against Satsuma and Choshu, inviting 
the retainers of Aizu to a reception might have indicated that the British 
would be against Satsuma and Choshu. However, the invitation would on 
balance be advantageous for the British by demonstrating their neutrality. 
Not only Mitford but also Satow showed the same attitude towards the 
Japanese. According to his diary of 31 December 1866, Satow explained to 
the samurais of Uwajima that the British would never become involved in 
Japan’s domestic affairs.619  
     By these episodes, one thing was proved: all the members of the British 
Legation followed the official guideline of the British Government. More 
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than that, the British themselves tried to let the Japanese recognise their 
formal guideline, as the following statement of Mitford suggests: 
 
          England is the very good friend of Japan under whatsoever  
form of government.620 
 
Admittedly it was a simple statement, but that simple statement summed up 
British diplomacy. The British did not really care about any future Japanese 
regime: they focused only on the future for international trade.  
 
     Yet even the historian, Takashi Ishii, who tried to revise Japanese 
historical orthodoxy and to suggest new perspectives, still insisted that there 
was British involvement in Japan’s domestic affairs according to 
international law. According to official documents, on 20 February 1868 the 
representatives of Britain, France, the Netherlands, the United States, Italy 
and Prussia agreed to declare neutrality in the conflict between the Mikado 
and the ex-Tycoon.621 By this declaration, they tried to assure the Japanese 
that they would not become involved and also appealed to them not to 
request any foreign support. From this declaration, their common position 
seems clear enough. 
     However, according to Ishii, this declaration contained an illegality 
because, as a result, both the regime of the Mikado and that of the ex-Tycoon 
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were defined as belligerents.622 Not only, therefore, was the Mikado’s regime 
acknowledged to have the same political status as that of the ex-Tycoon 
internationally but, by virtue of it, the ex-Tycoon’s regime lost its political 
legitimacy and became defined as merely a belligerent, like the Mikado.623 
Tokugawa Yoshinobu had, of course, already returned his political authority 
to the Mikado, following which the Imperial Court declared the 
establishment of the new regime on 8 January 1868. However, in February 
1868 the Western states had not handed diplomatic credentials to the 
Mikado, so, under international law, neutrality by the Western states was 
illegal. The Mikado’s regime was not internationally acknowledged, 
therefore the ex-Tycoon was still the representative of Japan with whom the 
foreign powers had signed their treaties and had a diplomatic relationship. 
Yet although the Mikado’s regime was not officially recognised 
internationally, by that declaration the Imperial Court was indirectly 
approved. Parkes intended that the Westerners should not become involved 
in the civil war and he did not expect the Japanese to ask him for help. But 
to avoid those possibilities, he made that declaration and as a result the 
Mikado’s regime was de facto approved by the Western nations. If Parkes 
really did not expect to be involved in domestic affairs, Ishii contends, then 
he should not have made that declaration.  
     As a result of this declaration and its implicit acknowledgement of the 
Mikado’s regime the following happened: 
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1. The action of the Mikado’s regime to take over Osaka and Hyogo became 
justified. Those were cities directly governed by the ex-Tycoon, but their 
military occupation was now approved internationally.  
2. The ex-Tycoon’s Government had ordered a battleship from the US, but 
because of this foreign neutrality, could not now receive it from the 
Americans.624 
 
Considering these historical facts, Ishii concluded that the declaration of 
neutrality caused nothing but disadvantage for the ex-Tycoon’s 
Government.625 Perhaps understandably, many modern Japanese concluded 
that the British must have favoured the side of the Imperial Court.  
     Although it may not be strong evidence, there is one possible reason 
why Parkes had to declare neutrality as quickly as possible. It relates to the 
agreement of 22 July 1864. Before the bombardment of Shimonoseki, the 
Western representatives had agreed the following five points in Yokohama: 
 
1. Neutrality of Japanese regions. This agreement would also be applied to 
the ports for international commerce.  
2. Mutual understanding and combined actions for the purpose of protecting 
free trade.  
3. Combined actions to protect foreigners’ lives and properties.  
4. In terms of the Japanese regions, nobody should request any special 
concession from the Japanese. Also, none should accept any Japanese 
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5. In terms of Japanese domestic conflict, nobody should interfere in 
Japanese jurisdiction.626 
 
Since the bombardment of Shimonoseki the above five agreements appeared 
to have held among the Westerners. That was why when the civil war 
happened in 1868 Western representatives could agree on neutrality in such 
a short period. Thus, from the Western point of view, nothing had changed. 
But from the Japanese point of view it was not so simple because the 
Japanese political situation was very different from what it had been in 
1864. In 1864 the Imperial Court did not sanction a civil war. That was why, 
in 1868, Western declarations of neutrality now offered an advantage to the 
Imperial Court. As a result, Japanese historiography has defined the British 
as being on the side of the Imperial Court.  
     Did Parkes consider all this before deciding about the declaration? In 
light of his instructions before the civil war, that Britain was concerned only 
with commercial activities and should never become involved in Japanese 
domestic affairs, he might have thought that for the purpose of maintaining 
British dignity he would avoid any situation whereby Britain could be 
accused of any such interference. That might have led him to declare 
neutrality as quickly as possible, otherwise it seemed apparent that both 
sides would try to draw the British into the civil war for the purpose of 
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justifying their own political position. The episode between Satow and Saigo 
might well have been an example of that. Perhaps, it was not Satow who 
offered but Saigo who requested British military help in the civil war. 
Parkes’s quick action could thus be explained as a measure to forestall any 
conspiracy by the Japanese and to prevent the Japanese from taking any 
advantage of the foreigners. Ishii was correct about international law, but at 
the time of the civil war Parkes had to make a decision quickly to safeguard 
Britain’s position in Japan.  
     Not only in 1868 but also among subsequent generations, to justify 
their beliefs and to produce advantageous conclusions, Japanese writers 
have analysed unfairly when emphasizing the British role in their history. 
Before any detailed analysis, such Japanese had already determined the 
outcome, and to reach it they did whatever was necessary. The idea that the 
British were associated with domestic Japanese matters emerged from that 
intellectual background. Yet by analysing events from the British and wider 
international standpoints their conclusion cannot be accepted as historically 
sound.  
     Both before and during the civil war, the British, as in past years, 
simply wanted effective administration, the maintenance of order, and the 
observation and profitable operation of commercial treaties in Japan; 
whoever or whatever political arrangements could provide those conditions 
would always likely gain their approval and support. There is some evidence, 
though, to show that the British might have distanced themselves from the 
Tycoon’s Government. A guideline was sent from Russell to Parkes on 23 
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August 1865 in which Russell wrote that it was after the supposed subjection 
of Satsuma and Choshu that he began to doubt what the Tycoon’s 
Government had been telling us.627 Judging from this, it can be surmised 
that the British no longer entirely trusted the Tycoon’s Government, and 
this might be considered as the point, after 1864, when the British began to 
associate themselves more with Satsuma. This, anyway, is what Japanese 
historiography has long defined as orthodoxy. If this hypothesis were correct, 
then 1864 might be held up as the turning point for British diplomacy 
towards Japan.  
     However, in reality, the British never changed their attitude. They 
might well have doubted the reliability of the Tycoon’s Government but they 
never questioned maintaining their diplomatic relations with the Tycoon. In 
the same official document, Russell wrote that the British Government 
would sincerely maintain the 1858 Treaty.628 This demonstrates that the 
British never changed their diplomacy and also that the Meiji Restoration 
was not caused by any British political influence. The Japanese fought each 
other in 1868-69 to determine, in effect, which elements from the old feudal 
structure would control the new system－a system born in November 1867 
when the last Shogun was obliged to acknowledge that the Tokugawa clan, 
after more than 260 years, could no longer keep domestic order or regulate 
the nation’s external affairs and hence returned the mandate to govern to 
the Mikado as Japan’s spiritual authority. In fact, the British played little 
part in the Meiji Restoration and in the struggle for supremacy which 
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followed. For the participants in that struggle, however, their propaganda 
value was immense. In fact, Parkes had doubts about Satsuma’s policy. In 
his report to Hammond on 16 January 1867, he wrote that perhaps Satsuma 
intended to establish an oligarchy but could not be confident whether the 
Japanese would benefit by such a regime.629 This statement proves that 
Parkes already suspected Satsuma’s political ambitions before the civil war. 
That being so, would he have decided to support Satsuma by violating his 
official guidance? Furthermore, since many nineteenth-century Japanese 
might likewise have doubted Satsuma’s policy, it suited the samurais of 
Satsuma to promote the propaganda line that the British were on their side 
by picking up on any small incident. For the samurais of Satsuma to claim 
that the British were on their side helped to justify the new Meiji 
Government, and, based on that, Japanese historiography has defined 
diplomatic relations at the time of the Meiji Restoration accordingly. 
Japanese historiography contributed the raison d’etre for the Meiji 
government: it did not care much for evidence derived from historical facts. 
As will be further examined in the next chapter, it was the forces of Satsuma 
and Choshu which harnessed the cry of foreign menace most successfully to 





                                                 





















Chapter X: The Japanese background to the Meiji Restoration 
 
     In addition to the common Japanese assumption that in the civil war 
from 1867-69 the British supported Satsuma, Choshu and the Imperial 
Court, while the French supported the Tycoon’s Government, as indicated 
earlier, it is commonly believed that Britain’s hidden intention was 
colonisation through the new regime. Thus, to thwart that conspiracy, the 
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Japanese ended their civil war as quickly as possible, and as a result were 
able to establish the modern state and save the Japanese mainland from 
Western imperialism. If the Tycoon’s Government had existed after 1868, or 
had the civil war continued, the Japanese would have been dominated by the 
Westerners. These notions are seldom doubted by modern Japanese. 
Historical analysis and discussion produce neither new ideas nor promote 
counter-arguments. Since the foundation of the Meiji Government this has 
been historical orthodoxy.  
     British historians have generally considered three reasons for the 
collapse of the Shogunate. First, that the Tycoon’s Government allowed 
foreigners, who had always been regarded as ‘Western barbarians’, to 
construct their Legations in Edo. The second reason is that the government 
accepted low tariffs on foreign imports to the detriment of the domestic 
economy and the Japanese population. Finally, that the Shogunate was 
constantly blamed by Western powers for failing to maintain the 
international treaties.630 British historians have also defined the diplomatic 
attitude of the Western powers. Daniels observed in 1968 that ‘Britain’s 
prime objective in Japan was certainly to obtain an expanding trade and safe 
conditions for British merchants’, although he recognised that Satow’s 
attitude, and that of Mitford, were different.631 British historians judge that 
although Alcock showed military power to the Shogunate for the purpose of 
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negotiation, he had never had any intention of using it because, if he used 
military force, the British would gain little advantage when compared with 
its great cost and the difficulties which would follow.632 This assessment is 
important to show because it will be a necessary comparison with the 
analysis of the Meiji Restoration created in orthodox Japanese 
historiography.  
     Albeit still a minor movement, after the Second World War some 
historians emerged who questioned that orthodoxy. Their intention was to 
test whether there was really any possibility of Japan being colonised by the 
West during the Meiji Restoration. As indicated in chapter one, the historian 
Akira Tanaka has explained the historical process.  
     According to Akira Tanaka, the first questioning occurred in 1951 when 
the historian Shigeki Tohyama published a book suggesting that although 
the possibility of economic subordination to the West existed because of 
Japan’s inferiority, politically there was no possibility of colonisation.633 
Tohyama thereby denied one aspect of traditional Japanese thinking. 1951 
was almost a century after the Meiji Restoration, and Tohyama felt the need 
to explain why it took so long to propose this new idea. According to him, 
before the Second World War nobody was allowed to undertake free research 
and analysis about either Emperors or the imperial system.634 Also, until 
the end of the war, historians could not access materials which related to 
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Emperors and Court nobles.635 Hence until 1945 there was no scholarly 
analysis or discussion about the Meiji Restoration, which was why 1951 saw 
the first challenge to historical orthodoxy. A large counter-argument against 
Tohyama then started.  
According to Tanaka, in the same year in which Tohyama published his 
work, the historian Kiyoshi Inoue did the same. Inoue’s method was to 
review every historical incident in order to strengthen the traditional 
concept, and, by adopting that attitude, he refuted Tohyama’s proposals.636 
Thus Inoue tried to defend academically the old idea that the Japanese in 
the nineteenth century were in danger of being colonised. These two 
publications in 1951 marked the beginning of the debate about whether the 
Japanese faced colonisation or not. However, even though the new proposal 
from Tohyama had emerged, it did not split Japanese academic opinion into 
two or caused long-term discussion by leading to a review of historical 
material. In fact, most scholars maintained traditional ideas and refused to 
acknowledge any new interpretation. As a result, although a new historical 
movement was temporarily created, before it could receive public 
recognition, Tohyama’s idea was strongly denied. In 1981 Takuji Shibahara 
published his book, which supported Inoue not only by criticising Tohyama’s 
method of promoting argument and his conclusions, but also because it 
demonstrated a systematic academic discipline. 637  In Shibahara’s work, 
Japanese academic authorities found historical concepts which modern 
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Japanese could equally accept as commonplace. After this, Tohyama 
compromised.638 From the beginning, Tohyama was under a disadvantage 
because he was not only a minor scholar but also because nobody followed 
after him. But he was important because the Japanese academic field did 
change a little whereby some historians started to re-examine the traditional 
notion of the Meiji Restoration.  
With the systematic work of Shibahara and the concessions made by 
Tohyama, the argument within Japanese scholarship appeared to have 
ended and the orthodoxy was reconfirmed whereby Japan in the nineteenth 
century was in danger of colonisation. However, that does not mean there 
has been no further opinion. In 1991 Takashi Ishii published another book in 
which he disputed Shibahara’s conclusions. He did not deny all Shibahara’s 
ideas, but he challenged academic authority by insisting that Shibahara’s 
ideas would need to be re-examined.639 Ishii did not deny Western pressure 
on the Japanese, but he asserted that it was not for colonisation but for 
economic subordination and for the purpose of developing a new market for 
Western capitalism.640 Ishii’s idea was not so sensational compared with 
those of Tohyama but many historians nevertheless argued against him. But 
Ishii never compromised his major concept and he remains a small though 
valuable contribution to Japanese scholarship.  
What, then, was the real danger of colonisation by the West? The 
Japanese in the nineteenth century understandably were fearful after the 
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arrival of foreigners. In fact, in 1853, when Perry first arrived in Uraga, the 
wife of the principal of the feudal school in Kii, Kawai Ume, wrote twice 
about Perry in her diary.641 Even within Japan’s strict social structure 
where ordinary citizens did not move around the country, this lady was 
already apprehensive about the arrival of Westerners. That was the 
psychological impact of Perry. After him, the British, French and Russians 
arrived, also with military forces. Although the Japanese had long 
maintained commercial relations with the Dutch, that had been under 
severe restrictions and the Dutch were never seen except at Nagasaki. 
Against that background, it was only natural that the Japanese had a fear of 
colonisation and the attitude of nineteenth-century Japanese need not be 
examined further. The point of contention is the attitude of modern 
Japanese, because they know of subsequent historical developments and, 
furthermore, can access primary materials and official documents. Modern 
Japanese have been able to construct argument using those materials, so, 
given that, scholars now have to examine how and why certain conclusions 
about Western diplomacy were reached at the time of the Meiji Restoration. 
The major purpose of this chapter is to analyse how modern Japanese came 
to comprehend the nineteenth-century domestic situation. 
 
     In modern Japan, when academics have attempted to analyse both the 
political and diplomatic situations at the time of the Meiji Restoration, they 
have always confronted the overriding concept, as already explained above. 
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The majority have conformed to it. Those are principally Inoue, Shibahara 
and Shiso Hattori. Together they are recognized as historical authorities 
regarding the Meiji Restoration, while after them came Yuzo Akiyama and 
Jiro Chaya with their analyses of nineteenth-century Japan. Tohyama and 
Ishii stand opposed to them. Tohyama and Ishii admitted the sense of 
danger, but they did not support the idea that Japan could become colonised 
like so much of Asia and Africa. Tanaka, who merely described the historical 
evolution of these arguments, remained neutral. So, what was the basis for 
their respective arguments?  
     Kiyoshi Inoue wrote in the first page in his book: Our ancestors were 
the only Asian race who could achieve independence from Western 
imperialism.642 However, his sentence is problematic because Inoue wrote: 
achieve independence. But which state ever colonised Japan? Through 
Japanese history, the only time when the Japanese were governed by 
foreigners was between 1945 and 1951. Furthermore, that was not 
colonisation; American administration followed the Second World War and 
even promoted democracy. Had Inoue written, maintain independence, his 
point would be more easily understood; but he did not. Furthermore, he did 
not indicate which state had effectively colonised Japan at the time of the 
Meiji Restoration, thereby avoiding any need to discuss it in detail or to 
explain how the Japanese achieved independence. He did not indicate either 
which historical materials he had used or was referring to.  
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     To illustrate the crisis of colonisation, Inoue pointed to two historical 
incidents. The first relates to the foreign settlements in Japan. After the 
opening of ports in 1858 foreign merchants started to live in Japan, but the 
Tycoon’s Government forbade them to live among the Japanese and so 
constructed settlements for them. That in Yokohama was the best known. 
There, Japanese officials could not enter and also Japanese laws were not 
applied. Referring to that, Inoue insisted on a crisis of colonisation, because, 
from his point of view, China had been colonised by the West following the 
construction of foreign settlements.643 The historian Shiso Hattori supported 
Inoue by also stressing the existence of the foreign settlements.644 Inoue 
concluded that because foreigners controlled the administration, the police 
force and security matters in the foreign settlements, Japanese sovereignty 
had been severely infringed by them.645 To prove this, he pointed to the fact 
that during Japan’s civil war the British Minister, Harry Parkes, ordered 
British soldiers to be landed to defend the foreign settlement in Yokohama 
and also, by using British naval force, he refused to allow all except British 
ships to enter the port of Yokohama.646  
     Inoue’s line of argument is understandable, but it would be hard to 
conclude that his idea was based on logical argument. Indeed, his argument 
could be refuted by examining the 1858 commercial treaty. For example, 
when the Tycoon’s Government made that treaty it was agreed that when a 
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Japanese committed a crime against the British, that person should be 
punished according to Japanese law. Equally, when a British national 
committed a crime against the Japanese, that person should be punished 
under British law. Hence both British and Japanese would be subjected to 
their own country’s laws, rather than to that of any other. As a result, it was 
simply a matter of course that Japanese official administrative powers were 
not effective within the foreign settlements where foreigners obeyed and 
were protected by their own laws. Inoue’s logic would only be correct if the 
Government had not agreed that term in the foreign treaties. The Western 
settlements on the Japanese mainland were created and conducted 
consistent with agreements and laws.  
     How about Parkes’s use of military force to defend the Yokohama 
settlement? Inoue cited this as undoubted proof of the invasion of Japanese 
sovereignty. 647  Since military activity in a foreign state is normally 
considered to be illegal, Inoue was technically correct. However, as Inoue 
acknowledged, Parkes used the British soldiers to defend the settlement; his 
intention was not to join the Japanese civil war. The British army never 
marched to Edo, so the argument that Parkes infringed upon Japanese 
sovereignty is hardly plausible. Furthermore, Parkes’s decision was 
considered to be unavoidable because, at that time, the Tycoon’s Government 
had disintegrated. In 1867, when Tokugawa Yoshinobu returned his political 
authority to the Imperial Court, his Government was nominally ended and 
after the Battle of Toba-Fushimi in 1868 it totally collapsed. As a result, the 
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foreigners in Japan faced a crisis because the Government which had 
guaranteed their lives and properties was gone and they would now have to 
defend themselves. In fact, Ohkubo Toshiaki, who was a grandson of Ohkubo 
Toshimichi, showed a report which had been sent by Parkes on 9 April 1868, 
the main content of which was that the magistrate of Kanagawa had 
requested support from Parkes. The main reasons for his request were: 
 
1. By virtue of the surrender of Tokugawa Yoshinobu to the Imperial Court, 
the magistrate of Kanagawa lost his legal status and as a result he could 
not maintain the security of Yokohama. 
2. He had tried to transfer his duties to the new government but nobody had 
been sent from the Imperial Court.  
3. Against the Imperial army, which had been advancing on Edo, the 
magistrate of Kanagawa was powerless, so he could protect neither 
Japanese nor foreigners from the flames of war.648 
 
Considering this, it can be deduced that the reason why Parkes ordered the 
British army to defend Yokohama was not to join the civil war but to protect 
the foreigners in the foreign settlement. Indeed, Ohkubo supported Parkes 
by concluding that for the purpose of defending British trade with the 
Japanese, Parkes had to defend the port of Yokohama whatever the 
situation.649 Parkes and the other Western representatives and officials had 
to withdraw from Osaka and Hyogo right after the battle because the 
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Government could no longer guarantee their security, which was partly why 
Parkes took quick action to defend the foreign settlement in Yokohama.  
     The second proof of the colonisation crisis which Inoue referred to was 
the existence of Ernest Satow. Tokutomi Soho, recognised as a major figure 
in Japanese historiography, was the first to point out, in 1936, his secret 
relationship with Satsuma samurai, Saigo Takamori, and, since then, 
Japanese historians have followed this idea. As a result, in modern Japan, 
Satow has been sometimes thought of as a spy working to facilitate Japan’s 
colonisation by the British. There was no proof for this, but Inoue also took 
that line. Inoue insisted that before the civil war Satow had suggested to 
Saigo that if the latter needed their help, the British would always respond 
to him.650 Saigo responded that Japan’s future regime should be decided by 
the Japanese, thereby rejecting Satow’s proposal. 651  Inoue used this 
supposed episode to show how Saigo’s nationalist attitude was truly 
magnificent compared with that of the Government’s limp diplomacy.652 Yet 
what was the background to Inoue’s conclusion? Inoue insisted that the 
French supported the Tycoon’s Government in economic ways whereas, on 
the contrary, the British supported Satsuma and Choshu in order to have 
greater political influence over the new regime after the civil war.653 Inoue’s 
analysis of British diplomacy was therefore that it sought to construct a 
puppet regime in Japan and Satow became symbolic of this conspiracy. Inoue 
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mentioned and praised Saigo in order to promote his idea that, without 
Saigo, the Japanese would have been colonised by Western states.  
     But what value has Inoue’s argument? In 1865, when Parkes went as 
Minister to Japan, the British Government ordered him not to become 
involved in Japanese domestic affairs and furthermore, except in any crisis 
which threatened British subjects’ lives and properties, he was not allowed 
to use military force－ and even then he was required to inform the 
Government. Parkes, therefore, had no discretion regarding either diplomacy 
or the use of military power. Indeed, when his predecessor, Rutherford 
Alcock, had authorized the bombardment of Shimonoseki in 1864 without 
official approval, he was transferred to China. Previously, in 1862, the 
British had publicly shown their official diplomatic attitude when Layard 
sent an official statement to the Admiralty regarding Russell’s opinion. It 
concerned Russell’s approval to use the British naval force present in Edo 
Bay to protect the British Legation in Edo.654 This statement meant that 
since the conclusion of the treaties with the Tycoon, the British Government 
did not approve any use of military force except in an emergency. Thus, even 
when the Japanese moved towards civil war, the British did not change their 
diplomacy. Although it was true that Parkes and Satow met many Japanese 
feudal lords and samurais, that did not mean they interfered in Japanese 
domestic affairs. They were merely gathering or confirming information by 
which to analyse Japanese politics. As for Satow’s reported offer of support to 
Saigo, although since Tokutomi Soho many Japanese historians have 
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mentioned this episode, it should be regarded as simply a method of 
honouring Saigo and asserting the “patriotic” spirit of the Meiji Restoration.  
     Hattori was another who insisted that Satow was agitating to cause the 
civil war. He focused on Eikoku Sakuron. He highlighted the passage about 
the possibility of excluding the Tycoon, who had been illegally parading as 
Japan’s national sovereign, and concluded that Satow had justified the 
Restoration on the grounds of restoring ancient rule.655 Hattori claimed that 
Satow clearly interfered in Japanese domestic affairs by simply writing such 
a thing. Technically, perhaps, that was correct, although Satow was 
recognized as a British official who was an expert in Japanese language, 
culture and tradition. Hattori would be correct, perhaps, if Satow had clearly 
justified the Restoration. But did he? 
     Some Japanese have clearly misunderstood the content of Eikoku 
Sakuron. True, Satow did argue that removing the Tycoon from the position 
of national sovereign would be legal, but he never indicated a constitutional 
monarchy as the future Japanese regime. Furthermore, Satow did not insist 
on a Restoration which would recover imperial authority; he advised the 
Confederate Daimios under the Mikado, thereby indicating that feudal 
elements would remain appropriate for the future regime. Could this be 
defined as the essence of modernization? It could not be so, because Daimio 
symbolized the feudal structure. Thus, by advocating the Confederate 
Daimios, it could scarcely be said that the Japanese could move much 
towards modernization influenced by Satow’s essay. In that respect, Satow 
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could not be defined as infringing on Japanese affairs, and Hattori’s 
argument could be correct only if Satow had insisted either on a 
constitutional monarchy devoid of feudalistic elements or if he had argued 
for something which would have obstructed Japan’s effort to modernize.  
     When Satow wrote Eikoku Sakuron in 1866, however, the Japanese 
were not promoting modernization. Again, then, could nineteenth-century 
Japanese possibly have thought Satow to be interfering in Japanese 
domestic affairs? It is hard to believe. In fact, any Japanese influenced by 
Satow’s thinking would have envisaged Japan’s future as remaining 
essentially feudal rather than that which developed after the foundation of 
the Meiji Government. In fact, in his diary on 19 August 1867 Satow wrote 
that on another day a samurai from the Tycoon’s Government asked Satow 
to provide a counter argument to Eikoku Sakuron.656 However, Satow did 
not write about this topic in his diary anymore, so, it is hard to know 
whether they argued further or not. From this diary entry, though, it can be 
argued that Satow was antagonistic towards the Tycoon’s Government, and, 
as a result, Eikoku Sakuron could be defined as an anti-regime essay. Yet, it 
is hard to view Satow’s essay as being either revolutionary or as interfering 
in Japanese politics before the civil war. Indeed, after the civil war, the 
Japanese created a constitutional monarchy under the Emperor Meiji 
instead of the political structure which Satow had suggested. Hattori is 
therefore not correct to criticise Satow for involvement in Japan’s domestic 
affairs.  
                                                 




    Compared with the books written by Inoue, Shibahara and Hattori, 
those by Yuzo Akiyama in 2000 and Jiro Chaya in 2004 were academically 
light weight. However, they were effective from the view point of 
understanding how the Japanese generally analyse events and what they 
think about Satow and British diplomacy during the Meiji Restoration.  
Like Hattori, Akiyama took the position that Eikoku Sakuron was 
symbolic of British involvement in Japanese domestic affairs. Akiyama 
insisted that after Satow had completed writing Eikoku Sakuron, he 
requested the assistance of Awa samurai, Numata Torajiro, and already 
intended to enter into Japanese affairs.657 Akiyama concluded that if Satow 
did not intend to do so, he would have published his name.658 Officially, 
Satow never admitted writing Eikoku Sakuron, even in his memoirs, so it is 
hard to be certain of his motive. Thus, the analysis provided by Akiyama 
could be justified. However, Akiyama advances his argument often by 
guesswork, to the point where Eikoku Sakuron is assumed to be the 
consensus view within the British Legation. By using that method, he 
concluded that the British had become involved in Japanese internal affairs. 
As proof, he insisted that Satow had not been punished for writing Eikoku 
Sakuron.659 Can this analysis be recognized as fair? As Akiyama admitted, 
Satow wrote it in anonymity, so how could all the staff at the British 
Legation have known about it in so short a period? Modern Japanese who 
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research the Meiji Restoration accept that it was written by Satow, but 
Japanese in the nineteenth century could not recognize that so easily. Not 
surprisingly, Satow was not rebuked at the Legation.  
     Satow probably did not write the truth in his memoir, but Inoue wrote 
what he believed to be true in his 1936 book when he reflected on Satow’s 
memoir. According to Inoue, he had joined the team to translate Satow’s 
memoir into Japanese, which was completed successfully. It was printed, but 
when the schedule shifted to the bookbinding stage everything had to be 
stopped. The vice-president of the committee for the edition, Tsugihisa 
Kurosawa, ordered the elimination of all the passages which mentioned the 
Emperor, imperial family and the imperial system. As a result, the content of 
the book was significantly changed. Furthermore, it was planned to publish 
2000 copies. However, those were not allowed to be sold publicly and were 
delivered only to people associated with the book. The remainder was held in 
storage at the Ministry of Education, after which Inoue did not know what 
happened to them.660 Inoue’s experience was valuable to understand the 
Japanese attitude towards Satow’s memoir; only after 1945 was Satow’s 
memoir translated fully and published. Because Satow mentioned the 
Emperor and the imperial system in his memoir, the Japanese government 
feared that ordinary people might discover that the foreigners had already 
been discussing the role of the Emperor. That was what the government had 
been hiding for the purpose of protecting imperial authority. This episode 
proved one fact though: although several decades had passed, ordinary 
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Japanese people still could not read the complete version of Satow’s memoir 
before the Second World War.   
     Akiyama might counter-argue that at the time of the Meiji Restoration 
a translated version of Eikoku Sakuron had already been published so 
obviously some Japanese could read that. In fact, he stressed that.661 The 
translated version at the time of the Meiji Restoration was indeed preserved. 
That, however, does not mean that the majority of Japanese people had 
already read it. If Eikoku Sakuron was already widely known in Japan then 
why did so much debate arise about whether Eikoku Sakuron should be 
defined as a milestone in Japanese modernization? As already described, 
Satow urged the Confederate Daimios under imperial authority, yet the 
Meiji Government did not do what Satow had advised. Furthermore, Satow 
criticised the Tycoon for behaving as the national sovereign of Japan, but he 
did not agitate for the collapse of the Tycoon’s Government. Therefore, 
Japanese in the nineteenth century who had read the translated version of 
Eikoku Sakuron were more likely to believe that the Meiji Government did 
not follow Eikoku Sakuron and were unlikely to regard his essay as a 
milestone in modernization. In fact, although some Japanese undoubtedly 
read it, Eikoku Sakuron did not have the same psychological impact then as 
it has had since with modern Japanese readers. It might be not the 
nineteenth-century Japanese but more recent Japanese who have been 
influenced by Satow’s criticism of the Tycoon.  
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     Akiyama argues that the background to why Eikoku Sakuron was 
spread among the Japanese at the time was that the feudal lords and their 
retainers gained confidence that the British would encourage the collapse of 
the Tycoon’s Government.662 Akiyama also claimed that with the emergence 
of Eikoku Sakuron, the Japanese and British could agree a common interest 
because the Japanese expected British support while the British wished to 
have political influence in the new regime.663 However, these ideas would be 
hard to endorse because, first of all, the British had made their commercial 
treaty with the Tycoon’s Government and therefore had no reason to wish for 
the collapse of that Government. Furthermore, any new regime established if 
that Government collapsed would be of uncertain political ability. Britain’s 
main focus was on commercial activity in Japan, with no intention of 
involvement in Japanese affairs. The British would never choose an option 
which might create anarchy. Although the Tycoon’s Government was old 
fashioned, it still had administrative power in Japan and the British would 
likely always value it more that any regime which consisted merely of 
anti-Tycoon feudal lords. In short, the British needed the Tycoon’s 
Government to uphold the 1858 Treaty.  
     Jiro Chaya’s stance as a historian, in 2004, was to insist on British 
influence in the Meiji Restoration, but his method of argument was different 
from that of previous scholars. He claimed that Parkes knew that Satow had 
written Eikoku Sakuron664 although he did not indicate any proof for that 
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and his opinion appears to be based on pure hypothesis. Then, after insisting 
on the above, Chaya concluded that Parkes had excluded Satow from 
diplomatic work.665 The reason for this was because if the Japanese pursued 
modernization by following the plan of Eikoku Sakuron, the British would 
lose their influence with the new regime.666 According to that logic, Satow 
was side-lined by Parkes and Mitford. Consequently, Chaya concluded, the 
Japanese could not establish any idea of a democratic society. 667  Also, 
according to Chaya, Satow was considered to have made an effort to support 
the Mikado by the use of military power.668 Can this analysis reflect any 
truth? 
     The one link between Akiyama and Chaya was to identify Eikoku 
Sakuron as a milestone for Japanese modernization. However, as already 
discussed, could any new regime which maintained feudal elements ever be 
defined as modernized? Satow’s idea was never adopted because soon after 
the civil war all feudal status and lands were abolished, which would suggest 
that the Japanese were not greatly influenced by Satow’s essays. This is 
another indication that Eikoku Sakuron could not really have served as an 
important milestone for Japanese modernization. So why did Chaya point to 
Satow as above? Partly because there is a general tendency in modern Japan 
to single out Satow as a major contributor to the Meiji Restoration, and 
Chaya simply conforms to the idea that without Satow the Japanese could 
not have modernized. However, as a translator and junior official it is hard to 
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believe that Satow had any political influence or that his essays really had 
much impact on either the Japanese or the British. Honouring Satow’s role, 
based largely on second guessing, has been the work of modern Japanese 
writers. When, in April 1867 and January 1868, Tokugawa Yoshinobu met 
the British representative, Parkes spoke for British diplomacy, not Satow－a 
true reflection of Satow’s unimportant standing. Could the Japanese 
seriously have expected or entrusted a foreign diplomat so junior to help 
establish a modern regime? And could Satow have possibly made any offer or 
decision to support the Mikado by using the British military? 
     The evaluation of Satow by Akiyama and Chaya represents the 
common perception of Satow by present-day Japanese. However, this 
attitude must be considered to be a mistake. Not only nineteenth-century 
Japanese but also modern Japanese historiography assumed that Satow was 
given a significant political influence and also that his status placed him 
next to the British Minister in the Legation. But one thing must be made 
clear. In the 1860s, although Satow worked at the British Legation, his 
status was consular. That meant he was a staff member of the British 
consulate in Yokohama which was of lower status than the Legation.669 His 
diplomatic standing was thereby lower than that of Mitford. The latter 
worked at the British Legation in the diplomatic service.  
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     Why, then, did such a misunderstanding occur? Michael R. Auslin, the 
American historian and Japanologist, explained the background. It was that 
until 1867 there was no Japanese word which expressed “consul”.670 Thus 
the Japanese might understandably, but wrongly, have believed that 
because Satow had worked at the British Legation he was also a member of 
the diplomatic service. That misunderstanding affects even modern 
Japanese historiography. Akiyama and Chaya might not have appreciated 
that fact, but that was not entirely their fault. That misunderstanding had 
already begun in the 1860s.  
     Reviewing the above arguments, it seems clear that those historians 
who claimed that there was a crisis relating to foreign colonisation in the 
1860s do not support their conclusions with any worthwhile evidence. Their 
arguments are based either on bias or on an extremely narrow point of view. 
How, then, did Shigeki Tohyama, who in 1951 claimed that the crisis never 
existed for nineteenth-century Japan, promote his argument?  
     Tohyama did not analyse historical incidents in the same way, 
explaining instead the cultural background to why the existence of such a 
crisis had to be emphasised. As already discussed, Tohyama asserted that 
before the Second World War, nobody had been allowed to research and 
discuss either the Emperor or the imperial system. This, he insisted, had led 
to the common historical misunderstanding that there was a colonisation 
crisis in nineteenth-century Japan. Tohyama also claimed that pre-modern 
Japanese history, including that of the time of the Meiji Restoration, 
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remained an uncultivated area of scholarship in Japan, 671  which he 
characterized as follows: 
 
1. All the primary materials were not publicly available. 
2. Those few materials which were opened, were not academically analysed 
and properly discussed. 
3. Most were one-sided editions produced by the owners.  
4. Even when intentions to translate and make optional selections for an 
edition might exist, academic correction and argument to revise were not 
allowed.672 
 
Tohyama therefore concluded that because the Meiji Restoration was widely 
welcomed, as a result materials came to be used simply to justify political 
positions taken by the victorious side. Tohyama did not directly refute any 
crisis of colonisation, but he did conclude that, because of this background, a 
common version of historical events had simply emerged naturally. His idea 
made sense. Since the foundation of the Meiji Government, the Japanese had 
been making efforts to protect the Emperor and imperial system, because 
any collapse of the imperial system would mean a collapse of Japanese 
national identity. To avoid that possibility, the Government had to maintain 
the Emperor as sacred, and that divinity meant that ordinary people were 
not allowed to discuss imperial affairs. That did not mean the Government 
prohibited all knowledge. The Government did order an historical edition 
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about the Meiji Restoration and, as a result, Fukko-ki (The Record of the 
Recovery of Ancient rule) was published in 1889. Tohyama, however, defined 
this as a book which was extremely poor concerning historical accuracy.673 
For him, it was proof that the Japanese were only allowed to use limited 
materials, as edited by the victors of the Restoration.  
     After 1945, was that traditional attitude changed by the promotion of 
liberalism? In some respects, it was, but in most cases it was not. Although 
Japan’s political identity was changed, the historical interpretation of the 
Meiji Restoration did not alter. Tohyama claimed that the reason was that 
the same vested interest, as in the Meiji Government, still existed in post 
1945 Japan.674 As a result, historians still tended to analyse the Meiji 
Restoration without proofs and without an open mind. Tohyama advanced 
his argument without criticising his opponents. One major reinterpretation 
concerned the bombardment of Shimonoseki in 1864. He suggested that at 
that time, the British, French and Dutch had already drawn up a 
memorandum, the main points of which were a prohibition on demanding 
Japanese territory or specific concessions and also a prohibition on 
involvement in both national and local Japanese political affairs. 675 
Unfortunately, Tohyama did not discuss that memorandum in detail, so it 
could only be regarded as his point of view. Yet after the bombardment the 
Westerners did not demand any Japanese territory and they maintained 
that same diplomatic stance throughout the civil war. The existence of such a 
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memorandum was, therefore, plausible, because had there been no common 
agreement among the Westerners, the possibility might well have arisen of 
incidents which the Japanese would no doubt later have been able to claim 
as proof of colonisation ambitions. Tohyama’s argument was 
counter-argument by an indirect method. 
    When reviewing the history of the Restoration, the only incident in 
which the Westerners did use military demonstration was in 1865 when they 
requested imperial ratification for the 1858 Treaty and the opening of the 
port of Hyogo. True, the British, French and Dutch sent a fleet to the Sea of 
Hyogo, but they had no intention of firing on any Japanese cities. They 
showed their naval power to support diplomacy and to reinforce negotiation. 
That Parkes had no intention of opening fire was proved by official 
documents. Thus, although Japanese fears at the time are readily 
understandable, it is wrong for modern historians to define that incident as 
proof of a colonisation crisis. Still, some Japanese may counter-argue that 
although there was no battle or bombardment, the incident might confirm 
some conspiracy by the Westerners to make Japanese affairs more chaotic. 
Different Westerners were involved in different ways. Satow mentioned it in 
Eikoku Sakuron.  
     Tohyama played down the affair. He did not deny Western involvement 
but he focused on the background of how the Japanese handled that 
situation. He wrote that from the Tycoon’s Government side, rumours were 
spread whereby, with British support, Satsuma would challenge the 
Government by taking advantage of this crisis. In the meantime, Satsuma 
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spread the rumour that the Government had committed treason by making a 
secret alliance with the foreign Ministers, thereby causing this situation. 
Their purpose, in both cases, was to criticise and slander their opponents.676 
For Tohyama, western involvement in Japanese domestic affairs was cited 
by conflicting Japanese parties merely for the purpose of creating political 
advantage. By emphasizing the involvement of foreigners on the opposite 
side, both tried to create a psychological impact on Japanese citizens, and 
since ordinary Japanese had little access to accurate information, such 
simple rumours were likely to be effective. As Tohyama indicated, among 
nineteenth-century Japanese the most effective propaganda tool was 
invariably to stress the existence and fear of foreigners.677 There is no proof 
for any of the rumours; nonetheless, the modern insistence on the 
colonisation crisis must have emerged from them. The samurais of Satsuma, 
spreading those rumours before the civil war, and then again after the 
foundation of the Meiji Government, used them for the purpose of sanctifying 
the Emperor and also for justifying their own political position. Tohyama 
acknowledged pressure from the Western states, but this, he stated was not 
for colonisation but for commercial purposes. Foreign pressure was to 
expand the market for selling their products and to purchase other 
materials.678  
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     Indeed, the major purpose of the Western advance into East Asia was 
to promote commercial activities, and, since Perry, the Westerners had been 
requesting changes to the Japanese national administrative system which 
would allow greater international trade. But, they had never undertaken any 
invasion of Japanese land. In fact, Auslin, defined the attitude of the 
Western states as follows: 
 
        The treaty powers had not come to Japan to colonise, for  
         the country was part of that larger sphere of informal empire 
         tied to Western, mainly British, commercial interests.679 
 
There is thus one common point about the diplomacy of the Western states: 
the Westerners did not have any intention to colonise Japanese regions. 
More than that, Auslin concludes as follows: 
 
         Since Japan was not to be colonised, the Westerners treated  
         Japan from the beginning more “equally” than they did colonised  
         states, such as India, or semi-colonised nations, such as China.680 
 
His statement appears to prove one thing: the more the Japanese claimed 
the possibility of colonisation, the more can be shown the weakness of their 
analysis of the Meiji Restoration. Had it been otherwise, then Hokkaido 
might already have been colonised because, before the Meiji era, Hokkaido 
remained an untended region. Tellingly, the British and Americans 
constructed a port at the Ogasawara Islands (Bonin Islands in English. 
Bonin was derived from Mujin in Japanese, which means uninhabited). 
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However, once it was confirmed to be originally Japanese land, they 
withdrew from there, indicating no intention to colonise.  Although later 
Japanese adopted Eikoku Sakuron as justification for the collapse of the 
Tycoon’s Government, in reality, it was not. Satow certainly criticised the 
Government, but that was not for political but for commercial purposes; he 
considered that because of feudalism, neither Westerners nor Japanese could 
develop modern commercial activities. Furthermore, not only did Satow 
avoid involvement in Japanese domestic affairs, he also rejected any 
approaches from the Japanese side. For example, his conversation with Date 
Munenari in January 1867 in which Satow rejected any suggestion of British 
involvement in Japanese domestic affairs on the grounds that a solution to 
conflict would be even harder to find. Date had then said that he had been 
considering that Japan should be a confederate state with the Mikado at the 
head of it, but again Satow answered that whatever his intentions were, it 
would be none of Britain’s business.681  
     However, still there was one occasion on which Satow perhaps showed 
his vanity. In his diary on 6 January 1868 he wrote that what he had argued 
for in Eikoku Sakuron would be the main basis for the future of Japanese 
politics.682  However, this statement is not evidence of his involvement; 
merely an expression of his feelings, perhaps after he heard the news that 
Tokugawa Yoshinobu had returned his political authority. He might well 
have considered that the political situation would now be influenced by what 
he had argued in Eikoku Sakuron.  
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More than that, Satow wrote of his indignation on 8 January 1868 
when Koba Dennai, who was a samurai of Satsuma, visited him and asked if 
he knew whether the army of the ex-Tycoon’s Government would advance to 
Kyoto or not. Satow replied that he knew nothing.683 However, in his diary, 
he asked: what made them think that he would let them know such 
information?684 From this incident, though, it does seem clear that by the 
start of 1868 the Japanese had already come to believe that the British were 
on the side of Satsuma. The Westerners always focused on commercial 
activities, and although political pressure was sometimes applied, it cannot 
be concluded that it was evidence for colonialism. That was Tohyama’s point, 
in essence, and Ishii later supported it. Tohyama promoted his argument 
using indirect methods-the same by which other Japanese scholars have 
defined Western diplomacy as that of colonialism.  
 
     The major difference between the modern historians who claim the 
existence of the colonisation crisis and those who deny its existence is 
whether they used Western primary materials or not. The major materials of 
the former are either Japanese secondary material or, if they used primary 
materials, only those which were edited by the Meiji Government. On the 
contrary, the latter used Western primary materials, so their point of view 
and method of analysis are totally different. There is also a difference when 
developing historical argument. The former first determined the conclusion 
and then advanced argument to move towards that goal, which means that, 
                                                 




although they tried to promote historical analysis, they used only the limited 
materials which would be effective to reach their predetermined conclusion. 
By contrast, the latter analysed historical incidents and then reached a 
conclusion after the argument. Unfortunately, the latter remain minor in 
Japanese historiography because the threat from western colonialism is 
deeply ingrained in Japanese historical understanding. To escape that 
mindset, the use of Western primary materials and official documents will, 
at the very least, be necessary, hard as it is to access such materials while 
remaining in Japan.  
     Nevertheless, Japan’s major historians should not be seen simply as 
stubborn. Certainly their point of view has been narrow, but their efforts 
have been inspired by a perceived need to defend and justify the Emperor 
and the imperial system. For that purpose, a traditional interpretation of the 
Meiji Restoration has been essential. The Meiji Restoration was when 
Japan’s modern identity was established, and, since then, the Japanese have 
shared the same idea about the Emperor. If this idea collapsed, modern 
Japanese identity would be diminished. Therefore, historians must justify 
the Restoration-even if it is not by impartial analysis. Perhaps, therefore, 
their attitude should not be overly criticised. Their attitude reflects and 
reinforces how modern Japanese consider themselves, their society, and the 
cohesion provided by the Imperial system since the Restoration.  
     The reason why not only nineteenth-century Japanese but also 
present-day Japanese have consistently honoured the Meiji Government is 
because the new regime became the symbol of Japanese modernization. 
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Under the Meiji regime the Japanese could gain a truly national identity. 
Acknowledging benefit from the Meiji Government also reflected criticism of 
the Tokugawa Shogunate. Indeed, to appreciate the success of Japan’s 
modernization, it became obligatory to criticise the Tokugawa Shogunate 
severely, to the extent that constitutional monarchy came to be accepted as a 
form of social justice whereas feudalism was a universal vice. As Hellyer 
wrote: 
 
         In the new environment of the Meiji period, however, there  
         was no place for such positive interpretations of the fallen  
         Tokugawa regime.685 
 
Hellyer’s statement nevertheless is evidence that not all historians 
considered the Meiji regime to be better than the Tokugawa Shogunate. 
Hellyer did admit a contrast between the Tycoon’s Government and the 
attitude of Satsuma when the Westerners came to Japan in the nineteenth 
century. He claimed that although the former recognised the potential 
benefit of commercial activities, they could not develop them well. 686 
Satsuma, meanwhile, succeeded in developing “their own 
industrialization”.687 It was on the basis of Satsuma’s approach that a high 
evaluation of the Meiji Restoration as a whole spread widely among the 
Japanese.  
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     However, it was significant that although the Meiji Government had 
been founded, not everything was done smoothly. The main reason for that 
was the absence of any new leader who could direct this new society. Auslin 
has stated that although it was at the very end of the Tokugawa Shogunate, 
in fact Tokugawa Yoshinobu was the person most able to recognise the 
complexities of international diplomacy.688  Of course, once the Tycoon’s 
Government fell, he would inevitably lose his feudal status, but had the Meiji 
Government used him as a leading politician, what might the Meiji regime 
have become? Japanese modernization might have been promoted in a 
different way. That was, albeit unconsciously for many Japanese a question 
to be asked about the Meiji Restoration, and, of course, an issue which would 




Chapter XI: Conclusion 
 
     Historical understanding of Ernest Satow and of British diplomacy 
during the period of the Meiji Restoration has been changed by this research. 
Until now, their roles have been little questioned in Japan. However, 
traditional ideas among the Japanese have rested largely on their own sense 
of values rather than objective analysis derived from the use of Western 
official material and primary sources. Satow’s significance must therefore be 
reconsidered. It had been long believed that Eikoku Sakuron was a major 
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contribution to modernization, made possible because Satow had learned the 
language, and knew about Japanese cultures and customs. By focusing on 
this, the notion took hold that, without him, the Japanese could neither have 
recognised what was essential for modernization nor achieved it in such a 
short period. This notion is widespread within Japanese academic circles, 
regardless of whether Satow is honoured or criticised for interfering in 
Japanese domestic affairs. 
     This fresh evaluation of his importance stems firstly from detailed 
analysis of Eikoku Sakuron itself. Modern Japanese may well define Satow’s 
essays as a milestone for the country’s modernization because at that time 
the only political structure which the Japanese knew was feudalism, 
whereas the essays drew attention to the existence of the Mikado and 
concluded that there was a hierarchy which the Mikado headed. Of course, in 
the nineteenth century the Japanese already recognised the Mikado as their 
spiritual head, albeit not related to secular matters. It was because Satow 
insisted on the primacy of the Mikado that modern Japanese have judged his 
analysis to be perceptive. Yet during and after the civil war, when the 
Japanese themselves created a national monarchy under the Emperor Meiji, 
did they really require Satow to point out the potential significance of the 
Mikado?  
 
     While Satow rightly defined the Mikado as being head of a national 
hierarchy, the Japanese nevertheless recognised the Mikado differently from 
Satow. The latter, after all, urged the Confederate Daimios to serve under 
320 
 
the Mikado and said nothing about a constitutional monarchy. Not only that, 
when Saigo Takamori presented his idea for a future Japanese political 
structure essentially modelled on the British structure, Satow thought the 
idea unworkable－suggesting that Satow was pessimistic about rapid 
Japanese modernization. Had he considered the possibility of rapid change 
in Japan, he would surely not have suggested the Confederate Daimios since 
feudal elements were incompatible with a modern society. For Satow, 
Japanese politics could only advance step by step, and the Confederate 
Daimios was the next step for them.  
     Modern scholars in Japan are able to appreciate this, yet their stance 
regarding Satow’s importance has generally not changed. In fact, that 
attitude has not changed since the Meiji Restoration when the samurais of 
Satsuma and Choshu tried to justify their victory in the civil war and after 
the foundation of the Meiji Government by using Satow’s essays as material 
for their propaganda. Their argument was that because the British had 
offered a blueprint for modernizing in the essays, it could be achieved and 
that achieving it was proof that the Meiji regime was properly developed and 
fit to govern. There was no concern about the contents of Eikoku Sakuron in 
any detail; Satow had pointed out the existence of the Mikado and that was 
all that was needed as propaganda. Satow thus became a notable figure in 
the Meiji Restoration narrative. In the meantime, what Satow had truly 
tried to express was left behind.  
     There is another reason why Eikoku Sakuron has been a focus for the 
Japanese since the Meiji Restoration. It is that Satow had appeared 
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specifically to justify the end of the Tycoon’s Government in his essays. 
While some Japanese praise Satow because, without him, Japan could not 
move so quickly towards modernization, others criticise him and insist that 
he had agitated to cause the civil war in an attempt to establish a British 
puppet regime. Although the purpose of their argument is different, both 
camps share one idea: Satow had advocated the end of the Tokugawa regime.  
     However, after careful analysis of Eikoku Sakuron, a new 
understanding is required because Satow did not insist on any such thing. 
He defined the Tycoon as a feudal lord who governed his hereditary lands, 
but that did not mean he was the national representative. Considering this 
point in isolation, it could be surmised that Satow’s position was 
anti-Tycoon. He also concluded that supplanting the Tycoon would not 
constitute a revolution. Based on those remarks, the Japanese considered 
him to be a British official justifying the collapse of the Government on the 
grounds that the political position of the Tycoon’s Government was not 
internationally recognised.  
     However, it is hard to believe that Satow truly held such political ideas 
because one important statement which he made to Saigo can be historically 
confirmed. Satow insisted: the British did not care whether Japan was 
governed by the Mikado, by the Tycoon or by the Confederate Daimios, but 
Britain would like to know who the nation’s leader was. From that 
statement, it would be difficult to conclude that Satow agitated for the 
collapse of the Government. From an international perspective, the Japanese 
political structure was unclear because both the Mikado and the Tycoon 
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existed. Satow did not suggest the collapse of the Government: he simply 
expected the Tycoon to withdraw from the position of national 
representative. He did not mention whether the Tycoon should be included 
in the Confederate Daimios, but doubtless simply assumed that would be 
inevitable because, as he acknowledged, the Tycoon was the wealthiest 
feudal lord in Japan and so could not be ignored in any new regime. The 
Japanese have tried to define Satow as either agitator or as a man who could 
justify the Restoration but, in truth, it is hard to confirm either attitude as 
historically valid.  
     After the foundation of the Meiji regime, Japanese politicians 
constantly tried to emphasise their legitimacy and to justify their actions. 
Indeed, Ohkubo Toshiaki pointed out the fact that Japanese historiography 
was connected with governmental projects.689 Why did historical projects 
have to be promoted under government leadership? The main reason was the 
need to focus on and emphasise the restoration of Imperial rule, whereby the 
government would have to establish a historical perspective which would 
completely denigrate earlier feudalism. 690  For that reason, impartial 
analysis would not be demanded from subsequent Japanese historiography. 
For that purpose, Satow proved highly beneficial. Rapid modernization 
meant many forced changes in Japan which politicians recognised created 
many potential enemies. Those Japanese who had long possessed a 
traditional status or vested interests in feudal society were losing everything 
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in the name of modernization. That was why Meiji politicians cited Satow to 
insist that it was a neutral outsider who had identified what was necessary 
for Japan. Hence Eikoku Sakuron received excessive attention, and as time 
passed the more the truth about Satow and his essays became either 
distorted or forgotten.  
     In fact, Satow did not write anything about the constitution, the Diet, 
political parties, or the ministerial system. It was not until 1890 that the 
first imperial diet and the constitution were formed. This was almost 30 
years after the civil war. The Japanese thereby needed a long time to 
establish their modern political structure, which refuted the idea that they 
could achieve modernization influenced by Eikoku Sakuron in a short period. 
Furthermore, what the Japanese eventually achieved bore little relation to 
what Satow had advocated a quarter-century before.  
 
     A second factor indicating the need to re-evaluate Satow’s standing 
relates to the background to Eikoku Sakuron. When first considering how 
Satow could write such excellent essays, there seems always one obvious 
answer: because Satow was steeped in Japanese culture without which he 
could not have written Eikoku Sakuron, so clearly reflecting aspects of 
Japan’s national identity. However, when researching the era of the Meiji 
Restoration, without focusing on him, the following historical facts remain: 
 
1. Vice-admiral James Hope reported to the Admiralty as early as 1862 that 
a pamphlet which claimed that the Tycoon was not the national sovereign 
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of Japan was widely distributed in Yokohama.  
2. Although in March 1866 Satow’s first essay was printed in The Japan 
Times, Satsuma samurai Matsuki Kouan expressed almost same idea in 
London at the same time. 
3. Satow and Matsuki are considered to have both referred to the same 
material, which was the memorandum written by Rutherford Alcock in 
1864.  
4. The representative of the Swiss commission, Aime Humbert, who visited 
Japan for ten months in 1864, had already examined why the Tycoon 
could not be the national representative of Japan.  
5. The Prussian commission, which visited Japan for about half a year in 
1860-61, reported that the Tycoon could govern only his hereditary lands.  
 
By 1862, when Satow came to Japan, astute Westerners had therefore 
already recognised that the Tycoon was not the national sovereign. 
Demonstrably, Satow was not the first foreigner to notice that.  
     Both nineteenth-century and modern Japanese have therefore shared 
the same mistaken idea that Eikoku Sakuron was Satow’s original analysis. 
In 1866 Satow was only 23 years old, and although a university graduate 
and accomplished linguist, he was only a junior at the British Legation, 
working predominantly as a translator and not dealing with diplomatic 
matters. Reviewing the above historical facts, Satow clearly did not reach 
original conclusions. While Hope’s report and Alcock’s memorandum were 
not made public, the accounts by both Humbert and the Prussian staff were 
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published in 1864－two years before Eikoku Sakuron. And because he 
worked at the British Legation, there was every possibility that Satow had 
read Alcock’s 1864 memorandum too. Japanese scholars, however, do not 
focus on this. Only one historian, Takashi Ishii, who does not follow the 
Japanese orthodox idea about the Meiji Restoration, has pointed out the 
similarity between Satow and Matsuki’s idea, and suggested that they might 
both be influenced by Alcock’s memorandum.691 It is certain that Satow 
wrote Eikoku Sakuron, but in doing so he did not indicate the materials he 
used. Despite the historical evidence, nevertheless the Japanese have never 
wished to discuss the possibility that this British blueprint for Japanese 
modernization, and its apparent justification for the Meiji Restoration, was 
not all Satow’s original work.  
     There is no intention here to denigrate Satow; he did assist the 
Japanese in the nineteenth century to understand essential aspects of 
modernization. However, one thing must be remembered: since the Meiji 
Restoration the truth about Satow has not been discussed without 
difficulties. Modern Japanese have made little attempt to challenge or 
redefine his standing, following instead the guidelines which the Meiji 
Government set. Whatever their belief about Satow’s role, Japanese 
historians generally know little about his work and ideas in any detail.  
     Contributing to this background whereby the Japanese developed a 
restricted mind-set regarding Satow were the books written by Tokutomi 
Soho. As has already been argued, by praising the Meiji Restoration 
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Tokutomi tried to establish absolutism for the Emperor Meiji and Imperial 
family. He wrote that the Mikado was not only the national sovereign but 
also the symbol of Japanese identity and was at the core of Japanese 
society.692 In other words, for the purpose of reinforcing a sense of Japanese 
nationalism, this element was required to overcome the threat to Japan. In 
that situation, the role of the Mikado would be strengthened. Thus, although 
Tokutomi might have recognised the value of British civilization, he 
nevertheless took advantage of British diplomacy for the purpose of 
endorsing the Meiji Restoration. As a result, his analysis of Satow has led to 
misunderstanding and bias among the Japanese.  
     In 1945, however, when the Japanese surrendered, Tokutomi’s career 
and reputation as the leading Japanese historian ended. He had always 
believed that his major duty was to raise the fighting spirit, hence he had 
contributed support for the war without any hesitation.693 Thus, the defeat 
of the Japanese in World War II was also the defeat of Tokutomi in terms of 
raising the spirit of nationalism.694 In fact, since the 1890s and subsequent 
Russo-Japanese war, he had followed and written about Japanese 
imperialism, and, as a result, he had acquiesced in the censorship of various 
ideas.695 However, in his 1952 book, Shorisha no Hiai (The Tragedy of 
Victor), he returned to his original ideas about the foreign relationship with 
Japan during the Meiji Restoration.696 Now Tokutomi denied the possibility 
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of colonisation in the nineteenth century which he had previously suggested 
for the purpose of boosting Japanese nationalism. Yet although he changed 
his analysis regarding colonisation, concepts about Satow and British 
diplomacy, which had been mainly defined by him, did not change. Modern 
Japanese historians have still largely accepted Tokutomi’s analysis, despite 
the more liberal academic environment established after 1945.   
 
     From this research, the traditional Japanese notion of British 
diplomacy during the Meiji Restoration must also be changed. In the past, it 
has been based on Japanese assumptions and was not based on an impartial 
attitude. The Japanese have commonly believed that the British supported 
Satsuma-Choshu whereas the French supported the Tycoon. Britain’s 
intention was to establish a puppet regime under their political influence, 
and that if the civil war had continued Japan would have become colonised 
by them. This is orthodox Japanese historiography.  
     However, official British documents clearly show otherwise. The 
British Government ordered both Alcock and Parkes not to associate 
themselves with Japanese domestic affairs and also prohibited the use of 
military force except where British subjects were in danger. That was 
apparent after the bombardment of Shimonoseki in 1864 when Alcock was 
transferred because he had used naval power when British subjects were not 
in danger. Meanwhile, Parkes had kept to the other official guideline and 
confirmed that he had never interfered in any Japanese domestic matter. 
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The truth was that the British focused only on commercial activities in 
Japan; they did not care much about Japanese political affairs.  
     Yet though official documents appear to prove it, the Japanese do not 
admit that interpretation of British diplomacy and many remain convinced 
that Britain provoked civil war with a view to eventual colonisation. This 
notion of a British threat is again related to the justification required by the 
Meiji Government and for its abolition of feudalism. Defending the 
government in 1891 against criticism that it was dominated by 
Satsuma-Choshu, the Minister of War, Kabayama Sukenori, himself from 
Satsuma, lectured the imperial Diet on events a generation earlier. Who had 
provided then for the security of the state? It was the Daimios and samurais 
of Satsuma and Choshu who had created the new political order in Japan 
and thereby saved the nation not only from domestic chaos but also from 
international encroachment. 697  His speech was a good example of how 
statesmen of the Meiji era justified the regime. A foreign danger made the 
greatest impact, and the more the regime relied upon its impact, the more its 
existence became essential. As a result, to meet the new regime’s 
expectations, historians and scholars worked to establish a historiography 
which bolstered the drive for modernization. Related to this, Satow was also 
used by the Japanese in a one-sided manner. He was supposed to have told 
Saigo that the British could send troops to support Satsuma in a civil war. 
The Japanese regard this as true even though there is no evidence and 
no-one at the British Legation, in fact, could have committed the British 
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army in that way. Even Parkes had to report to London any use of military 
force, so how could Satow have taken such a decision? Yet Japanese 
scholarship still largely keeps to the traditional line; justification for the 
Restoration still overrides proper academic scrutiny.  
     More than that, because the Meiji Restoration of the late 1860s was 
more a change of political regime and was not a movement for the 
modernization of Japan in the strict sense of the word, Satow and British 
diplomacy were always analysed for the benefit of Japanese historiography. 
One good example of that is provided by the analysis of Austrian diplomat, 
Alexander von Huebner. He visited Japan in 1871 for the purpose of 
establishing diplomatic relations with the Meiji Government, and, with the 
guidance of Satow, Huebner met many leading Japanese figures. At the 
time, Huebner asked the question: “What could be the reason for the success 
of the Meiji Restoration?” Only Iwakura Tomomi, who was an ex-Court noble 
and who also became one of the major figures in the Meiji Restoration, gave 
him a clear answer. He answered: The Tycoon became loathed by Japanese 
citizens because the Japanese had always maintained an absolute loyalty 
and respect for the Mikado who alone was the legal national sovereign of 
Japan. 698  Iwakura’s answer represented not only the conviction of 
nineteenth-century Japanese but also the common position in Japanese 
historiography. In fact, in the present, the Emperor is defined in academic 
works as political victor who defeated the ancien regime and also as the 
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pinnacle of the Japanese race, history and religion, even with status as 
liberator.699 However, Iwakura’s assessment, although it was the basis for 
the interpretation of the Mikado in Japanese historiography, was rejected by 
Huebner at the time. The following were his reasons for doing so: 
 
1. If the Japanese had really possessed such a respectful view of the Mikado 
and in such a way, why were they subjected to usurpers for seven 
hundred years?  
2. Furthermore, during such a long period, there seemed to be no loyalty for 
the Mikado in public, so how did that attitude emerge so suddenly in such 
a short period? 700 
 
Using those two questions, Huebner refuted the definition of the Mikado 
provided by the Japanese in 1871. He claimed that the existence of the 
Mikado was just one element in Japanese national identity and that it was 
nothing but a necessary charm with which to control the people.701 As 
evidence for this idea, he indicated that in reality the Mikado did not possess 
political, financial or military powers.702 So, even in 1871, Huebner already 
recognized that the Meiji Restoration was not a modernization process but 
rather a political struggle. That was why he concluded that there was no 
specific definition for the Meiji Restoration and that the only thing which 
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had changed was the address of the Mikado.703 By analysing Huebner’s 
observations, it can be said that the Meiji Restoration itself was a deceit, and 
that is the background to why Satow and British diplomacy were invariably 
discussed unfairly, because nineteenth-century Japanese wished to conceal 
the truth. This is probably also why in Japanese historiography, all 
historians possess their own ideas when they argue about the relationship 
between the nature of the Meiji Restoration and the foundation of the 
modern Imperial system.704  They have never shared one common idea, 
largely because the truth about events surrounding the Meiji Restoration 
has never been disclosed in public.  
     Japanese historiography will also not admit the following assessment 
stemming from Michael Auslin: 
 
         Auslin effectively demonstrates that the leaders of the  
bakufu skilfully used negotiation to temper the diplomatic  
         demands of Western nations in the 1850s and 1860s.705 
 
This judgement suggests the idea that the Tycoon’s Government might be 
evaluated higher than the subsequent Meiji regime. Furthermore, according 
to Auslin, the reason for the collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate was not 
due to structural inability but because, by using their military and economic 
power, the Westerners forced the Tycoon’s Government to enter into 
international politics, thereby giving up national traditions. 706  By that 
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reasoning, the Meiji Restoration began simply because of events and 
circumstances at the time. In fact, the Swiss Rudolph Lindau (1830-1910), 
who was in Japan between 1859 and 1862, wrote much the same thing. He 
was convinced that whatever the situation, the Japanese could not ignore 
the foreign presence and would have to accept diplomatic relations with the 
Westerners.707 From this situation, though, a brilliant future for Japan 
might emerge.708 It seemed as if Lindau was already predicting the Meiji 
Restoration. From these ideas, it can be concluded that the Meiji Restoration 
began largely because of Japan joining the system of international trade.  
 
     This research has attempted to change ideas which hitherto have been 
considered as historical truths. In Japan, it is not easy to access foreign 
materials, and it has been within and by means of Japanese primary and 
secondary materials that the arguments and conclusions have been long 
defined. As a result, there has been little opportunity to challenge orthodoxy 
and to establish ideas based on new points of view. Furthermore not all 
Japanese primary materials were made public. All this meant that in terms 
of the Meiji Restoration, Japanese history would always be interpreted and 
studied under limited conditions. Even after modernization, officials have 
reserved matters judged unsuitable for closer analysis, of which the truth 
about Satow and British diplomacy in the 1860s is a prime example. For the 
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Japanese, the traditional stance in scholarship and public assumptions both 




















Three heroes of the Meiji Restoration 
 
     These samurais have been defined as heroes by Japanese 
historiography because they contributed to the Meiji Restoration not only by 
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weakening the Tycoon’s Government but also by later helping to establish 
the modern state. The three are Saigo Takamori (1828-77), Ohkubo 
Toshimichi (1830-78) of Satsuma, and Kido Takayoshi (1833-77) of Choshu. 
There were, of course, other samurais and Court nobles who contributed to 
the Meiji Restoration, but since the Meiji regime and until the present these 
three have been regarded as nationalist heroes. However, it is hard to 
conclude that only by the action of these three could the Meiji Restoration 
and the establishment of a modern regime be completed because from among 
all their political activities there cannot be found any certain vision for the 
future of Japan. For example, they did not even have the plan which Goto 
Shojiro had already considered.  
Furthermore, from their behaviour and attitudes, doubts emerge about 
why they might not be heroes. In the case of Saigo, he directed various 
terrorist attacks in Edo for the purpose of causing civil war at the end of 
1867. Also, Ohkubo fiercely rejected the plan whereby Tokugawa Yoshinobu 
would attend the new regime until after his hereditary regions and noble 
status were returned to the Imperial Court. At that time, except for them, all 
Japanese had hoped and made an effort to establish the new regime without 
any conflict, hence their intrigues to cause the civil war appear unworthy of 
‘hero’ status. At the time of the Meiji Restoration, Kido’s name was Katsura 
Kogoro, but in the 1860s he was called Kogoro the Runaway, because on any 
decisive occasion he had a tendency of not joining in. However, the reason 
why they were defined as heroes relates to the new regime. The core part of 
the Meiji regime was founded by the samurais of Satsuma and Choshu, so, 
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the three needed to be honoured politically to justify and explain the 
structure of the Meiji regime. Thus they were defined as heroes, although it 



























Four wise feudal lords in the late Tokugawa period 
 
     Since the arrival of Perry, Japanese political structures became 
increasingly fragile because of the weakness of the Tycoon’s Government. In 
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that situation, however, there were four feudal lords, who contributed 
support for the Tycoon, and Japanese historiography has generally honoured 
their efforts. These four were Shimazu Nariakira (1809-58) of Satsuma, 
Matsudaira Yoshinaga (1828-90) of Echizen, Date Munenari (1818-92) of 
Uwajima, and Yamauchi Toyoshige (1827-72) of Tosa. Shimazu Nariakira 
died before the Meiji Restoration, so, in detail, he was not considered to have 
contributed to Japan’s modernization, although in an earlier period he had 
promoted modernization in Satsuma because Western ships had started to 
show up around Ryukyu (modern Okinawa), which was his dominant region. 
He was the first, thereby, who recognised the necessity of modernization in 
Japan, so he became defined as a wise lord. Indeed, had he not promoted 
modernization in his own territory, Satsuma could not later have become the 
major influence in the Meiji Restoration.  
Matsudaira, Date and Yamauchi, by contrast, were forced into 
retirement by the Purge of Ansei in 1858-59, but after the death of Ii 
Naosuke (1815-60), who promoting that purge, they returned to national 
politics. They tried to establish a closer relationship between the Imperial 
Court and the Tycoon’s Government, which was generally recognised as 
Koubu-Gattai (The Unification of the Imperial Court and the Tycoon’s 
Government). By this political structure, Japanese domestic affairs became 
more stable for a short period. This situation could not last, however, 
because along side the Tycoon’s Government, political figures could not be 
united. Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu (1837-1913), who became the 15th Shogun, 
Tokugawa Yoshinobu, asserted that although Shinpan and Tozama would be 
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allowed to join national politics, the Tokugawa family should remain the 
major factor. By contrast, Satsuma recognised a confederation of the feudal 
lords and considered that the Tycoon should not possess dominant political 
and economic powers. In fact, the Tycoon and the major feudal lords held two 
conferences in 1863-64 and 1867, but each time they could not reach 
agreement; the gap between Tokugawa and Shimazu proved to be fatal. As a 
result, Satsuma started to distance itself from the Tycoon’s Government 
while Tokugawa strengthened his relationship with Aizu and Kuwana－a 
relationship that led to the battle of Toba-Fushimi. Thus, although those 
three feudal lords could briefly establish a new political structure reasonably 
successfully, they could definitely not promote long-term modernization. 
Furthermore, although they worked for the establishment of a new regime 
peacefully, they could not prevent the civil war. Thus, from the viewpoint of 
promoting Japan’s political modernization, they were not considered to be 







The Purge of Ansei (1858-59) 
 
     As described, this was a severe political oppression conducted by Ii 
Naosuke, Tairo of the Tycoon’s Government. The nominal reason was to 
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punish the people who opposed the Treaty of 1858 with Harris. Its origin was 
when Tokugawa Nariaki, feudal lord of Mito, and his son Yoshiatsu, and 
also, Tokugawa Yoshikatsu feudal lord of Owari, visited Edo castle to meet 
with Ii. However, it was not on the designated date. Matsudaira Yoshinaga 
of Echizen and Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu then criticised Ii for his arbitrary 
decision. As a result, all of them were forced to retired from politics by Ii, and 
this was the beginning of the oppression. However, this incident was merely 
the nominal reason. In reality, the main concern for Ii, and the group of 
anti-Ii, was who would succeed as 14th Shogun. They saw the political 
struggle in those terms and did not care so much about the 1858 Treaty 
without its imperial ratification. The anti-Ii people wanted a good reason for 
criticizing Ii, and the 1858 Treaty was one such reason. The two groups had 
different political ideas. Ii and Fudai recommended Tokugawa Yoshitomi 
(1846-66), who was a master of the Kii-Tokugawa family. (He became the 
14th Shogun, Tokugawa Iemochi). Meanwhile, the Shinpan and Tozama 
recommended Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu, who was a son of Tokugawa Nariaki. 
(He eventually became the 15th Shogun, Tokugawa Yoshinobu). Each of them 
had a different political vision. Ii intended to maintain the Tokugawa 
Shogunate, as established by Tokugawa Ieyasu, so, whatever the situation, 
he could not allow Yoshinobu to be the 14th Shogun, otherwise, Shinpan and 
Tozama would enter into national politics. Yet, since the arrival of Perry, it 
had become apparent that traditional feudalism could not be maintained, 
hence, Shinpan and Tozama had requested a place in national politics and to 
recommend Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu to be the 14th Shogun was their first 
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step. Thus, although both groups argued about the 1858 Treaty that was not 
their main concern and Ii could not compromise at all. As a result, Ii 
punished all the Japanese who opposed his politics; people who were 
considered to have planned to import Western values and ideas were 
punished too since Ii considered that such importation would be the reason 
for the collapse of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Under his oppression, many 
Japanese were punished without mercy, and in Japanese history such a 
severe oppression had never happened before. Thus, it can certainly be said 
that after 1853 Japanese domestic affairs started to fragment. With Ii’s 
assassination in 1860 the Tycoon’s Government lost much of its political 
authority and as a result the Japanese political system was changed to 
Koubu-Gattai, and Shinpan and Tozama were allowed to participate in 
national politics. Furthermore, at the request of the Emperor Komei 
(1831-67), all the ex-feudal lords (except Tokugawa Nariaki, who had died at 
the time of being restrained from making any public appearance) were 








The contribution of Shibusawa Eiichi 
 
     Shibusawa (1840-1931), who was a former samurai of the Tycoon’s 
Government, helped to recover the honour of Tokugawa Yoshinobu by later 
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interviewing him and also writing books about his life. However, these 
projects were carried out after his retirement, and the overriding reason why 
he became famous in Japan was that he had contributed to the establishing 
of Japanese capitalism. After the foundation of the Meiji Government, he 
had initially decided to serve Tokugawa Yoshinobu, who had now, of course, 
retired from politics, but Yoshinobu recommended him to accept his new life, 
so, Shibusawa decided to contribute to Japanese economic modernization. He 
had ability and knowledge in finance, especially from his time in France 
where he had learned about the system of the joint-stock company. This 
experience became the major aspect of his contribution. In 1869 he attended 
the Ministry of Finance where he worked for the establishment of weights 
and measures and also for laws for the foundation of a national bank. In 
1873 he resigned because he disputed with the Ministry the terms of the 
budget. Then he became the CEO of the First National Bank, and directed 
the founding of local banks. In the meantime, he directed the founding of 
companies which dealt with gas, insurance, paper-manufacture, railways, 
cement, hotels, a stock-exchange, spinning and beer. It is said that the 
number of companies which he created in this way was about five hundred. 
At the same time, after the foundation of the Meiji regime, various 
conglomerates (Zaibatsu in Japanese) were founded, but he did not found his 
own because his priority was to promote public, not private benefit. In fact, 
from his private properties he founded many hospitals and universities for 
the purpose of supporting socially disadvantaged people and also to educate 
the young generation for the future good of Japan. By these actions, he was 
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considered to have contributed significantly to Japanese modernization from 
an economic point of view, and this is the reason why he came to be honoured 



























Battle at the imperial gate of Hamaguri (20 August 1864)  
 
     This is the battle caused by the samurais of Choshu. Before this battle, 
not only they but also the Court nobles of Sonno-Jyoi were exiled from Kyoto, 
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so, for the purpose of recovering their position, the Choshu army marched to 
Kyoto and the Imperial Court in 1864. Satsuma and Aizu, however, did not 
want their recovery, so, they defended the vicinity of the Imperial Court. As 
a result, serious fighting developed, especially when the Choshu army tried 
to enter the Imperial Court from the imperial gate of Hamaguri (Clam in 
Japanese). The battle was named after that. The origin of this battle lay with 
an incident on 30 September 1863 when Satsuma and Aizu had exiled 
Choshu from Kyoto. Choshu had been the main force at the Imperial Court 
and their political discipline was Sonno-Jyoi. But Satsuma and Aizu were on 
the side of the Tycoon’s Government and their political ideal was 
Koubu-Gattai, so, for them, Choshu was nothing but trouble. Thus, with the 
support of the Emperor Komei, they exiled the Court nobles supporting 
Choshu from the Imperial Court and the Choshu army was ordered to leave 
the Court guard. This incident is called, the Coup d’état of 18 August 
(Japanese calendar) and as a result all the people from Choshu had to leave 
Kyoto. In the battle Choshu was defeated. After that, the Tycoon’s 
Government planned to crush Choshu completely, and it appeared to be good 
timing. There was the obvious justification that because the Choshu army 
had fired on the Imperial Court, they could be defined as the enemy of the 
state. The first move against Choshu progressed smoothly, but no battle 
occurred. Choshu surrendered to the Tycoon quickly, and Satsuma did not 
expect a recovery of the Tycoon’s political authority. Thus, because Satsuma 
had meditated between the Tycoon and Choshu, the planned expedition was 
not implemented. Nominally, the Tycoon had achieved a success but in the 
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meantime the Government had lost the opportunity to defeat Choshu 
completely. The time for victory passed when Satsuma could no longer work 
with the Tycoon’s Government, and started instead to approach Choshu, 
which also was now hostile to the Tycoon.  
The Tycoon’s Government formed a second expedition against Choshu, 
but this time it was disadvantageous for them, because there was no 
justification for it and also because Satsuma officially refused to join. Still, 
the Government forced a battle but were heavily defeated. Choshu had 
imported advanced weapons from the Western states via Satsuma while the 
weapons of the Tycoon’s forces were old-fashioned. As a result, the expedition 
was cancelled on the pretext of the death of Tokugawa Iemochi, but from its 
failure it became apparent that the Tycoon’s Government could not defeat 
even just one feudal lord. Thus the second expedition to Choshu symbolized 
the downfall of the political authority of the Tycoon. One year later 
Tokugawa Yoshinobu returned his political authority to the Imperial Court. 
Thus, from that perspective, the battle at the imperial gate of Hamaguri was 
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